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Introduction: the broad picture 
 
This paper is a background contribution to the 2006 Human Development Report on Water. It has 
been developed by a group of contributors, and builds on their practical and theoretical 
experience in different countries. 
 
The lead author acknowledges the limitations of this first draft, but is keenly awaiting feedback 
on which to towards a better second draft as soon as possible. 
Water, livelihoods and production—global-local challenges 
Global challenges of water and production are essentially solved locally. There is no global 
solution to problems of water availability for production. This report charts some of the local 
issues involved and makes the case for a local-level view of the global challenge.  
 
What is that challenge? Water is not an abundant resource.  Three-quarters of global freshwater is 
trapped in ice sheets and glaciers; less than 1% flows freely on the surface; and some 20% is 
stored underground. In most parts of the world, distribution of flows and available sub-surface 
water is highly uneven. With these figures come concerns about scarcity. The global community 
is fixated by per capita availability on which it determines simple figures for scarcity.  
 
Commonly, annual per capita availability of less than 1,600 m3 is used to indicate ‘water stress’; 
below 1,000 m3 water becomes ‘scarce’. However, embedded in these notions are complex 
assumptions. This amount includes domestic uses and water for food production, when in fact 
few countries in the world are actually food self-sufficient. Such figures produce broad-brush 
comparisons, but tell us little about the actual water-food relationship at a national level. They tell 
us even less about issues of water access. High per capita availability does not mean high per 
capita access, necessarily. The governance of the resource is therefore crucial: what systems 
prevent or provide for access? How are rights regimes significant? What role does power play? 
And how can equity be established in complex environments of entitlements?  
 
According to figures of the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), some 800 million 
people remain chronically malnourished worldwide and the gap between production and market 
demand for cereals is anticipated to increase to 27 million tonnes by 2020. A report produced for 
the Second World Water Forum in The Hague (March 2000) by the International Water 
Management Institute (IWMI) concluded that, by 2025, 33% of the world population, or two 
billion people (based on UN medium term population growth predictions), would be living in 
countries or regions with huge water deficits; all countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) by 2025 would be experiencing absolute water scarcity. The report stressed that regions 
and countries would need to supplement food requirements ‘from other sources’. IWMI views the 
problem in terms of future water needs and predicts that, by 2025, an additional 22% of primary 
water, mainly for irrigation, will be needed to meet global food requirements. The International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) is more pessimistic, foreseeing a doubling of food imports 
over the next 20 years in many countries.  
 
At a household level, per capita availability is relatively meaningless as a concept. The daily 
struggle to access water is a constant drain on resources and assets—including human, physical, 
social, financial and sometimes political capital.  Of the 1.2 billion people who lack access to 
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likely to be substantial. By a simple calculation, if improved access generated a net income gain 
per person, per year of $4 that would be generating nearly $5bn, or about half the UK’s annual 
overseas aid budget.  Clearly understanding how the household water economy works and the 
kinds of links to pro-poor growth strategies is crucial to understanding the water-food production 
links.  
 
One of the more persuasive arguments in recent years is the notion of ‘adaptive capacity’. This 
term, coined by Ohlsson (1999), is applied at a large-scale to states and regions that are water 
scarce (first order scarcity). If they lack ‘adaptive capacity’ they are said to be suffering from 
second order scarcity as well. The idea is that a particular set of social capacities will enable 
alternatives to be arrived at rather than relying on simple resource availability. Hence, the concept 
is tied to the broader debates on food production and trade and concepts such as ‘virtual water’ 
(see Allan, 1999). The idea of adaptability is not new, but it is useful to keep in mind when 
looking at issues of governance, poverty and equitable access to water. In many cases in the 
country studies below, it is precisely the lack of adaptive capacity that matters most when 
resources fail. 
A fugitive resource—temporal and spatial issues 
Increasingly the World Bank and others are ‘bringing the infrastructure’ back in. This means an 
increasing focus on supply capture and delivery. Justifications range from the need to avoid 
countries being ‘hostage to hydrology’ to the need to develop multipurpose projects that provide a 
suite of benefits to be shared across borders. The notion that water capture and delivery is critical 
to growth and economic success in many countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, is strong.   
 
The effect of spatial and temporal variability goes beyond simple changes to food production—
though these are considerable. Over the last three decades, meteorological droughts in Southern 
Africa have been of major significance, both economically and politically. In South Africa, the 
last major drought occurred just prior to the democratisation process and ‘policy space’ was 
opened up enabling radical rethinking of water management priorities, including the development 
of a strategic reserve (Turton, 1999).  In Zimbabwe, the drought experience revealed both the 
vulnerability of a national economy to rainfall variability, but also the importance of local action 
in mitigating impact.  
 
The 1992 drought affected 40% of Zimbabwe’s population and caused GNP to fall by some 12%. 
Sale of livestock led to the slaughter of 600,000 cattle, which provided last-resort cash income for 
households where crop production had ceased. Annual maize production dropped from an 
average of three tonnes in 1991 to less than half a tonne in 1992. Of particular significance were 
responses by individual households to ensuring water for domestic and productive uses. 
Individual water points—particularly upgraded family wells—continued to provide supplies right 
through the drought in many areas, with fewer than 10% of such wells failing, against a national 
failure rate of 40%.  In the Middle East too—already extremely arid—droughts can be 
‘emblematic events’ as well. Feitelson (1998) describes how the Israeli policy process, for 
example, was largely facilitated by the decreasing importance of agriculture to the economy. By 
1980, the sector contributed a mere 3% to GDP. Following the droughts of 1990/91, however, 
this reduced significance enabled the pricing of water to be used as a demand management 
instrument.  
 
Africa is a particular focus of climate change concern, because variability is already such a 
distinct feature. Though central, east and West Africa have some of the largest, most significant 
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regions suffer from acute water stress. A total of 14 out of 53 countries in Africa are defined as 
water scarce, and a further 11 will face water stress by 2025 (Shiklomanov and Rodda 2003). 
Even within a region such as southern Africa, water resources are highly unevenly distributed in 
both time and space. Rainfall patterns are dominated by the influence of the Indian Ocean, and 
most water is received during a five- to seven-month wet season.  
 
In a country such as South Africa there are particular regional extremes with a marked north-
south trend in annual rainfall combined with an easterly shift from the wet Indian Ocean coastline 
(where there is 800mm annual precipitation—some 80% falling between October and March) to 
almost nothing in the Namib Desert in the west (Calow, et al, 1996, 10). As a result the river 
systems of southern Africa are heavily seasonal in flow, affecting issues of abstraction, quality 
and management arrangement within river basin catchment. 
 
How do households respond to variability? At the local level, the provision of ‘small water’ to 
households from groundwater is estimated to provide some 60% of the rural and urban water 
supply for communities in southern Africa. In an arid country such as Botswana, 80% of animals 
and humans rely on this resource alone (Chenje, M. and Johnson, P. (eds) 1996; 41). 
Groundwater is frequently accessible from shallow, hand-dug wells and other small tube wells, 
which, in time of drought, can provide a ‘last resort’ supply—even if other natural assets have 
been reduced to a bare minimum in order to cope with drought shocks (for instance the sale of 
livestock). In southern Africa, as in South Asia and other regions of the world, the variability of 
this resource is being affected by significant over-pumping. Combined with the relative paucity of 
data on the resource itself this has major implications for long-term management and the capacity 
of users to guarantee supplies to meet present and future production needs.  
 
One of the chief problems of groundwater development is the uncontrolled abstraction from deep 
wells, caused mainly by the rapid development of irrigation from tubewells. Rapid aquifer 
drawdown reduces available shallow groundwater, particularly at a local level (Calow, et al, 
1996). At a time when there is extreme lack of availability access to the resource may fail. This, 
rather than depletion, may be a major cause of ‘groundwater droughts’. A report on the 1992 
drought experience in southern Africa states that, "the failure of wells and boreholes during 
drought is a function of both increased demand on low-yielding sources and reduced recharge to 
the aquifer”. The report suggests that “Identifying hydro-geological zones that have low 
permeability, wells and boreholes that are low-yielding and areas of high demand might therefore 
help to identify areas which are vulnerable to groundwater drought" (Calow, et al, 1996, 4).  
 
This argument is that even though there may be variability in rainfall and water availability (a 
‘meteorological drought’), the impact can be multiplied considerably by factors leading to a 
‘social drought’, including failures in management structures, the breakdown of systems of 
supply (including various forms of pumping technology) and the increasing competition and 
control over access by more powerful groups. Waterkeyn notes that the well-deepening initiative 
taken by families in Zimbabwe in 1992 as the water table sank, combined with careful rationing 
of water use (such as giving up vegetable plots), and was a key local reaction to variability. At the 
same time more than 75% of communal sources failed, and were only rehabilitated when 
assistance was made available by outside agencies (Waterkeyn, 1998).  
 
In many regions there is growing competition for groundwater by sectors and between 
individuals. In South Asia and parts of Africa (what might be termed ‘vertical competition’ for 
access) challenges local institutions of management, frequently established at the user level. 
Other forms of conflict concern ‘horizontal access’ (i.e. along water courses). Given this range of 
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investment, weak institutional environments and complex linkages between poverty and changing 
resource access, the challenges of overcoming intra-regional inequalities in use and withdrawals 
and the complexity of ‘social’ scarcity are immense. Ensuring that water is available for 
productive uses becomes a highly politicised process.  
HDR Final [3]:  Page   6 





Traditions to Reforms, Core issues in Transformation
a
 
Irrigation has formed the basis for human settlement and development in Sri Lanka for centuries. 
It is centred on the operation and maintenance of small (minor) tanks (reservoirs). Irrigation 
management provided for self sufficiency in rice production and the many small tanks (< 80ha) 
and fewer major tanks (> 80 ha) catered for irrigation needs without much competition from other 
water use sectors.  
 
Minor tanks supplemented highly variable monsoon rains and provided water for a more limited 
crop during dry period. These schemes represented a third (460,000acres) of the irrigated area and 
were constructed by the proprietors, managed by the community through a system of customary 
laws and practices. Major tanks on the other hand stored water from larger catchments and were 
adequate to cultivate two crops of paddy.   
 
The small tank system in Sri Lanka, approximately 15,000
b in number is distributed mainly in the 
dry zone. These tanks have provided adequate water security for the communities supplying 
enough irrigation water for a maha (wet season) paddy crop, as well as water for environment, 
cattle and domestic needs. Early rulers (kings and chieftains) recognized the benefit of these tanks 
and managed them through a system of Rajakariya  (ancient custom of compulsory labour). 
Adherence to these systems over many generations resulted in the birth of customs and traditions, 
some of which were at odds with colonial administration under the British. The compulsory 
personal labour obligation (rajakariya), for instance, whilst helping to guarantee the maintenance 
of small tanks over hundreds of years, was abolished by the British who claimed that is amounted 
to a form of slavery. Without any substitute for rajakariya, maintenance was no longer enforced 
and many minor tanks fell into disrepair. Further neglect by the post-Independence State, 
continued to deny the rights of communities’ access to water for livelihoods and for cattle at a 
time when communities were not empowered to demand their rights.  Although in the 19th 
centaury, some British renovation works of major tanks had taken place, these were essentially to 
improve  rice production  in order to offset heavy expenditure on food imports.  
 
After independence, issue of food self sufficiency became a central concern. The initial strategy 
for increase food production came through new land with irrigation facilities and development of 
the Mahaweli scheme became a national example
c. Though operation and maintenance of minor 
irrigation remained satisfactory, productivity of these schemes was low. From an early stage, it 
                                                 
a Case study provided by Rajindra Ariyabandu. 
b Panabokke, C.R. Shakthivadivel R. and Weerasinghe A.D. (2002). Small tanks in Sri lanka: Evolution, 
Present status and issues 
c Mahaweli basin covers and area of over 10,325sq. km. Total extent of land developed for agriculture is 
around 326,000 ha of which 126.438 are irrigable land.  Total number of settler families are 130,000. 
Mahaweli is the first large scale multi purpose project which provided 35% -50% of the total annual energy 
demand of the country  during 1995 -2000.  
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subsistence and poverty would be inevitable. Increased productivity could only come from 
increased cropping intensity through better water management, timely input delivery and 
improved seed varieties.  
 
The Government made enacted legislation and issued ordinances to improve input delivery, but 
this was stymied by centralized input delivery control between a number of agencies that failed to 
achieve anything like the desired coordination. The implementation of special projects for input 
coordination and even the kanna meetings (seasonal cultivation meeting) failed to provide the 
necessary inputs on  time, which failed to provide the necessary production improvements. A 
particular problem in these initiatives was the inadequate farmer participation and 
institutionalization of efforts. 
    
By 1980, the irrigated area in the country had expanded to more than 500,000 ha, largely through 
new irrigation facilities provided through state investments. However, expansion failed to prompt 
the anticipated production and economic development of rural areas, especially in the dry zone 
settlements where the poor were mainly concentrated. Though rehabilitation was necessary for 
irrigation system improvement, sustainability of improvements was required to boost system 
performance.  This could only be achieved by improving the institutional development and 
increasing the participation of farmers in decision making. 
 
Initial institutional efforts were part of donor-supported irrigation projects. The Tank Irrigation 
Rehabilitation Project (TIMP) funded by the World Bank was the first such project attempting to 
increase productivity through irrigation rehabilitation and system improvement. However, efforts 
to involve farmers in committees for project planning and implementation were based on an 
inadequate understanding of farmer needs and constraints leading to unsatisfactory results. 
Subsequently, the World Bank-supported Village Irrigation Rehabilitation project (VIRP), which 
rehabilitated 1,200 minor schemes, adopted an institutional mechanism for farmer participation, 
creating an informal tank committee system consisting of farmer representatives and government 
officers who were expected to work with the Agricultural Planning Team (APT) to formulate and 
implement water management plans for rehabilitation projects. These committees were only a 
forum for farmer participation, however, and proved ineffective in improving productivity or the 
livelihoods of  farmers
d.    
 
These efforts indicated the significance in mainstreaming farmer participation within decision-
making processes; in effect mirroring the situation that had existed prior to British colonial 
control when minor tanks had been managed by the users with minimum support from the state. 
Two challenges faced the government: to improve productivity of the land and water based and to 
empower farmers to be equal partners in development, bringing the poor and marginalized 
farming communities into the process of development.  
 
Two models were followed: Firstly, implemented by the Agrarian Research and Training 
Institution (ARTI),  a semi-government body, the concept of an ‘outside catalyst’ in the form of 
trained Institutional Organizers (IOs) to organize farmers and promote participation; second a 
model introduced by a senior Irrigation officer introduce an NGO as catalyst. Both emphasized 
the importance of an institutional structure under which farmers were organized at different levels 
of the irrigation scheme and were able to voice concerns and exercise rights to water and other 
inputs to improve productivity and livelihoods. The IO model was later accepted as policy in 
participatory irrigation development and management and significantly changed the power 
                                                 
d Irrigation Management Policy Support Activity (IMPSA), Completion Report. 1992. 
HDR Final [3]:  Page   8relationships between the irrigation authority and farmers. The success of these experiences 
focused the government on policy initiatives that would change future management of major 
irrigation leading to improved O&M to ensure more reliable, adequate and equitable water 
distribution and delivery, better coordination of critical inputs to provide higher production in 




In 1983, the Ministry of Lands and Land Development (MLLD) instituted a programme for 
Integrated Management of Major Irrigation Schemes (INMAS), across 35 irrigation schemes over 
2,000 acres in size. This initiated the concept of introducing a Project Manager for each scheme 
for input coordination, improved water management and establishment of viable farmer 
organizations. INMAS was managed by the newly-established Irrigation Management Division 
(IMD) at MLLD, staffed by a multidisciplinary team. INMAS received policy guidance form a 
high level Central Coordination Committee established to oversee the implementation and was 
implemented through a series of committees, established to offer farmers a role in decision 
making. The project level committee which oversees activities consists of field staff of all 
agencies involved in agriculture production and farmer representatives from farmer organizations. 
This forum helped to determine the seasonal agricultural programme, distribution of irrigation 




These developments encouraged the formulation of the Participatory Irrigation Management 
Policy, though its exact nature was confused through being scattered between different pieces of 
legislation. In 1984, the government introduced collection of “irrigation service fees” to improve 
financing of operation and maintenance in order to promote system sustainability
g. Whilst 
collection of fees (Rs 100/acre) was successful at the beginning, it soon tailed off through lack of 
proper procedure, unfulfilled farmer requests and political unrest in the country
h. In 1998, the 
Government adopted a formal “Participatory Irrigation Management Policy” under which 
operation and maintenance of field and distributary canals in major irrigation became the 
responsibility of farmer organizations. In turn farmers were exempted from paying irrigation 
service fees and Government retained responsibility for operation and maintenance of head-works 
and the main system. This policy had attempted to achieve the dual goal of improved productivity 
through farmer management and less financial pressure on the government through increased cost 




Since the early 1990s farmer participation in irrigation management has become a key component 
in irrigation rehabilitation due both to the increased emphasis on participatory irrigation 
management  and an overall decline in irrigation investments. Farmer Organizations (FOs) were 
expected to enter into agreement to share operation and maintenance costs with state irrigation 
agencies. Investments in Irrigation peaked between the 1980s and 1990s particularly with the 
development of the Mahaweli multipurpose project in mid 1980s. Since then local and foreign 
                                                 
e Ibid (1992) 
f Meeting of proprietors and government agency staff dealing with agriculture and irrigation in the district. 
The meeting is chaired by the District Secretary. All decisions pertaining to agriculture production in a 
scheme is decided at this meeting prior to every season  
g IIMI/HARTI (1997). Monitoring and Evaluation of Participatory Irrigation System Management Policy 
h Ibid (1997) 
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i. One 
major reason for the decline in investments during the 1990s was the war in the north and east 
with the Government budget increasingly spent on the war conflict. For instant construction of 
Mahaweli ‘System A’ and the Madura Oya Right Bank project were discontinued due the war. 
The heavy decline in new irrigation investment was partially offset by a marginal increase in 
rehabilitation such that by the mid 1990s government investments in rehabilitation had increased 
to about 50% of public investment in irrigation.  With increases in public investment in 
rehabilitation and near constant investment in operation and maintenance, improvements in 
irrigation system performance and agriculture productivity depended heavily on effective 
participation of farmers in irrigation system management. 
 
The Participatory Irrigation Management Policy of 1998 clearly defined the responsibilities with 
respect to “joint management”
j and “irrigation management turn over”. Farmer organizations 
(FOs) in major irrigation systems were expected to take over operation and maintenance of field 
and distributary canals while in minor irrigation the total system was to be taken over by  farmer 
organizations after rehabilitation. The turnover of systems to FOs  had mixed results
k in major 
irrigation systems, it empowered FOs as local irrigation institutions. Enhanced through a series of 
committees, training and capacity building, legislative support improved the ‘social capital’ of 
farmers and FOs. An countrywide survey conducted by IWMI/HARTI  in 1997 revealed that 43% 
of FOs under the INMAS scheme had taken over irrigation systems for joint management while 
progress in minor schemes had not been as encouraging.   
 
Reaching the poor 
 
In spite of government efforts to maintain equity in water distribution in irrigation schemes, 
inequitable water distribution and input delivery were evident in many schemes. This was more 
prominent in minor irrigation schemes and in tail-end areas of the major irrigation schemes. 
Inequitable input delivery, particularly of water was due to structural inadequacies in the 
irrigation system, inadequate operation and maintenance, lack of investment and political 
interference. While major irrigation schemes are generally better managed by the Irrigation 
Department and its proprietors, minor irrigation, due to location and sheer number, are left to 
water users to manage with minimal support from the Department of Agrarian Services.  Minor 
tanks therefore, have been subject to faster deterioration and neglect.  
 
Coupled with increasing fragmentation of land due to land scarcity
l, this situation has decreased 
the average holding size  from 1.98 acres in 1982 to 1.16 acres by 2002
m. 50%-60% minor 
                                                 
i Kikuchi,M, Barker,R, Weligamage P, and Samad M. 2002, Irrigation sector in Sri Lanka, Recent 
Investment trends and the Development Path Ahead. Research Report #62, IWMI Colombo 
j Where major irrigation systems were managed jointly by the irrigation agency and FOs. However, both 
institutions have demarcated their own area of responsibility. Government continues to allocate O&M 
funds  on a pro rata basis to FOs but it is usually inadequate for complete operation and maintenance. 
Hence FOs are expected to actively contribute labour and cash.       
k Irrigation agency benefited interms of reduce cost for O&M, less demend on labour, improved 
administration due to fewer complaints. Farmers, had ownership of the canal system, better distribution of 
water and less head-tail water conflicts. However, investments for system improvement did not show a 
significant difference as there was no greater deterioration in non -turned over canals. Implying, turn over 
alone can’t prevent irrggation system deterioration.      
l At present per capita arable land is about 0.15 ha while in 1870, per capita arable land was 2.7ha. with a 
population of approximately 2.7 million. 
m Institute of Policy Studies, 2005. Sri Lanka, State of the Economy 2005 
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n located in the dry zone cultivates less than 15 acres of land.  A majority of 
small holders are located under minor
o irrigation and rain-fed cultivation areas, remotely located 
with minimal infrastructure facilities. Most land under minor irrigation cultivates only one wet 
season crop, with dry season cultivation not possible due to lack of water. Often the wet season 
paddy crop is damaged because of lack of water for the last two water rotations, thus availability 
of water even in the wet season  becomes a crucial factor under minor irrigation systems. These 
uncertainties cause income from agriculture under minor schemes to be limited to about 15% of 
the total household income
p. The major share of income comes from wages and salaries (40%), 
non agriculture income (16%) and other income sources (29%). 
State intervention in minor irrigation schemes are limited to maintainance carried out by 
Department of Agrarian Serveces. Due to  nature, size and high land fragmentation state has not 
given adequate priority to development of minor irrigation schemes as opposed to major 
irrigation. Investing in major irrigation has political advantages too. Being settlement schems 
with high state ownership of land, governments of the day has the freedom to allocate lands to 
people of their choice.. Reurns to investments too are high for major irrigation as opposed to 
minor irrigation. However, successive governments in Sri Lanka have supported poor in minor 
irrigation schems through welfare oriented programmes, low interest loans and subsidies     
 
In order to address this situation and improve farmer income, the Government introduced in 1986 
conjunctive use of water  through ‘open dug wells’, commonly known as the “Agro-Well 
programme”.Purpose of the agro well programme was to resolve the problem of water shortages 
during the ‘dry’ season and supplement irrigation during ‘wet season.
q Lack of irrigation resulted 
in low farmer income, under employment and discontentment among farmers. The programme 
offered a subsidy for the provision of agro-wells and was implemented by the Agricultural 
Development Authority (ADA) under the ministry of Agriculture. The Government subsidy was 
Rs,15,000
r (1990 prices), or approximately a third of the total cost of a standard agro well. 
Studies conducted in early 1990s indicated that farmer contributions to agro-well construction in 
cash, material and labour varied from 16-78%
s. High farmer contribution was attributed to 
staggered construction due to non availability of readily disposable cash and progressive 
deepening of wells depending on water demand for crops.
t   Most wells were constructed in 
minor tank command areas in order to capture seepage. These wells provided poor farmers in the 
dry zone, especially under minor tanks, an assured supply of water during the dry season, which 
allowed for increased cropping intensity and productivity. Some studies
u indicate that all 
beneficiaries of agro-wells cultivated dry season cash crops (including Chillies and Onions), 
when previously land had been left fallow. Those who had cultivated with Sesame and 
Blackgram prior to the programme diversified to chillies and onions with high returns to 
                                                 
n Country has approximately 15,000 minor tank with largest concentration in the dry zone.  Research 
suggests that of the total 15,000 minor tanks, approximately, 7,600 are operating and 7,700 are abandoned 
o Minor Irrigation cultivates less than 80 ha while major irrogation cultivate more than 80 ha.  
p Ibid, 2005 
q In Anuradhapura district alone ( largest concentration of agro wells) cultivable land extent under irrigation 
has declined by 43% during the period from 1978 -1988, decline under minor irrigation during the same 
priod is 47%. Main reason for  decline is attributed to lack of irrigation water 
r Considered to be 50% of the total cost, determined by ADA  on total grants available from  State. Later it 
was found that the subsidy was far below 50% of actual cost of costruction.This  followed the policy of the 
government in transferring ownership to farmers through beneficiary contributions.   
s Ariyabandu R. de S and Somaratne W.G. 1994. Impact assessment of the Anuradhapura Agro well 
programme, ARTI 
t In response to this situation  ADA recommended an increase in subsidy to cover 60%-65% of total  
Government  only increased the subsidy by Rs5000 in 1992  
u ibid 
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water supply through agro wells has increased labour output per farmers by almost 100% (family 
and hired labour). Hence, labour productivity has increased in teams of cash income and idle 
labour has decreased. The success of the agro-well programme is evident in its expansion. The 
programme started in 1986 with a target of 11,000 wells by 1995,  had grown to 25,000 wells by 
2000. Surveys conducted in year 2000 indicated that almost 50% of agro wells were privately  
owned, built without any subsidy either from State or other sources. This is an indication of 
success of the programme. Though farming with an agro well is limited to less than 1.5 acres 
during the dry season, returns to investments in high due to availability of water year round.     
Water Pump Rental markets 
 
Large scale diffusion of groundwater use for agriculture took place at the same time in other 
South Asian countries like India and Bangladesh. A feature of ground water diffusion in India and 
Bangladesh was the evolution of water markets, through which water was sold to farmers who did 
not own agro-wells and pumps. In Sri Lanka, in spite of the rapid growth in agro wells there was 
no evidence of developing water markets. This can be attributed to the low capacity of wells and 
pumps used in Sri Lanka, usually irrigating an area of just 0.2-0.8 ha of land in the dry season. 
Once a pumping cycle is over there is hardly any water left for sale. However, there is an   
established pump rental market in the  dry zone, given that some 30% of the agro-well farmers do 
not own water pumps
v. Rent of pumps can vary from Rs25-Rs85 an hour without fuel, depending 
on the level of demand
w.  
 
Construction of some 30,000
x by 2000 (from an initial estimate of 11,000 by 1995), indicates the 
demand for groundwater use as supplementary irrigation for poor and marginal farmers in the dry 
zone. Surveys conducted during year 2000, indicated that as many as half of the wells were 
constructed without subsidies, reflecting the perceived benefits to farmers in terms of improved 
crop production and household income. However, access to government subsidies targeted at the 
poor were denied or made difficult in some cases and the transparency and inclusiveness in 
granting subsidies was challenged. Government attempted to address this situation, but with 
mixed results. At the same time as increasing production and income, the success of agro-wells 
has had environmental consequences. Some 10% of dry zone cascades have exceeded carrying 
capacity due to the indiscriminate sinking of agro wells
y, creating severe draw-down of water in 
domestic wells in a number of  cascades in the dry zone.  
 
New water governance 
 
The bulk (85%) of developed water resources in Sri Lanka are used for irrigated agriculture, 
which produces approximately 80% of the main staple, rice. However, other sectors with greater 
purchasing power are increasingly competing for their share of water resources. Annual 
precipitation is about 108,000 MCM of which  43,000 MCM is renewable. Out of the renewable 
                                                 
v Aheeyar, M.M.M. and R de S. Ariyabandu 2002. Socio-economic issues pertaining to agro well farming 
in Sri Lanka. Symposium proceedings. Use of Groundwater for Agricultue in Sri Lanka. 
w Kikuchi, M, R Weligamage, R. Barker, M.  Samad, H. Kono and H.M. Somaratne. 2003. Agro Well and 
Pump Diffusion in Sri Lanka, Past Trends, Present Status and Future Prospects.  
x Ibid 2003 
y Panabokke C.R. 2002. Nature of occurrence of the regolith aquifer in the hard rock region of North 
Central dry zone and its rational exploitation of agro well development. Symposium proceedings, Use of 
Groundwater for Agriculture in Sri Lanka.  
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z  can be developed for all water uses with most of the 
remainder disappearing as run off.  
 
With increased urbanization—from 21.5% in 2002 to 30% in 2025—and improved standards of 
living, demand for safe drinking water is expected to increase by 8%-10% per annum. Currently, 
few existing water supply systems which can cater for future demand for 24-hour water supplies. 
It is also important to note that most of the available water sources have been developed and used 
primarily for agriculture. Additional demand for safe water has to be met through water-sharing 
arrangements from already developed sources
aa.  While Sri Lanka can improve on its high (51%) 
rate of non-revenue-water
bb, this alone will not be sufficient to meet the future demand. 
 
At present 72% of the population has access to safe drinking water and includes 28% of the 
population with access to pipe borne water. However, it is expected that 100% of the urban 
population will have access to pipe borne water by 2010 and 100% of the total population will 
have access to  safe drinking water by 2025
cc. Though there is per-capita water availability of 
2,400 cubic meters, spatial and temporal variations in water availability create pressures on 
demand management given that further water resources development is limited due to 
environment and economic constraints. 
 
Recognizing the future challenge Sri Lanka has attempted to institutionalize Integrated Water 
Resources Management (IWRM) with river basins proposed as the unit of management. Wider 
stakeholder participation in river basin management would allow equitable water sharing among 
all sectors, including agriculture, domestic and industry. Stakeholder participation was considered 
vital as issues of water pollution, salt water intrusion and sand mining could be minimized 
through dialogue and consensus. In order to implement this management approach, a new policy 
regime was envisaged supported by the Asia Development Bank.   
 
Attempts to develop water policy and implement institutional reforms go back to 1950s and again 
during the 1980s. In the 1960s, a Water Resources Board was established to advise the minister 
on policy formulation, planning and coordination. During the 1980s, during the initial period of 
the open economy in Sri lanka, most of the currently contentious policy instruments, bulk water 
allocation, full cost recovery and institutional coordination arrangement were proposed, though 
not submitted to Parliament. 
 
In 1996, a fresh attempt was made to reintroduce policy and institutional reforms supported by a 
technical assistance programme of the Asian Development bank.  Moving from purely sub-sector 
issues of irrigation reform, this process looked at sector-wide coverage, including policy, 
legislation and institutional change. After an extensive consultation process, the “National Water 
Resources Policy and Institutional Arrangement” was approved by the cabinet. Following 
approval, however, key components of the policy were challenged by the public, media, NGOs 
and environmental groups including on issues of ‘ownership’, ‘entitlements’, ‘commodification’ , 
‘cost sharing’, ‘transferability’ and ‘new institutional arrangement’. 
 
                                                 
z Ministry of Irrigation and Water management, 2003. National Workshop on Water for Agriculture and 
Rural Development. 
aa Competing for irrigation and domestic water from the same reservoir, two cases, a) Kudapity Oya (river) 
in Pytallum district and b) Turuwila tank in Anuradhapura. 
bb Includes 35% unaccounted –for-water 
cc Wickamage, M. 2005. Water and Human Settlements. Preparatory workshop on Sri Lanka National 
development Report 
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development process which led to substituting some of the well-accepted concepts in the West 
into the local policy process. One of the key issues that was vehemently opposed was “water 
rights through  entitlements” to water users. This was a new concept to Sri Lankan water users
dd 
and policy makers and professionals were ill-prepared for its application. Granting entitlements to 
water users was construed as allowing water to become a marketable commodity for trade. This 
was reinforced by the addition of ‘transferable water rights’. As a nation Sri Lanka opposed 
“commodification of water”, and especially when it was water for irrigation.    
 
Key issues in the water entitlement debate were how to grant entitlements to a large number of 
small (less than 1ha) farmers, whether entitlements would be sold by the already poor farmers and  
exacerbate poverty, and whether the rich and powerful (read multinationals) would accumulate 
entitlements leading to further impoverishment of the poor? Proponents of water reforms could 
not address these concerns satisfactorily due to their own ignorance of the local context and 
uncertainty.   
 
The concept of water as a common good that cannot be ‘owned’ by any individual or group is 
stated in the “Roman -Dutch law”, which subsequently came to form part of common law
ee. The 
preposition that water belongs to the State was challenged as contrary to public ownership or 
public trusteeship as stated in the common law. Devoid of public ownership of water, the 
Government could allocate (transfer) water to anybody it chose. This was strongly opposed by 
civil society due to lack of trust between public and State. In public opinion in the absence of 
‘public ownership’ to water, governments could transfer water out of agriculture affecting food 
security and livelihoods in Sri Lanka.  
 
Reference in the draft policy to balancing consumptive use of water between irrigation, domestic 
and industrial sectors gave the impression that policy was designed to favour private sector 
economic growth as opposed to traditional livelihoods. The policy also mentioned that future 
water allocation would be based on “Demand Management” which advocated water moving from 
low productive agriculture (paddy cultivation) to high value non-paddy crops. Increasing the 
economic value of water by allowing it to move to crops with higher returns was again seen as 
neglecting the food security and livelihoods of the poor. As a welfare state, with a high 
percentage (60%) of rural poor, wilful diversion of water from food security purposes was 
publicly not acceptable. Critics pointed to a paradigm shift from traditional hydraulic civilization 
towards a more commercially-oriented culture of commodities. 
 
Sri Lankans do not associate as an input into agricultural water use to be treated as an economic 
good. The draft policy proposed a pricing system for irrigation, by which farmers would be 
expected to share water resources development and management costs. It was not clear whether 
this was for all farmers or only for those who used bulk
ff quantities. However, the policy 
reiterated that small farmers would be subsidized by the state to access water until they were able 
to contribute to cost sharing. This indicated that all farmers would be targeted to pay for water. In 
fact, ‘paying’ for irrigation water had been part of ancient irrigation practice. The Irrigation 
Ordinance (1968) mentions payment of irrigation rates with respect to land use in paddy 
cultivation. An amendment to the ordinance in 1994 vests powers with farmer organizations to 
                                                 
dd Samad, M. 2001. Establishing Water Rights: A potential instruments for efficiency gains in water 
resources allocation 
ee Rajapaksa, R. 2005, national Water Policy and Legal framework for Water management in Sri Lanka. 
ff Not defined clearly in the policy document. Draft water act gives a descriptive list of water users who 
could be considered as potential bulk water users. 
HDR Final [3]:  Page   14exempt collection of irrigation rates from those canals handed over to farmer organisations, but 
allows provisions to impose a levy for operation and maintenance with respect to land cultivated. 
Previously, rates had been paid in respect of area of land cultivated, distinguished from 
volumetric charges in the new policy. However, this demarcation was not too clear in the new 
policy. The new institutional arrangement proposed also ignored the importance of traditional 
irrigation agencies, previously leading subs-sector development. New reforms were perceived as 
a threat to their existence and authority, prompting their criticism of the reforms process. 
Traditional irrigation agencies wielded superior political patronage on government and this was 
cleverly articulated and used by some of these institutions. 
 
Policy to Practice 
 
In spite of many constraints to the institutionalization of water reforms, some key issues like bulk 
water allocation, cost sharing and demand management were experimented with through the 
policy initiative. Some of these were results of donor funded projects while others were initiatives 
of local policy makers. The following two case studies show how policy has been introduced in 
different systems to varying degree of success.   
 
Box: Turn over of Irrigation systems and Bulk Water Allocation (BWA) 
 
Despite a number of reforms in the irrigation sector, land and water productivity is still 
considered to be low. Efforts to improve water productivity have not been too encouraging. 
Participatory irrigation management was introduced in late 1980s but fell short of expectation.  It 
was realized that irrigation systems need to be handed over to farmer organizations for joint 
management.  Joint management was expected to improve system performance through increase 
farmer participation and decrease involvement of the state.  
 
In 1998 the World Bank emphasized the need to restructure irrigation system management 
through the Mahaweli Restructuring and Rehabilitation Project (MRRP). This project envisaged 
decentralization of management of the Mahaweli Authority, and a shift in role to facilitating 
farmer organizations in joint management
gg.  By 2003, 256 distributory canals had been 
transferred to Distributory Canal Farmer Organizations (DCFO)
hh. The two main objectives were 
improving water productivity and increasing cropping intensity.  
 
However, system rehabilitation prior to turnover is a precondition. Though system turnover
ii and 
bulk water allocation
jj (BWA) have been in operation since 2001, few studies conducted have 
assessed the impacts. BWA has improved cropping intensity from 1.5–1.8 with an average of 
1.62. This has been achieved through promoting low water consuming crops like Green Gram, 
Black Gram and Millet. With improved cropping intensity, water productivity has increased by 
about 35% by using less water on a larger land area during the dry season. Irrigation authorities 
                                                 
gg Mathmaluwe, S 2003. The Effect of Irrigation Management Transfer on Productivity of an Irrigation 
System. Study on Mahaweli System H, Sri Lanka. (unpublished MSc thesis report) 
hh Thiruchelvam, S 2004. Economic Effects of Irrigation Management Transfer in Mahaweli System H. 
Paper presented at the Water Professional day Symposium 2004  
ii A process where irrigation  system below the distributory canal is handed over to farmer organisaions 
(FOs) for operation and maintenanace. Turn over envisage empowering of FOs with necessary 
management and technical know how combined with an institutional arrangement which allows farmers to 
be equal partners in decisison making and management.   
jj Bulk water allocation defines a fixed quantity of water for a particular water use within a fixed time frame 
before start of  cultivation practices. BWA encourages water users and water providers  work on  collective 
decisions, opimize water use per unit of land  and improving overall water productivity. 
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kk and they are informed of the water 
quota entitled for their canal. This ensures a degree of “water rights”
ll to farmers.  
 
However, farmers have complained that although cropping intensity has increased their income 
from crop production has declined. Research suggests otherwise. A Gini coefficient of 0.33 has 
been reported from a few canals in Mahaweli ‘system H’, against the national Gini coefficient of 
about 0.43. Income inequality in some of the canals has not been apparent
mm. However economic 
inequality of settler farmes have been identified in many major irrigation schemes in Sri Lanka. 
Literature on irrigation management reveals impact of income inequality among users as a major 
factors affecting corporation among framers. Change observed in Mahaweli ‘system H’ is due to 
bulk water allocation issues introduced in 2001.    
  
The success of the BAW system for irrigation depends on management and communication 
between the irrigation agency and DCFO
nn. Farmers complain that in order to improve 
management, the irrigation agency advocates low water-consuming crops, which invariably have 
poor market value. Some farmers defied the irrigation agency and cultivated high value crops like 
chillies and onions, and suffered crop losses due to lack of water. Cultivating high value crops are 
a risk  unless supplementary irrigation can be provided by Agro Wells.  Therefore, DCFOs are 
faced with the challenge of sharing available water, deciding on the cropping pattern and linking 
with markets
oo.  It is now acknowledged that achieving optimum water productivity is not only a 
function of improved irrigation system management, but also a combination of agricultural 
knowledge, farmer behaviour, community demand, markets and communication.  
 
On going research
pp on BWA reinforces earlier findings. While cultivated extent has been 
increased in the dry season, farmers have not been able to cultivate crops of their choice resulting 
in poor income from production. There is general reluctance on the part of farmers to cultivate 
low water-consuming crops due to low individual income, lack of storage, marketing risks and 
susceptibility to pest attack, though there are collective gains through increased cropping 
intensity.  Thus, BWA has improved equity in water distribution, but deprived farmers in terms of 
a better income. More research is needed to ascertain the relationship between cropping intensity 
and farmer income vis-à-vis irrigation system management by irrigation authorities. Farmer 
communication too needs to be more proactive with responsive irrigation agencies in identifying 






                                                 
kk Improved inter agency communication channel now being adopted in Mahaweli System H   
ll Expected to be conferred by National Water Resources Act. However, the act did not get parliamentary 
approval thus making water rights only notional.   
mm Thiruchelvem, S 2004, Economic Effects of Irrigation Management Transfer in Mahaweli System H. 
Paper presented at the Water professionals Day symposium 2004 
nn Bulk water users are large individual (commercial) uers or group water users ( eg. DCFO) which may 
include abstraction of  surface water, groundwater or conjuctive use of water as prescribed by regulations. 
Small water users, access  water from bulk or group water users or independent  livelihood water users 
(draft National Water Resources Act, 2003) definitions in both catregories are  vague due to non approval 
on National Water Resources Act.. 
oo Guneratne, B. 2003. Bulk Water Allocation concepts for Improving Water Productivity. Paper presenated 
at the water professionals day 2003. 
pp HART, 2005. Assessment of Bulk Water Allocation in Mahaweli system H area. (on going research) 
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The turnover of irrigation systems to farmer organizations was to reduce operational cost to the 
State, improve operation and maintenance efficiency and agriculture productivity. Participatory 
Management of Irrigation systems was successful in achieving this goal. However, with 
limitations in land availability caused by fragmentation and scarcity of water, commercialization 
of small farm agriculture was to be considered as a policy option in the future. This blended well 
with the commercial orientation of the agriculture policy which prevailed in mid 1990’s. National 
Development Council (NDC), in 1995 recommended unification of farmers under farmer 
companies as a strategy to accelerate commercialisation process in non plantation agriculture in 
Sri lanka.
qq Farmer companies were expected to overcome major problems faced by farmers, 
such as water service delivery, procurement of inputs, access to technology, credit, extension and 
markets. The vision at the time was, farmers would be shareholders, decision makers and 
beneficiaries of the company
rr.  
 
Ridibendi Ela (RBE) Farmer Company is one of the more successful companies out of a total of 
59 companies in existence in 2003.
ss Some of the key consideration in selecting RBE irrigation 
schemes for company formation were maturity of the scheme, relatively large size and minimum 
reliance on other schemes (to minimize collateral damage in case of failure), and proximity from 
the centre for monitoring purposes. 
Combination of identified interest groups and viable business ventures were transformed  into 
farmer companies. Farmer companies are invester owned companies established under companies 
act as ‘peoples companies’.
tt Only farmers and other stakeholders involved in agribusiness, living 
within the particular geographical region can become shareholders. Share trading can take place 
among eligible memebership through  Director Board of the company.  At any give time, only 




The company has two main objectives: commercialization of agriculture and irrigation 
management. Commercialization of agriculture includes farmer participation in company 
activities, input and credit supply, value addition, market facilitation, extension and training and 
private sector participation. Irrigation management includes improvement in irrigation water use 
efficiency and maintenance of structures
uu.  A farmer group loan programme is the key activity of 
the company while poultry production, seed paddy and vegetable seed production and production 
of basmati rice, are some of the smaller-scale activities.  
 
The group loan scheme has proven favourable to farmers. Nearly 35% of farmers participate in 
the scheme. Between 1999 and 2004 the number of loan recipients increased form 549 to 1,035. 
                                                 
qq Esham, M. and S.A.P. samarasinghe 2005,Present Status and Issues of farmerCompanies in Sri Lanka. A 
case study of RideBendi Ela farmer Company 
rr Desalos, C. 2003. Water control and Sustainability of the Farmer Company in Ridi bendi Ela, Irrigation 
Scheme, Sri Lanka. MSc thesis, Irrigation and Water Engineering Group, Wageningen University 
ss Etablished in 1998, by the Irrigation Management Division of the then Ministry of Irrigation and Power. 
Start up capital and operation cost for the first three years of the company were borne by the government 
RBE farmer company was a pilot programme with an aim to commercialise agriculture and transfer 
operation and maintanence of irrigation system to users.   
tt Poples companies shall safe guard possible private ownership by imposing restriction on membership and 
share trading 
uu Esham, M and S.A.P. Samarasinghe 2005. Present Status and Issues of farmer Companies in Sri Lanka. 
A case study of Ridibendi Ella farmer Company. 
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vv.  An 83% 
recovery rate by 2003 indicates the success of the programme.  
 
Besides the loan scheme, farmers are satisfied with the extension services and input provision 
(fertilizer and seed paddy) functions of the company and mainly invest in the company to access 
service provision and not as an investment expecting returns. Some 65% of the shareholders in 
the company believe that farmer company is an extension of the farmer organizations, which 
indicates the welfare orientation of farmers as opposed to commercial farming. Initial successes 
observed in functioning of the farmer company began to fade away with macro policy changes 
and change in attitudes of the bureaucracy. Political interference in the selection of Board 
Directors and the recruiting of staff has contributed to poor performance and an overall decline in 
company performance. These changes have also contributed to maintaining the welfare 
orientation of the company. 
 
At the inception of the concept in Sri Lanka, it was envisaged that farmers would be given free 
title to their land and  water rights conferred on them. This was to be evolved through land grants 
and the National Water Resources Act, which was to have been operational by the end of 2001
ww.  
With the ownership of land
xx and water being with the State there were issues to do with rights to 
sharing water from the main reservoir. Concept of commercialisation of agriculture would not be 
realised without transfer of ownership to land and water to  users. This was to be followed by 
transfer of irrigation system assests
yy to farmer company for ownership and better management of 
water. While these are prerequisite for successful commercialisation of agriculture, non 
implementation of  transfer of ownership due to political reasons affected  functioning of farmer 
company to its full potential. However, use of water for cultivation by farmers have not been 
affected irrespective of their membership in farmer company. Rights to irrigation is through rights 
to land.
zz   At the inception of the scheme, the command area for cultivation was only 1,853 ha. 
This was increased to 2,063 ha during 1938-1943 by augmenting with water from the Deduru 
Oya (river) through a feeder canal 15km upstream. The current reservoir  command  is 2,400ha. 
At present, reservoir water is used to cultivate one wet season rice crop and field crops in the dry 
season, and a short third season (depending on the water availability) in between the two main 
seasons.  
 
The tank also has to meet the demand of drinking water for three cities (approximately 1,200 acre 
ft /year). Inflow to the tank is restricted due to very high density of small reservoirs in the area 
and large number of agro-wells. Traditional small tank systems claim prior rights to water for 
cultivation, and the  fishing community which depends on the tank for their livelihood also claim 
their rights. Hence, the issue of establishing rights was a pre-requisite anticipated at the beginning 
of the scheme.  
 
In the absence of a clear rights regime, the farmer company’s responsibility is limited to 
supporting farmers with agricultural inputs and agricultural loans. Establishing a pilot river basin 
                                                 
vv Obviously promoting paddy cultivation in the “granary” area  
ww Government of Sri Lanka agreed with ADB to finalize and approve the water resources policy and 
legislation by 2001. Subsequently the deadline was extended, currently the policy and the legislation is on 
the hold.  
xx 80% of the land is owned by the State.  
yy Discribed in the tripartite  agreement signed between the farmercompany Irrigation agency and System 
level farmer organisation 
zzAccording to customary law in Sri Lanka access to water for cultivation is gurenteed thorugh access to 
land. . 
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conflicts of interest over rights issues.  
 
Overall, the farmer company concept is a viable preposition in commercialization of agriculture 
provided it is given the flexibility to operate as a commercial venture. Farmer companies should 
be able to make their own decisions for the betterment of shareholders without unnecessary 
institutional barriers. Currently, though it functions as a company, a number of operational 
barriers limit efficiency
aaa. Besides, the macro policy environment too has not been favourable 
and consistent for the sustainability of farmer companies. Recent changes in political 
administration have viewed farmer companies as a means to deny the legitimate rights of farmers 
to paddy cultivation.  
 
Equity in the Periphery 
ater governance debates is how to achieve equity while maintaining 
fficiency in water management?  Being an ancient hydraulic civilization, was equity a concern at 
tral and 
outhern dry zone are a mechanism to transport water from one tank to the other through gravity.   
 bethma  was one of the most important mechanisms to maintain equity in water 
istribution  in Sri Lanka and continues as a practice. However, heterogeneity in settlements has  
 
                                                
 
The key issue in current w
e
any time in Sri Lanka?. It could be the ancient rulers realized the importance of equity and 
constructed a large number (more than 20,000) of small tanks and anicutsbbb widely distributed 
in the dry and wet zones, respectively. Some of the small tanks were built only for domestic use, 
for cattle and  for environmental purposes. In rural Sri Lanka domestic wells are a major source 
of drinking water. These are shallow wells recharged by surface water and precipitation. 
 
The ancient system of small tank cascades found mainly in the north-western, north-cen
s
These tank cascades supplied water for irrigation, environment, domestic use and animals over a 
large area. The Irrigation water distribution pattern always prioritized the first ownership to land 
when issuing water. Owners of Puranawel
ccc  always got first rights to water as opposed to 
akkarawel
ddd  land owners. This maintained  respect for traditional prior rights to land and water 






caused  problems in the working relationships under this system. Under bulk water allocation on 
the Mahaweli irrigation system, farmers appear to prefer cultivation of their own land with low 
water intensive crops than cultivating paddy on bethma. In the post-independence period, self 
sufficiency in rice was the main objective, overlooking equity and efficiency. During the 
subsequent era of irrigation rehabilitation concern was focused on system improvements and 
productivity increases.  
 
aaa If the company need to make changes to water allocation it has to obtain approval from the Project 
management Committee, convince the Irrigation agency, Irrigation management Division of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Irrigation, Mahaweli and Environment  , System Level Farmer Organization (SLFO), farmer 
organization leaders, and farmers 
bbb Run off the river type irrigation facilities (wiers) 
ccc Traditional land cultivated by propitiators  under small tanks 
ddd Land Development Ordinance (LDO) land allocated to settlers under major irrigation schems 
eeeTemporary  Shifting  of tail end farmers to head end areas of irrigation systems during dry season.  Under 
bethema cultivation all farmers irrespective of their land holding size cultivate equal portion of land 
depending on the availability of water.  
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responsible for maintaining some equity in distribution of inputs including water.  Equity was not 
e main focus of many irrigation interventions. As a result there was widespread marginalization 
 
ot coincided with equity objectives. Some of the major projects implemented in recent years had 
 Management (IWRM). The Draft National Water 
esources Policy, very boldly introduced the concept of river basin management (RBM), hitherto 
r users, it however failed to evolve a feasible mechanism to 
rotect the rights of small water users vis-à-vis bulk water users.  Bulk water user rights were 
provements in livelihoods, population increase, and industrialization are generating demand for 
ack of clear policy guidance and institutional arrangements has led to poor 
lanning and vision in the development of the water sector. This has forced ill-conceived projects 
                                                
th
of farmers mainly in tail-end areas of major irrigation systems. The agro-wells programme, which 
began in mid 1980s, was an attempt to provide irrigation facilities to tail end farmers thus 
improving equity with respect to improved water availability. However, a lack of an overall 
approach to water resources management and a preoccupation with sectoral management of 
water, coupled with achieving project objectives, has denied equity concerns in water allocation.  
 
Most of the key institutions dealing with the development of water resources have been 
functioning according to a project mentality with set objectives and goals. Often these goals have
n
targets to achieve in terms of number of families served, extent cultivated or systems turned over, 
but in most projects equity was not an issue. 
 
Water reforms process which began in mid 1990s attempted to address this issue through 
introduction of Integrated Water Resources
R
not practiced in Sri Lanka, which attempted to manage river water through a multi-stakeholder 
consultation process backed by an enabling legislation. While the intension appeared good, there 
were a number of problems in formalizing the policy. The overall policy objective mentions that “ 
National Water Resources Policy is to encourage Integrated water Resources Development and 
Management, to ensure the national water resources are conserved and efficiently managed and 
equitably allocated among all stakeholders to meet socio economic and environmental needs of 
the present and future generations.”    
 
In formalizing the policy there were many gaps. While the policy intended to maintain equity by 
recognizing water rights of small wate
p
protected through a system of ‘entitlements’ or ‘permits’. However, the same mechanism was not 
possible with small water users due to their large number.   The policy introduced the concept of 
river basin management and river basin organizations (RBO). While representation of 
stakeholders was a good concept for decision making, the power balance within RBOs could be 
to the disadvantage of the poor and marginalized who are naturally weak in making their voice 
heard. Therefore, equity could be challenged in favour of those who possess power and wealth. 
This was one of the key issues that challenged the validity of the draft policy with respect to 





access to water. A l
p
to emerge, while more deserving, nationally-important projects have been shelved
fff.  This can be 
largely attributed to institutional and sectoral biases and the lack of a holistic vision to 
conceptualize an integrated approach. The existence of a large number of institutions and 
ministries dealing with water resources development has compounded the problem yet in spite of 
 
fff Dharmasena, G.T. 2005, Holistic Approach, Water Resources Management, The Island paper December. 
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ggg. Specific challenges will 
be: 
 
-  Implementation of a national Policy for Water Resources Management and Development 
-   resolution.  
versee water resources management. 
e 
-  king in water resources development and management. 
hydrological boundaries. 
tank 
-   water resources development to meet the MDGs for safe and sanitation by 
 
                                                
supported by an enabling legislation 
Institutional coordination and conflict
-  Establishment of an overall coordination body to o
-  Political will and commitment to water sector reforms with a clear national perspectiv
and international collaboration 
Decentralization of decision ma
-  Releasing state control on water and land subject to regulations governing its use. 
-  Regulating ground water extraction and pollution control. 
-  Introducing IWRM in water resources management within 





ggg a) Inadequate drinking water to cities of Anuradhapura and Kandy despite surrounded by reservoirs, 
case of water allocation between irrigation and domestic water. b) Problems of water diversion from 
Polgolla diversion in the Mahaweli river when there are water shortages in  Anuradhpur and Polonnaruwa 
for irrigation. These two districts belongs to the rice bowl of the country where large number of major 
irrigation schems are fed by Mahaweli waters. Theoritically,decision to divert water for hydropower 
generation can deny water for agriculture However, this has not happed yet due to livelihood water 
demands are prioritised over power generation. .  Conflict of interest between water for irrigation and 
power. c) Pollution of river and streams due to industrial waste. Lack of policy on industrial sitting  on river 
banks. Common problem along many urban rivers. Though there are environment regulations on waste 
disposal, most industries  discharge waste to rivers and streams totally disregarding pollution of some of the 
major drinking water sources in the country. Lack of clear policy preventing such acts and stringent 
enforcement of regulations may prevent further deterioration of water sources.. (Dharmasena 2005)   
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India 
 
India is undergoing rapid socio-economic transformation
hhh. The economy is industrialising and 
major changes are taking place in rural areas as people move to the cities and shift in large 
numbers into wage-labour occupations. These transformations have been part of rapid change 
taking place in rural areas, including in the relationship between economic sectors and resources 
such as water.  
 
Governance in India is defined within a federal framework consisting of three tiers, Central 
Government, State governments and local governance bodies at the village (panchayats) and city 
(nagarpalikas) levels. Constitutionally, water is dealt with by all three tiers. However, 
constitutional rights and responsibilities related to water are rather blurred within the federal 
framework.  
 
It is often loosely claimed that, “water is a State subject and individual states are responsible for 
the provision of water” (Iyer, 2002). This is subject to Entry 17 of the State list – “Water, that is 
to say, water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, water storage and water 
power subject to the provisions of Entry 56 of List I”.  
 
This is, therefore, not an unqualified entry, but is subject to the provisions of Entry 56 in the 
Union List which reads – “Regulation and Development of inter-state rivers and river valleys to 
the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared 
by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest”.  
 
The link between the State and Union lists is further established by the provisions made in Entry 
20 in the Concurrent list pertaining to economic and social planning. According to this provision, 
major and medium irrigation, hydropower, flood control and multipurpose projects have been 
subjected to the requirement of Central clearance for inclusion in the National Plan. However, 
despite this intersection between the State and Union Lists, the subject of water does not, in itself, 
find any place on the Concurrent list (Iyer 2003:23).   
 
Thus, though not explicitly mentioned, water is as much a Central subject as a State subject, 
particularly as most of the country’s important rivers are inter-State. Additionally, the 73rd and 
74th Amendments to the Constitution specify that, ‘inter alia, drinking water, water management, 
watershed development and sanitation are subjects to be devolved to the local bodies of 
governance, i.e. village panchayats and city nagarpalikas’.  
 
Iyer (2002) identifies the following deficiencies in the Constitutional perspectives on water: 
 
-  sectorally fragmented, with an overt focus on irrigation  
-  engineering-dominated, showing little recognition of water as an ecological and thus a 
basic human and animal resource 
-  inter-State rivers bias, which ignores the ecological impacts of poor management and 
exploitation of intra-State rivers  
                                                 
hhh This section draws on the work undertaken by Dr Deepak Joshi under the SecureWater project. See 
www.securewater.org.uk.  
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bodies of governance, especially as the latter are still evolving as operational units of 
administration.  
 
Practically and administratively different aspects of water-use in India fall within the purview of 
several ministries, line departments and institutions at both central and state levels. These 
traditional distinctions do not adhere to the recent constitutional amendments on water. The water 
sector is fragmented into several sub-sectors ranging from water for agriculture (irrigation), water 
for industrial use, water for power generation and water for drinking and domestic purposes. 
These categories are in turn divided by sub-categories of surface water versus ground water, and 
large versus medium and small irrigation projects. In general coordination between various 
institutions within a water sector is minimal, and with other sectors it is non-existent. The lack of 
coordination visible at policy level is multiplied in the translation of policy to practice.   
 
The division between surface and ground water has important implications with regard to the 
issue of ownership of water. Surface water is constitutionally considered primarily as river 
waters. Here there is a riparian perspective to rights to water which is, “…essentially one of rights 
to the waters of a flowing river inhering in, or claimed by different users located alongside (or in 
the vicinity) of that river. This can arise at the level of households, farms, communities, villages 
or towns, but occurs in a more marked form at the level of political or administrative units within 
a country…” (Iyer 2003: 82).  
 
Thus, the law recognises only use rights and not ownership or proprietary rights over flowing 
water. Jurisdiction over disputes is vested in the government – explicitly, Central Government in 
relation to inter-State disputes and, implicitly, the State in case of intra-State rivers.  
 
In contrast, ownership of groundwater is linked to land ownership, which although subject to 
governmental control and regulation, is difficult legally to regulate, given obscure regulatory 
legislation and multiplicity of uses and responsible agencies. This leads to inequities of various 
kinds given that land ownership is skewed in most cases.  The linking of water and land rights has 
led to a situation of unmitigated tapping of groundwater by the richer sections of society with the 
purchasing power to invest in pumping technology. This has important repercussions on the 
availability of water for drinking and domestic purposes especially in rural areas. This situation is 
exacerbated given the fact that groundwater contributes to 50 per cent of irrigation for agriculture, 
85 per cent of rural drinking water and a further 5 per cent for industry (http://ddws.nic.in).  
 
Efforts by the State to control the over-exploitation of groundwater have largely focused 
on regulation, through the establishment of legal or administrative controls over its use. 
Efforts have been made to put in place legislation controlling groundwater extraction 
through the circulation of a draft Central Government bill to all states. However, in 
practice pressure exerted by powerful agriculture lobbies—that have both political clout 
and the money to invest in groundwater extraction technology—has prevented any 
effective legislation from being implemented.  Unregulated use of groundwater has been 
encouraged by highly subsidised irrigation electricity tariffs and there is tremendous 
political resistance to the removal of subsidies or power tariff reforms. At a more local 
level, there are cases of collective action to regulate the use of groundwater primarily by 
banning the cultivation of water intensive crops. For instance in Hiwri Bazaar in 
Ahemednagar district in Maharashtra, in a well- known example of the success of a 
community based watershed development programme, under the leadership of a 
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controlling over-exploitation of groundwater, through successful bans on growing water 
intensive crops like banana and sugarcane and the control on spacing out dug-wells used 
in irrigation. The lives of the small and marginal farmers in Hiwri Bazaar are reported to 
have radically transformed both economically and socially.   
 
However, collective action on the conservation of ground water has limited value as, firstly, it is 
rare and, secondly, it can place controls on use rather than on access to water. Effective controls 
require that ground water be treated as common property, within the constitution of a collective 
mass, irrespective of traditional user rights and practices  (Comman Draft Report: 2004). This 
requires a radical redefining of property rights whereby water rights are in effect de-linked from 
land rights. Separating land and water rights has been tried in a few isolated cases in India, but 
has been more of an exception than a rule. 
 
Sukhomajri: De-linking Land and Water Rights 
Located in the foothills of the Himalayas along the Shivalik range, Sukhomajri came into prominence in 
the 1970s when catchment protection work based on community participation was facilitated in the 
village by the Ford Foundation and the Central Soil and Water Conservation Research and Training 
Institute, Chandigarh. The primary motive behind this was to prevent the silting of Sukhna Lake in the 
downstream city of Chandigarh, which was directly linked to the degradation of the catchment area of 
Sukhomajri and surrounding villages. Villagers were encouraged to give up free grazing and tree biomass 
collection in the hills. To motivate them to do so, two earthen dams were constructed from which they 
were able to derive enormous benefits by drawing accumulated water for irrigation. Most noteworthy was 
the incentive provided to the landless and the predominantly grazier community in the village to 
participate in protecting the surrounding forest through the de-linking of land and water rights. All 
households in the village, irrespective of the size of landholding, were allotted an equal share of water 
collected in the dam. This allowed the landless and the land poor, in principle, to capitalize on their share 
of water by selling it to large landowners.  
 
Even in Sukhomajri, however, where there has been a de-linking of land and water rights, this has 
not included regulating access to groundwater. De-linking water from land in this case was 
perhaps facilitated by the fact that the water in the reservoir was viewed as common property.  
De-linking land and water rights will require extraordinary political will.  
 
This is complicated by the multiple institutional interests in the water sector, including the 
following three major institutions, and more than 10 other institutions:  
 
-  Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) – In charge of overall planning and 
coordination of water resources; however, in practice the focus is on river water 
irrigation. This ministry formulated the National Water Policies (1987 and 2002)  
-  Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) – Three departments come under this 
ministry.  
-  Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) - Also implements watershed 
development schemes such as the National Eco-Development Programmes and other 
afforestation programmes 
 
In irrigation management, there is a clear trend towards reducing the role of government in 
operation and maintenance, through the promotion of ‘Participatory Irrigation Management’ 
(PIM) (GoI, 1997). The MoWR since the Ninth Five Year Plan has incorporated PIM as an 
important component for which funds are made available under the centrally-sponsored scheme 
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(WUAs) amongst beneficiary farmers. The WUAs enter into a contractual relation with the State, 
whereby the State has to supply an appropriate quantity of water based on volumetric pricing and 
the WUAs are given the rights to distribute water to their members, to determine prices and to 
charge for the water supplied. Appropriate division of management responsibility between users 
and agency varies in different cases:  PIM is seen to be tested in mostly medium-sized and minor 
irrigation initiatives. Fewer initiatives are seen in the handing over (for operation and 
maintenance) of portions of major canal irrigation systems to farmers’ associations.  
 
On the whole most major water policies in India recognize that water as a social and an economic 
good and the importance of user contributions; the need for decentralization and community 
management; and the need for inclusion of historically marginalised sections of communities in 
water management initiatives. However, both conceptually and practically there is little clarity on 
how communities can be disaggregated in order to ensure that the marginalized are genuinely 
able to voice an opinion in decision making processes as well as securing access to water. This is 
especially evident as water rights continue to be linked to land rights and land ownership is not 
only skewed but is also gender biased, exhibiting a distinct pattern of male proprietorship. 
 
Until 1985 there existed only one water ministry, the Ministry of Irrigation and Power at the 
National Level, in charge of a separate Department of Irrigation. In late 1985, the Department of 
Irrigation was made a separate Ministry of Water Resources, and one of the first achievements of 
the MoWR was the formulation of India’s first National Water Policy in 1987. The need for a 
National Water Policy was underlined by the recognition that there was a need to move away 
from an excessive preoccupation with technocratic projects towards issues of resource 
management. The policy made explicit that the first priority should be for drinking-water. 
However, it has been argued in hindsight that,  “… this was no more than a pious declaration; 
and, despite the intention of shifting the focus from projects to resource policy issues, it still 
devoted what may now seem to be a disproportionate amount of space to large irrigation projects” 
(Iyer 2003: 56). 
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-  Water is a scarce and precious ‘national’ resource 
-  The basis of planning has to be a hydrological unit, such as a basin or sub-basin 
-  Project planning should be for multiple benefits, based on an integrated and 
multidisciplinary approach, with special regard to the human, environmental and ecological 
aspects 
-  Groundwater exploitation should be regulated with reference to recharge possibilities and 
considerations of social equity 
-  The conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater should be ensured 
-  In water allocation the first priority should be for drinking- water 
-  There should be close integration of water-use and land-use policies 
-  The distribution of water should be with due regard to equity and social justice 
-  Water rates should cover maintenance and operational charges and part of the fixed costs 
-  Farmers should be progressively involved in the management of irrigation systems and the 
assistance of voluntary agencies should be enlisted in this context 
(Iyer 2003) 
  
The National Water Policy 2002  
 
-  The new National Water Policy has largely been a revision of the 1987 policy with a few 
minor changes. These include: 
 
o  Promotion of watershed management through extensive soil conservation, 
catchment area treatment; preservation of forests and increasing forest cover and 
the construction of check dams 
o  Appropriate reorientation / reorganization of institutional structures and 
mechanisms 
o  Involvement and participation of beneficiaries and other stakeholders from the 
project planning stage itself 
o  Optimal productivity per unit of water 
o  A participatory approach to water resources management 
 
Whilst the new National Water Policy makes references to people’s participation and local water 
initiatives, there is no indication of how these can be put into practice. The Policy has come under 
criticism for its poor conceptualisation of community involvement and management (See Iyer 2003).    
 
The situation in Andra Pradesh 
 
Andhra Pradesh is generally known as a ‘river state’ but the last decade has been marked by 
recurring droughts and expanding demands on water. Given this pattern, it is predicted that, by 
2025, demands on AP’s water resources will have exceeded available supplies, calculated at 78 
bcm (AP Water Vision, 2003). This projection does not take into account the relative notions of 
water scarcity and stress and the fact that there are regional variations in water availability and in 
the recurrences of drought.   
 
Present and projected Water Requirements for various sectors in Andhra Pradesh: 
 
Description Present  Needed  by  2025 
 bcm  bcm 
Drinking-water 0.59  3.45 
Irrigation 64.21  107.98 
Industries 0.28  1.44 
Power Generation  0.03  0.06 
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Irrigation Department, 2001 (AP water web and AP Water Vision) 
 
Two southern districts in Telengana—Mahbubnagar and Nalgonda—are drought-prone. 
However, the common understanding is that much of Telangana remains neglected in terms of 
water development. The Telangana Development Forum, a people’s movement in favour of a 
separate Telangana State, perceives that successive state governments have neglected water 
development in Telangana.  
 
Of the three regions of the state, Telangana has the largest area, with 11,48,000 sq km, followed 
by Coastal Andhra with 9,28,000 sq km. 28.33 per cent of the cultivable land in the Coastal 
Andhra is irrigated under canal irrigation system, whereas only 4.17 percent of the cultivable land 
in Telangana receives canal water. By land mass and cultivable area statistics, Telangana is 
entitled to 975 tmc.ft of water from the inter-state rivers, Krishna and Godavari.  In 1974, 82 per 
cent of this water was allotted to AP by the Bachawat Award to Andhra Pradesh. A re-
distribution of Krishna waters in 1981 saw coastal Andhra getting about 47 per cent, Telengana 
33 per cent and Rayalaseema only 16 per cent. Telangana's share (by land mass) of Godavari 
waters is 47 per cent, however only 25 per cent is allotted.  The amount spent by the state in 
Telangana for irrigation is just 20 per cent of the total amount spent in Coastal Andhra. By the 
principle of expenditure proportionate to cultivable area, coastal Andhra gets more than twice its 
share of investments in irrigation.  
 
From 1956 to date, additional irrigation potential created in Telangana is only 5 per cent, since 
none of the planned irrigation projects have been completed although they were initiated some 
30-40 years ago. 12 projects sanctioned for Telangana have progressed at a snail's pace for 
decades. The Sriram Sagar Project (SRSP) was started 1n 1963 and the first phase of the project 
is yet to be completed. Experts and decision makers debate interminably as to whether to supply 
water through lift or tunnel in the Srisailam Left Bank Canal (which is to irrigate about 0.3 
million hectares in Telangana). In contrast, the Srisailam Right Bank Canal feeding the coastal 
districts progresses steadily. Rehabilitation of the people displaced under this project is still 
pending.  
 
The Bheema project, which is older than the State of Andhra Pradesh, has remained on paper. An 
initial budgetary allocation of Rs 9 million was made to this project in 1996-97, which was 
pruned to Rs1 million. To date, only 60%of the latter amount has been spent. Additionally, 33 
medium projects proposed in Telangana which could utilize 80 to 100 tmc.ft of water at a cost Rs 
500 million are pending. This delay is significant compared to the inter-State Telugu Ganga 
project, which got funds allocated consistently year after year and was completed within 12 years 
of its initiation and at a cost of Rs 1075 million.   
 
Inequity in canal irrigation has also been accompanied by a neglect of tank maintenance in 
Telangana, reducing (as a result) the cultivable area under tank irrigation. The area supported by 
tank irrigation has halved as compared to figures in 1956-57. This has pushed and encouraged 
Telangana farmers to exploit groundwater, which is serious in this semi-arid region. The 
dependence on electric pumps is not only hazardous to water conservation; power supply in 
Telengana, as in much of the State, is erratic and of low quality (low voltage). Farmers incur huge 
losses due to malfunctioning of motor pumps.  
 
Changing Crop Patterns, fuelled partly by water inequity and low returns, mean that farmers in 
Telangana with the resources to exploit ground water are seen to adopt cash crops over food 
crops. Staple cereals such as jawar, maize and bajra, which serve as local food and fodder, have 
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substantially. Groundnut, castor, sunflower, cotton, chillies and sugarcane have witnessed 
considerable growth in cropped area. While sunflower registered 500% growth, it is more than 
100% in the case of cotton. Except for castor and groundnut, all other crops have entered the 
region recently. It is reported that most of these farmers are migrants (since 1950s-60s) owning 
lands irrigated by Nagarjunasagar and Sriransagar canals. A development of this change has been 
the rise of a merchant class in towns dealing in these cash crops, again, the majority of whom are 
said to be immigrants from coastal area. (http://www.telangana.org/article1.asp) 
 
Corresponding to the GoI initiative in Participatory Irrigation Management, the AP Farmers’ 
Management of Irrigation Systems (APFMIS) Act, 1997, provides the basis for handover of 
irrigation schemes/systems with command areas above 40 hectares (divided into water user units) 
to Water Users (land-owning farmers) Associations (WUA). Each water-user area is divided into 
territories, for which directly elected members of the territorial constituencies form a 
Management Committee and oversee the functioning of the WUA. Presently some 10,300 WUAs 
exist in AP, covering 2 million hectares of irrigated land and representing 10 million farmers. 
Compared to official administration and management, under the WUAs there has reportedly been 
more timely and reliable water supply for irrigation, a 10% increase in crop yields and 20% 
reduction in maintenance costs (AP Water Vision, 2003). 
 
Net available ground water in the state is assessed at 30.24 bcm (State level Groundwater 
Estimation Committee, 2000) of which about 43% is currently used. The total area on which 
groundwater is withdrawn has increased by around 39% from 1975 to 2001. The increase varies 
regionally. It is reported that Rayalseema has 52 over-exploited water basins. Technological 
innovations supported by power subsidies and easy access to institutional finance are instrumental 
in excessive groundwater development. The agriculture sector consumes 36-40% of the power 
generated in the State, but contributes only 4-5% of the power revenue (AP Water Vision, 2003). 
Decreased quantity is not the only problem; saline water and fluoride and iron contamination are 
reported in different areas. Additionally, irrigation systems have resulted in 0.132 million 
hectares of waterlogged land (water table depths less than 2 m.).  
 
In recent years prolonged drought has prompted changes in approach to managing the State’s 
resources. Officially, it is declared that AP faces a water-stress situation. About 42 per cent of 
land is declared degraded and 548 Mandals as stressed, with groundwater levels lower than 10 m. 
A long spell of droughts was experienced throughout most of AP in the early 1990s. Water stress 
was reported across rural and urban areas, even in areas not formerly drought-prone. Out-
migration increased in most rural contexts and there was emergency delivery of water through 
water tanks in both rural and urban AP.   
 
Local-level control  
 
Chittoor District in has a population of 0.37 million with a density of 247 per square km. The 
District, in the Rayalseema region of AP, is divided into 66 revenue mandals. Of the total 
geographical area, 28.6% is cultivable. Wells and bore-wells (groundwater) provide for about 85 
per cent of the irrigation source; tanks 14.5 per cent; and medium irrigation canals built in the 
recent past on the tributaries of Swarnamukhi and Bahuda rivers contribute a low 0.13 per cent. 
The district receives an annual rainfall of 908mm compared to the highest state level of 1,159mm 
in Vizianagaram district (AP Water Vision, 2003).  
 
Nattiobannagaripalli and Tanda in Chittoor are two habitations located some ten kilometres away 
from the Mandal town, Peddamandyam. Together with five more habitations in the distant 
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Nattiobannagaripalli. Tanda has 64 households and Nattiobannagaripalli 67, making up an 
approximate population of 655.  
 
The socially dominant and resource-rich Reddys engaged the Sugali tribes, who were 
traditionally hunters and gatherers, as agricultural labourers. Scheduled Caste families from 
neighbouring villages were also employed as agricultural labourers and artisans. To supplement 
their livelihood needs, the tribal community reared animals and collected minor forest produce. In 
return for labour and goods, the tribal and Dalit families were given agricultural produce and, 
occasionally, clothes and food. Richer families amongst the Reddys have historically claimed 
ownership of both land and water resources in the village. The tribal and Dalit families lived in 
temporary dwellings and, as agricultural labourers, did not own land. Local social culture 
determined that these families were not allowed equal access to traditional sources of water (wells 
and tanks) and official sources
iii (handpumps and bore-wells built by the Rural Water Supply 
department and/or through Gram Panchayat funds).  
Land redistribution policies and legislation have resulted in the transfer of land to those tribals 
who worked on a share-cropping basis. However, this still leaves behind many amongst the 
tribals, and the Dalit family, who worked as artisans, landless.  
 
Irrigation schemes introduced in the village in the 1980s, together with access to electricity, 
brought about a dramatic shift in agricultural practise and people’s livelihoods. Those with access 
to natural and financial resources readily exchanged the earlier practises of rain-fed subsistence 
cropping for water-intensive rice cultivation: three croppings per year. The benefits of improved 
water delivery technology have not been accessible to the poor. To date the very poor, marginal 
farmers have little or no access to irrigation sources and continue to grow traditional rain-fed 
crops, with little market value and are rarely able to sustain family food needs. Assured economic 
returns from rice production dramatically increased the divide between landowners and landless 
agricultural labourers. This was accentuated because, while economic conditions have changed, 
there has been little improvement in daily wages of agricultural workers, especially women, 
which remain a pittance: Rs 20/day (1 US$= around 50 Rs), much lower than the officially (GoI) 
designated labour charges
jjj.   
 
Intensified agriculture has resulted in severe demands on available water and other natural 
resources.  The dense forest cover in the surrounding Edalugutta mountains, in which tribal 
families used to access minor forest produce for home-use and barter has decreased as a result of 
the unsustainable practise of felling trees for firewood and other exploitation of forest resources, 
and also because of increased cultivation in previously forested areas. This is thought to have 
contributed to more silting of traditional tanks, located in the mountain foothills, which were and 
remain the major water sources for rain-fed agriculture
kkk and livestock in the village.  
 
                                                 
iii The terms ‘traditional’ and/or ‘indigenous’ imply that the design, management and control of water 
delivery systems are established without any influence external to the local community (Agarwal and 
Narain, 1997). Systems of water delivery introduced through British colonialism, which also formed the 
seed of official water planning after Independence are referred to as official (Sengupta, 1985 and  Shiva, 
1989).  
 
jjj First fixed at Rs 35, revised to Rs 50 in 2002 and revised to Rs 66 in September 2003. The Hindu 
September 18, 2003. 
 
kkk Crops dependent on rainfall.   
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Mughal influence in AP’s history. The second-largest district, it has a population of 3.5 million, 
but a lower population density of 190 per sq km. Four major rivers flow through the area, 
including Krishna, AP’s largest river. However, of the 40 per cent cultivable area, only 8.4 per 
cent has canal irrigation and this is an obvious issue of discontent amongst Telengana residents. 
Scarce groundwater continues to provide the bulk of irrigation (52%). Low rainfall (754 mm), 
recurring drought conditions, and shallow soil levels contribute to increasing out-migration of 
Mahbubnagar inhabitants, who constitute the bulk of informal labour in neighbouring districts 
and states.   
 
Vemula, in contrast to Tanda and Nattiobannagaripalli, is a revenue village, situated 10 kms from 
the Addakal mandal of Mahbubnagar district. There are 837 households and a population of 
approximately 3,245. Agriculture is the mainstay of the village economy. Castor, pigeon pea, 
cotton, jowar, finger millet, maize are the major rain-fed crops, rice and groundnut the major 
irrigated crops. There are 210 marginal farmers, 218 small farmers and 88 large farmers, 
cultivating 353.96 hectares, 112.42 hectares and 524.08 hectares respectively. There are 25 
landless in the village.  
 
Distinctly characteristic of Vemula (and adjoining areas) is a visible intensity of water-stress 
related poverty; reports of contract (agricultural and construction) and child labour; and a high 
number of ‘poorest’ households
lll. Contract labour is common here. Terms and conditions for 
farm labour contracts are individually defined while construction labourers are paid about Rs 800 
a month and two meals per day. Farm-work requires labour every day of the contract period as 
and when demanded by the employer, while construction involves travel to adjoining districts and 
states, like Maharashtra, Orissa etc., working every day for around six months at a stretch. 
However, wages vary with physical capacities.  
 
“As construction labourers, the elderly like us are paid around 3,000 to 4,000 rupees for six months. If we 
are sick and cannot work, wages are deducted. If treatment is required, the costs are deducted from our 
wages and, if one of us dies, a message is sent back to the village for relations to come and collect the body. 
The food cooked collectively for all is generally unpalatable. Unless we carry mud on our heads, from 
morning to evening, we are not marked present,” says Harijan Pentaiah. Migration is a common 
phenomenon in Mahbubnagar. 65 year-old Harijan P. remarks that nearly 50% of the village population 
migrate from November/December to early June. “I migrated once for seven years and kept my wife in her 
father’s home, as I could not afford to keep her. I could barely manage to send money or earn enough to 
come home. When I returned, I was told my wife had been very sick and she had died. My son, 
Mannemkoda, now 20 years old, has done the same. I know he is in Hyderabad, but he has not come home 
or sent anything to me.” The migration of adults has serious consequences for children, many such children 
being unwanted guests at the homes of slightly better-off relatives. In some cases, “Couples with small 
children take a young girl from her relatives, to take care of the children and to come to the work site for 
breast feeding. Such girls are often paid small amounts of money – Rs 100 – 300 for the entire duration.” 
Ref 
 
The economies of the poorest households in all locations are precarious and unpredictable as they 
lack ownership of key livelihood assets, common in rural settings, i.e. land and livestock. Where 
there is ownership, there are neither the resources nor the implements required to convert physical 
assets into productive assets. The ability to survive hinges on the other two assets – human and 
social – which determine how families cope in different situations and conditions.  
 
                                                 
lll Note categorisation of households in Section 5.2 
HDR Final [3]:  Page   30For those who can work, the dominant livelihood strategy is manual wage labour. Agricultural 
labour is the key, failing which (in droughts, bad months), these households resort to non-farm 
labour (brick-making, earthworks and other construction), fuel-wood collection and, if all this 
fails, to seasonal migration, a common feature amongst this group. However, for a significant 
number of households, the only option for survival is social welfare.  
 
For the richer households, most are small farmers with three to five acres of land, of which half to 
two acres are irrigated by bore-wells shared within an extended family. There is assured kharif 
agricultural return from irrigated fields and they are able to risk cultivation in dry (rain-fed) lands 
except in peak drought situations. Many households practise leased farming: the terms and 
conditions–50% of the produce (or its approximate worth) to the landowner—with 
implementation and losses the leaseholder’s to bear. In a good year, we can get 10 bags of paddy, 
10 bags of groundnut and clear all our debts. Most have livestock including bullocks for 
ploughing (their own lands). These households put notable emphasis on education and 
diversifying their livelihoods. 
 
Many families reported that, as a result of drought-like conditions from 2000 onwards, they 
started working as farm and non-farm wage labourers and even migrated for wage labour—for 
the first time in their lives (in 2002). A few families have been migrants for a longer time. 
Experiences of migration varied from good to bad. Better-off households would not like to go 
again; whereas households closer to the poor felt migration was a better option than risky 
farming.  
 
For the richest in the community, access to water is assured, through privately owned bore-wells 
as well as preferential access to communal water sources, like tanks. Investment in bore-wells is 
not a huge problem. One farmer, Nagi Reddy, drilled 21 bores before he located water in two 
sites. He has no constraints on buying agricultural inputs including seed, fertilisers, pesticides, 
and has better access to markets through assured transport.   
 
At the top of the ladder, the richer Has are indeed resource-rich—from the comparative view 
point of the whole community. Those households who have diverse livelihoods (secure 
permanent employment, farming and/or as pastoralists) are the most secure. These are the money 
lenders, the leaders, decision-makers and, more importantly, livelihood opportunity providers, 
especially for the poorest and poor families in the village. For most of these households, water for 
productive use is an assured and secure asset. They are also rich from a human and social 
perspective. They consist usually of large, extended families with dependable networks both 
within and beyond the village.  
 
Krishna Reddy’s household, consisting of two sons, three daughters and his wife, are the richest 
family in their village. Two of the daughters have been married. He owns 20 acres of land, of which 
six are irrigated, through tank irrigation and two through personal bore-wells. The rest are scattered 
patches of rain-fed fields. He has two bullocks and 20 cows, which are kept for ploughing and, 
mainly, for manure. He owns 50 sheep, which he has loaned for shared-rearing to three families in 
Tanda. He has never had to buy rice and in a good year is able to sell up to 75 bags of rice, which 
fetches around Rs 75,000. He grows several other crops for both subsistence use and sale and his 
household income and expenses are varied. Krishna Reddy attends and settles village land disputes 
and commands obligation from many in both habitations.  
 
Nagi Reddy’s family is the richest in Vemula village. His 14-member household includes four adult 
sons, three of whom are in secure employment (army, police and government bus driver). All his sons 
and his one daughter are married and they have four grandchildren in the house, all of whom are 
studying. Nagi Reddy’s house is large and he spent more than Rs 200,000 on the construction. They 
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10 acres is grazing land, 18 acres dryland and the rest irrigated through the tank system and the bore-
well.  
 
He drilled 21 wells, spending 2.5 lakh, and has five functional bore-wells. Much of the crop is sold. 
The family have four bullocks, four buffaloes and eight cows. The milk is both sold and consumed. 
He also has a tractor, bought on a bank mortgage. Nagi Reddy is not politically active but, 
undoubtedly, little happens in Vemula without his approval.    ref 
 
Vemula presents a complex and conflicting water situation. There are many water initiatives and 
many water associations here, all of which have, however, been designed to cater to the needs of 
the better-off.  There are 13 water tanks in Vemula. The largest one, Pedda Cheruvu, irrigates 194 
acres of land, of which 60 per cent belongs to the Reddys, 35 per cent to other backward castes 
and five per cent to SC farmers. According to the 1997 GoAP Act, the management rights of such 
tanks have been handed over to a Water Users Association. This is made up of farmers who are 
landowners in the tank command area. The 194 acres irrigated by this tank is divided into 30 acre 
plots, to enable the election of a WUA member from each plot. Large farmers, who own 30 acres 
of land, are automatically elected members of the WUA, whilst, 15-20 smaller farmers elect one 
member. Neeti Theeruva Sangham (Water Users Association) members elect the president of the 
committee, whose tenure is for two years. Every three months the meeting of the main committee 
takes place.  
 
The WUA members argue that there is not adequate water for irrigation and that tank 
management initiatives are only partial solutions. “Here in Vemula, we are entirely dependent on 
rainfall, which has failed consecutively for several seasons now. The answer to our wellbeing is 
an irrigation channel. The Krishna river is just 40 kms away, water has been channelled from 
there to all mandals except Addakal. There are 64 mandals in Mahbubnagar district and obviously 
we are not a priority for the MLAs elected from the district. Behind our façade of well being, we 
are quite naked now. Huge loans have been taken to intensify irrigation, but the returns are 
minimal. A large number of us have started to sell our lands, but who (except the mad) will buy 
land in such conditions? Here amongst us are farmers ready to follow the example of the suicides 
(of cotton growing farmers) that were noted in Karnataka. We pay Rs 230 to 250 per month for a 
three-phase connection and the supply is less than five hours a day. At the most, we can only 
expect produce from one to two acres.” 
 
There is an inequity in distribution of irrigation waters between mandals, as there is across 
regions, and the reason for this is pointed out as political influence or lack of it. However, none of 
the rich farmers (and their HHs) have ever migrated or gone through distress-sale of livestock.  
Another issue of dissent is the conflict between water for irrigation and water for domestic use. 
“A couple of years ago, a geologist from the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation department 
identified an area below the Pedda Cheruvu tank as the site for putting a bore-well for drinking-
water. Since then the dilemma has been the competing uses of this water. We have lost our 
(irrigation) rights to this water,” say the WUA members, even though they use the same source 
for their drinking-water needs.  
 
Conflict between villagers and downstream (known as aayacut) farmers of village tank. 
 
In 2002, the domestic water situation in Vemula was the worst in a decade and villagers put up a 
collective fight to ensure that water in the tank was not depleted by irrigation use. Irrespective of caste, 
wealth, gender and political leanings, non-aayacut members of the village approached the village 
Sarpanch and asked him not to give permission for use of the tank water for irrigation. A village 
meeting was coordinated, resulting in a lot of conflict between the aayacut farmers and other villagers. 
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intervention. A decision was made by the MRO to allow the release of water in small quantities, four 
feet of water in two instalments of two feet each. The MRO assured the villagers that this use would not 
affect drinking-water needs. The release of water from the tank was strictly monitored by the villagers.  
  
 
Male farmers from rich HHs constitute the majority in the WUA and are, by connivance or luck, 
head-end farmers in most tank schemes and also the major consumers of these waters.  These 
farmers also have an informal but distinct control of water in other smaller tanks. Adoni Kunta is 
a tank lying just adjacent to the Dalit colony. This is on government-owned land, but the water is 
used mostly by Sudhakar Goud, one of the richer farmers, as his lands lie in the command area of 
the tank.  
 
Some Dalit farmers also have their lands here. Sudhakar has established a bore-well close to the 
tank and keeps that under lock and key. Although the Dalits readily access the tank for fetching 
water for domestic and livestock use, they have never dared to think of pumping this water for 
other uses. The reasons are more political than economic. The legislation is that groundwater 
rights are tied to land ownership. Landowners exercise a more subtle ownership and control of 
surface water located on private lands. Surface water on public lands is said to be communal, but 
is essentially linked to agricultural uses and practises established over a long period of time. Thus 
traditional users of such sources continue to exercise a dominant informal right over them.  Ref? 
Also add link to ComMan work? 
 
Bore-wells are the most common irrigating structures in Vemula. However, access to 
groundwater is dependent on ownership of land and the resources to invest in drilling bore-wells. 
This enables rich households unlimited access to available ground water and allows them 
continue production across the year. These facilities are denied to both the poorest and poor 
households.  A large number of medium-rich households in the village have invested in shared 
bore-wells. The costs for drilling a bore-well, buying the motor, buying other implements like 
pipes, switches etc, and getting a sanction for supply of the three-phase power amounts to Rupees 
40,000 to 60,000. The cost varies depending on the depth at which water is found and this is 
largely dependent on the absence or presence of competing bore-wells nearby. Some farmers 
have found good water supply at around 200 ft, while others have failed to source water even at 
350 ft.  
 
Water from shared boreholes is enough only for one annual cropping of paddy.  These households 
do not practise agriculture in the summer months. The cost of using the motors, the reduced 
availability of water, the dangers of motors being damaged: all these factors influence these 
decisions. Huge losses are incurred when water is not found and this pushes these families into 
debt. However, this is the difference between medium-rich and poor households. Poor households 
owning some land are not able to take these types of loans.  
 
As in Vemula, over the last decade there has been a marked increase in the number of bore-wells 
belonging mostly to richer HHs. Smaller, marginal farmers, primarily dependent on shallow open 
wells for irrigation, lost access to their irrigation water sources. Almost all the open wells of 
Tanda and Nattiobannagaripalli dug personally and/or through government subsidies dried up. 
For the first time in the last decade, farmers like these, and those who depended on rain-fed 
agriculture, laid fallow their lands. As in Vemula, securing ground water depends on two issues: 
firstly ownership of land, which is tied to water rights over ground water, and secondly, the 
ability to invest.  
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Zimbabwe 
 
The debate on water governance and poverty in Zimbabwe is deeply rooted in colonial history, 
the processes of land alienation and the emergence and development of white commercial 
agriculture
mmm. Processes of land alienation underlined patterns of productive use of water in 
agriculture on the one hand between Africans, located on small-scale farms and communal areas, 
and on the other Europeans, predominantly on large-scale commercial farms/estates. Land 
alienation was aimed at the expropriation of fertile land from Africans and their resettlement on 
poor and marginal soils, frequently in areas that lacked adequate water resources. 
 
The Land Apportionment Act of 1930, amended in 1940 and 1950, was a centrepiece of colonial 
legislation that facilitated the compulsory acquisition of good agricultural land and instituted the 
racial division into European and African areas. Invariably, European areas were located in areas 
of high rainfall with good water (re)sources, while African areas were arid and semi-arid areas, 
comprised of the Native Reserves, which later became Tribal Trust Lands and were renamed 
Communal Lands, in terms of the Communal Act of 1982, and the Native Purchase Areas which 
became Small Scale Commercial Farms after independence. African areas had poor soil fertility, 
experienced less rainfall and suffered frequent droughts. The water sources were also located 
further away from agricultural markets and transport routes. European areas, by contrast, were 
comprised of large-scale commercial Farms, located in high rainfall areas which were also well 
endowed with good soils and water resources, and were mainly found close to agricultural 
markets. 
 
The development of African agriculture was thwarted by the existence of a legal and 
administrative framework, which denied access to and use of water for productive purposes 
among Africans in communal and small scale farming areas. The Water Act of 1976 legally 
denied access to water for agriculture among Africans in communal areas on the basis that they 
did not have title deeds to the land; instead the Act gave right of ownership of surface water in 
perpetuity to land owners, who were predominantly European commercial farmers. 
 
The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 and amendments and the 1976 Water Act were the 
principal pieces of legislation governing use of water for agriculture between Africans and 
Europeans, as well as setting the parameters for agriculturally-based poverty reduction strategies 
in Zimbabwe. 
 
These historical facts helped establish the basis for a dual agricultural system in Zimbabwe and 
attendant patterns of productive use of water.  
 
Productive Uses of Water in Irrigation Schemes During the Colonial Period  
 
It is within the confines of land alienation and inequitable distribution of water as well as the need 
to reduce the impact of droughts in Native Reserves that Africans were allowed water use within 
irrigation schemes. The main reason that the colonial government promoted the productive use of 
water in communal areas of irrigation schemes was largely to enable the Native Reserves 
(hereafter referred to as Communal Areas) to carry a larger human and livestock population and 
                                                 
mmm Case study provided by Sobona Mtisi. 
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Bolding et al 2003:12 cp Weinrich 1974).  
 
However, later on the rationale for the establishment of irrigation schemes in communal areas 
shifted to provision of food security and improved livelihoods for Africans settled in these areas. 
In this vein Magadlela (2000) states that the main reason government promoted smallholder 
irrigation was a form of famine relief and food security. In addition, Rukuni and Makhado (1994) 
and Meinzen-Dick (1993:4) point out that small-scale irrigation schemes were regarded as a form 
of insurance against poor harvests and as cash generating ventures. This latter view dominates 
current thinking on productive uses in communal irrigation schemes and has shaped water 
governance and poverty alleviation strategies in this sector post 1980. 
 
Water Governance and Poverty Alleviation During the Post-Colonial Era 1980-2000  
 
Post-Independence Zimbabwe inherited a skewed distribution, access and control of land and 
water resources. To quantify the landholding situation at independence, it is noted ‘that about 
6,700 large-scale commercial farmers owned 15.5 million hectares or 47% of total farmland 
under freehold tenure, 8,000 small-scale  farmers owned or leased 1.4 million hectares or 4% of 
the total farm land, while 700,000 communal farmers occupied 16.4 million hectares or 49% of 
total farm land’ (Government of Zimbabwe, 1989; 2001; Tshuma 1997:30; UNDP 2002, Palmer 
1990).  
 
With specific reference to irrigable land it is noted that, of the total 119 038 hectares of land 
developed for irrigation in Zimbabwe, approximately 82% of this area is on large scale 
commercial farms and estates, and about 7% in communal areas and resettlement areas (Draft 
Policy 1994:2). In terms of actual figures, an estimated 8,461 hectares are currently irrigated by 
smallholders in communal and resettlement areas. This represents about 80 irrigation schemes on 
which farmers irrigate areas ranging from 0.1 hectare to about 1 hectare. Smallholder irrigation 
farmers cultivate only 2% of the national area under irrigation (ibid). 
 
Inequitable distribution of land and water and resulting water scarcity in communal and small-
scale farms is largely a result of the colonial legislation and administrative fiat that sought to 
undermine the productive uses of water in this agricultural sector by instituting a water 
governance framework that limited access to and use of water among communal and small-scale 
farmers.  
 
Access to water remains the single most important factor in agriculture, on which the 
Zimbabwean economy and the livelihoods of its rural people are largely dependent. Water plays a 
central role in agricultural production and economic performance as well as in enhancing food 
security.  Broadly speaking the macro-economy is related to the performance of the agricultural. 
In 1980, the commercial agriculture sector accounted for 75% of gross output, 95% of marketed 
surplus, nearly 100% of agricultural export earnings and 33% of the national formal wage 
employment (Mumbengegwi, 1986:210).  By 1988, agriculture contributed about 40% of the total 
export revenue and irrigated agriculture constituted nearly half the total value of exported crops. 
Fully irrigated crops like sugar and wheat are major foreign exchange earners. Tobacco and 
cotton, which are also irrigated (tobacco 26% and cotton 29%), accounted for 25% of the total 
value of exports. In short, between 1980 and 1999, there was significant contribution of 
agriculture, particularly irrigated agriculture, to the national economy. 
 
Added to this, is the contribution of agriculture to rural food security and livelihoods. Given the 
fact that more than 70% of the population in Zimbabwe reside in rural areas where agriculture is 
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labour markets. Given that some 80% of the rural population live in Natural Regions III, IV and 
V, where rainfall is erratic and unreliable, a significant proportion of the population rely on 
irrigation for crop production where cultivation is risky. Smallholder irrigators located in these 
regions grow a variety of food and cash crops including maize, cotton, wheat, beans, tomatoes 
and other vegetable crops. These farmers, although still poor, achieve incomes higher than their 
counterparts in dryland areas. In addition, there are small gardens that use either shallow 
underground water or borehole water which are central to household food security. 
 
It is within this context that government, the donor community and private sector have actively 
sought to improve to alleviate rural poverty through the development of smallholder irrigated 
agriculture, particularly given the drought-prone nature of communal areas, 75% of which lies in 
Natural Region IV and V where average rainfall is less than 600mm per annum. The impact of 
recent droughts in 1981/82, 1982/83, 1983/4, 1986/7, and 1991/92 was most devastating in 
communal areas where, inspite of high population densities, water and irrigation development are 
rudimentary. This is illustrated by the fact that communal area irrigation increased by only about 
4,000 hectares in a decade from 4,300 hectares in 1983 to 8,500 hectares in 1993 (Zimbabwe 
Irrigation Policy and Strategy). Currently, it is estimated that of the total 120,000 hectares under 
irrigation only 11% are on smallholder and outgrower schemes. The table below illustrates the 
status of irrigation development in Zimbabwe. 
 
Table 1: Current Status of Irrigation Development in Zimbabwe – Agritex estimates 1999 
Sector  Area  under  Irrigation  (ha)  Proportion of Total Area under 
irrigation (%) 
Large – scale   98 400  82 
State Farms  8 400  7 
Out-grower Schemes  2 200  2 
Smallholder 11  000  9 
Total 120  000  100 
(Source: FAO 2000:4) 
 
Limited development of small-holder irrigation in Zimbabwe has been attributed to the relatively 
low investment in communal area irrigation development by government (Rukuni, 1990). In 
addition,  the government gave priority to the rehabilitation of existing schemes and expansion of 
those with potential before undertaking new schemes (Ibid.).  
 
One of the key problems is the absence of a coherent irrigation policy in Zimbabwe. What is in 
place are draft irrigation policy strategies devised by government departments and non-
governmental organizations, with little coordination and consolidation of the strategies. In view 
of this the irrigation sector has an overall lack of guidance on access to and use of water for 
irrigation. The default guidance has been provided by the DERUDE document in the 1980s, and 
the FAO-assisted draft irrigation policy, which is said to have been incorporated into Zimbabwe’s 
Agricultural Policy Framework 1995-2020, in the 1990s. These two documents are largely 
viewed as having provided a framework for the management and development of irrigation in 
Zimbabwe in the 1980s and 1990s respectively. 
 
With particular reference to the 1990s onwards, the guiding principles on water and irrigation as 
stated in the Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Policy Framework are that: 
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in capital development while farmers will retain the responsibility for operation and 
maintenance of irrigation systems; 
-  Greater emphasis will be placed on more efficient and greater equity of water use; 
-  Effective water user associations will be encouraged and facilitated in the planning, 
development and evaluation of irrigation projects. Current Irrigation and Management 
Committees will be reformed and strengthened to allow broader participation and greater 
responsibility in irrigation management; 
-  Water allocation will take into account the imbalances in water supply between large and 
smallholder irrigators (Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Policy Framework 1995-2020b cited in 
Manzungu 1999:26); 
 
The ‘policy’ context within which irrigation schemes are located and which forms the governance 
framework for access to and use of water, is only limited in enabling  poor people access to and 
use of water for productive purposes. While irrigation schemes contributed to increased food 
security within rural areas, there were no radical changes to increase the number of people 
accessing water in irrigation schemes. The limited expansion of communal lands brought under 
irrigation cited above only serves to illustrate this fact.  
 
In the absence of an explicit irrigation policy, the Water Act of 1976 governed access to and use 
of water. In short, the Act was ‘based on the riparian doctrine and recognized the principle of the 
‘priority of rights’ and that all other things being equal, the holder can have the granted water 
right in perpetuity’ (Chitsiko, 1996: 211). However, Mtisi and Nicol (2003) pointed out that the 
1976 Water Act provided a legal basis for the denial of Africans access to and use of water for 
irrigation purposes, while on the other hand, providing access to water in favour of sectional 
interests, namely commercial farming, mining and manufacturing industries.  
 
Institutions Surrounding the Governance of Water in Irrigation Schemes 
 
It is within this policy context, that a plethora of institutions with an interest in smallholder 
irrigation existed. These institutions include government departments, traditional institutions, 
private companies, farmer and agro-industrial organizations. The interaction of formal and 
informal institutions, at various levels in the irrigation sector, directly and indirectly, provided 
limiting and enabling factors in gaining access to and use of water among farmers. In exploring 
the various institutions that are involved in the irrigation sector, particular attention will be given 
to the role of the State since it is central in the governance of water, the uptake of irrigation 
technologies and practices, as well as in driving reforms and activities surrounding the irrigation 
sector which are aimed at meeting national economic development and poverty reduction goals. 
 
The State’s role 
 
Formal irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe owe their existence to the State. During the colonial 
period, the state established smallholder irrigation schemes partly to direct African agriculture to 
meet the livelihood needs of the rural population under direct state control. This was aptly 
captured by Weinrich (1975) who noted that smallholder irrigation schemes are exclusively 
administered by civil servants and plotholders are discouraged from forming their own authority 
structures. Irrigation schemes, then, are government administered and admission and expulsion is 
by civil servants. Plotholders are mainly drawn from landless rural Africans who are offered a 
living on the condition that they conform to the instructions of the scheme personnel (Weinrich 
1975:12-13). The colonial state’s control of smallholder irrigation was particularly severe after 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, when the state sought to increase crop 
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rapidly increasing population pressure on tribal lands in the context of economic and political 
sanctions (Weinrich, 1975). 
 
Similarly, after independence in 1980, the State continued to have control of the smallholder 
irrigation sector, though its role was premised on being a driver of rural development based on 
redressing past colonial inequities in access to natural resources—mainly land and water—and 
the alleviation of poverty (especially as found in Zimbabwe’s Five Year National Development 
Plans, which were started after 1980). However, from the early1980s, there were increasing 
debates on the need by the state to turn over management of smallholder irrigation schemes to 
farmers, although concern was raised on farmer ability and preparedness to manage the technical 
aspects of irrigation schemes, particularly maintenance of infrastructure where pumping of water 
is part of the irrigation system (Magadlela, 2000).  
 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the establishment of Irrigation Management Committees 
indicated a clear shift in the direct control of irrigation schemes by the State, towards a strategy of 
encouraging farmers to manage the schemes themselves through elected irrigation institutions. 
However, despite the reduced role of the state in irrigation management, the state maintained 
subsidies on smallholder irrigation schemes on the basis that they were socially and politically 
desirable for improving household food security (Pazvakavambwa 1994; Rukuni and Eicher 
1987). Further, the State still exerts control indirectly through various government departments in 
the management of irrigation schemes. 
 
Other institutions involved in the irrigation sector and the main functions are presented in the 
table below. 
 
Institution  Roles and responsibilities 
AGRITEX (under the Ministry of Agriculture)   Has mandate for the design and management of 
all smallholder irrigation schemes. AGRITEX was 
tasked with providing agricultural extension and 
advice to irrigators 
Department of Water Development (under the Ministry 
of Rural Resources and Water Development) 
Has responsibility for the construction of dams 
and the provision of water up to the field edge 
District Development Fund (DDF) (in the Ministry of 
Local Government, Urban Planning and Rural 
Development) 
Has mandate to construct small dams and 
irrigation schemes of up to 20 hectares 
Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) (within 
the Ministry of Lands, Rural Development and 
Resettlement) 
Responsibility was stated as administration, 
management, operation and maintenance of 
government-run irrigation schemes in the 
communal areas and for the discipline of irrigators 
at these schemes. Also, it was responsible for 
developing new irrigation schemes in communal 
areas. 
Public Sector Investment Programme (comprises of 
officials from the ministries of finance, agriculture, 
water development, AGRITEX, National Economic 
Planning Commission) 
Its responsibility is to approve and allocate funds 
to the irrigation sector as well as planning and 
implementation of water resources for irrigation 
schemes 
NEPC  Is responsible for the appraisal of all water 
resources and irrigation proposals for funding 
Regional  Water  Authority  Overall management of water supplies to the 
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in the Lowvled 
River Board  Manage water at the river catchment or regional 
level 
Traditional  leaders  Has power over the allocation of land and 
selection of new entrants in irrigation schemes 
Local Authority - Rural District Council        
Irrigation Management Committee  Manages  water for smallholder irrigators at 
irrigation scheme level 
Agricultural Finance Corporation (currently called 
Agribank) 
Provides credit to irrigators. It also administers the 
National Farm Irrigation Fund (NFIF) to assist 
farmers (mainly large-scale commercial farmers) 
in the construction of in-field irrigation works 
Private companies (e.g. Cairns, Lemco, Cottco)  Purchase agricultural produce from irrigators 
 
The table shows that the various institutions governing the irrigation sector had diverse and 
divergent interests and mandates, some complimentary to, others conflicting with, each other. 
Complimentary roles and responsibilities led to duplication of activities and functions, which 
consequently led to inefficiency in the irrigation sector, more so among communal irrigation 
schemes. It has been commonly observed that the splitting of responsibilities between AGRITEX 
and the Department of Water Development, which in essence addresses similar challenges, causes 
problems of uncoordinated priorities (Magadzire, 1995). 
 
For communal or smallholder irrigators, this has ushered in a scenario of institutional complexity 
that has made it difficulty for them to access water for irrigation. Added to this, is the fact that 
some of the key institutions underwent significant changes from 1980 to 1998, as the government 
was grappling with various and interconnected challenges of agricultural and economic 
development, more broadly, and smallholder irrigation development, in particular. For instance, 
in 1991, the Government of Zimbabwe merged the Water Resources Development wing of the 
then Ministry of Energy and Water Resources Development with the Ministry of Lands, 
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement to create the new Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water 
Development. This was a remarkable step in the institutional reconfiguration of the water and 
irrigation sector. Despite the fact that water and irrigation were put under one ministry, MLAWD, 
there was still separation of responsibilities for water management between the Department of 
Water Development and AGRITEX. The Department of Water Development, through its three 
divisions—Designs, Planning and Hydrology and Operations—is responsible for the 
identification of national water and irrigation requirements. In addition, DWD is responsible for 
designing and construction of dams and run-of-the-river schemes. DWD’s roles make it the focal 
point of all water resources planning activities in the country.  On the other hand, AGRITEX is 
responsible for the identification, implementation and operation and maintenance of most 
communal and resettlement areas irrigation schemes. In addition, it acts as adviser to the Ministry 
of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development, and to farmers on irrigation matters. The 
Agricultural Engineering Division of AGRITEX is responsible for practical research on irrigation 
problems such as design of sprinkler systems and spray nozzle efficiency as well as testing all 
irrigation equipment. 
 
Institutional Changes from 1999 onwards 
 
As a result of global policy changes in water management, as well as local socio-economic and 
political dynamics, there were significant institutional changes in the water sector from the late 
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management’ which sought to ‘promote a coordinated development and management of water, 
land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an 
equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems’ (GWP 2000:22) 
as well as instituting a decentralized and catchment-based approach to water management, led to 
establishment of catchment councils and the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA).  
 
Catchment councils were expected to oversee sub-catchment councils, which were lower-tier 
water management institutions, and other water user groups in the catchment councils’ area of 
jurisdiction. In addition, catchment councils’ functions included, in part, determining   
applications and granting water permits, regulating and supervising the use of water, supervising 
the performance of sub-catchment councils, and dealing with conflicts over water (Mtisi and 
Nicol, 2002:11). 
 
ZINWA was created out of the Department of Water Development, with the objective to 
participate and advise on the formulation of national policies and standards on water resources 
planning, management and development, oversee dam safety, drill boreholes set water tariffs as 
well as provide bulk raw water and treated water to water users (ibid.). These functions and 
responsibilities turned ZINWA into a central institution in water resources management. 
 
In line with the institutional changes, Zimbabwe’s water sector reforms were underlined by 
progressive pieces of legislation—the Water Act (1997) and Zimbabwe National Water Authority 
Act (1997)—that sought to repeal the Water Act of 1976 and redress the inequities embedded in 
the 1976 Act. Of particular importance was the removal of preferential rights to water held by 
riparian owners. The new water law empowered the minister to regulate the use of water in times 
of scarcity, to deal with issues of water pollution and to be the overall custodian of water. Access 
to water for secondary purposes (i.e., for productive purposes) was based on a water permit 
system for which fees were charged.  
   
On the basis of the aforementioned legal reforms and the principles that underlay the reforms, 
ZINWA and Catchment Councils, as institutions governing water governance, were established to 
help redress colonial injustices and disparities in the allocation and distribution of water, 
particularly in a political context where inclusive and representative political systems were taking 
root. As such, the water reforms and the decentralized institutions of water that were established, 
were aimed at achieving an equitable distribution of water by providing enabling institutional 
foras of access to water by all water users. In this new water governance regime, access to water 
was defined through the issuing of a water permit, thus enabling more water users to have access 
to water for their livelihoods (Mtisi and Nicol, 2002). 
 
Local changes, particularly within ministries of lands, agriculture and water development, and 
partly in response to the need to effectively manage water resources saw widespread changes in 
the institutions that directly and indirectly govern water resources. The table below provide a 
summary of the institutions involved in the water sector and in irrigation, in particular.  
 
Institutions surrounding water governance 1998 to present 
Institution  Functions (particularly in irrigation sector) 
Zimbabwe National Water Authority 
(ZINWA) 
Provides bulk raw water at a fee to water users. Participates 
through construction of dams, pipelines, water treatment 
works, main canals and irrigation systems. 
Catchment Councils  Determining  applications and granting water permits. 
Regulating and supervising the use of water. 
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sector. Also responsible for policy formulation. 
Department of Agricultural Engineering 
(DAE) 
Field water management, operation of infrastructure and 
irrigation research. 
Department of Agricultural Research and 
Extension (AREX) 
Undertakes soil surveys as well as providing extension to 
farmers. However, extension services are mainly limited to 
crop production. 
District Development Fund (DDF)  Irrigation development for smallholder irrigation schemes 
of up to 20 hectares for rural communities. In addition, 
DDF has the responsibility to build small dams and drill 
boreholes for water supplies in communal and resettlement 
areas. 
Rural Development Fund (RDF)   Develops  smallholder irrigation schemes, usually 5 
hectares or less. 
Agricultural and Rural Development 
Authority (ARDA) 
Irrigation development for large-scale, state-funded 
irrigation schemes. Also operates its own irrigation 
schemes and administers settler schemes that are attached 
to its estates. 
Department of Water Development  Plans and implements all major national water schemes. 
Irrigation Management Committee (IMC)  Manages  water for smallholder irrigators at irrigation 
scheme level. 
  (Adapted from the Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee, 2003:65) 
  
In view of the institutional changes and the resultant establishment of various institutions of water 
governance, it is important to note the existence of a duplication of roles and functions between 
various government departments. The functions of DDF and RDF are a case in point (Refer to 
Table above). There seem to be no quantitative differences in the scale of irrigation schemes that 
the departments are responsible for, merits of their broader institutional goals notwithstanding. 
 
With specific reference to the smallholder irrigation sector, the splitting up of AGRITEX into 
AREX (under the Ministry of Agriculture) and Department of Irrigation (under the Ministry of 
Water Resources and Infrastructural Development) has led AREX to relinquish control of water 
management responsibilities at irrigation schemes, and to solely focus on crop management. 
Thus, water management in irrigation schemes falls, at least under three different institutions—




Role of the State 
 
The global changes in water resources management policy set the tone for the changes in the role 
of the Zimbabwe state in water governance. Chitsiko (1996) aptly captured the changed role of 
the state by noting that: ‘The process [water reform process] recognizes the need for stakeholder 
participation. In the general policy direction, this will mean an increased role of stakeholders in 
water resources management. They will have to shoulder more responsibility at local and regional 
levels, with government setting and monitoring the rules of the game’ (Chitsiko 1996:212) 
 
Thus, the state had to create an enabling environment to ensure effective water resources 
governance, though it has the political task to safeguard the interests of poor people in water 
management. Water sector reforms derived from emerging global discourses of integrated water  
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widened access of water to previously disadvantaged water users. In practice, this layering of 
‘old’ and ‘new’ institutions of water management has led to considerable institutional complexity 
and messiness which has adversely impacted  on rural livelihoods by limiting the ways through 
which smallholder irrigators access water for agriculture.  
 
The institutional complexity surrounding the governance of water resources in irrigation schemes 
and the impact it has on poverty alleviation, will be the focus of the next section, where findings 
from Mutema and Tawona irrigation schemes will be explored in detail.  
 
A Brief Historical Background of Mutema and Tawona Irrigation Schemes  
 
Case study work was conducted in two irrigation schemes: Mutema and Tawona located in Lower 
Save East Sub-catchment, in Chipinge District. The schemes are in Natural Region IV, commonly 
known as the lowveld, which receives 450-600mm of rainfall per annum. This region is too dry 
for successful crop production without irrigation, although some precarious rainfed  production 
takes place within communal areas. The two schemes were established in the 1930s and 1950s 
respectively, the former being one of the oldest in Zimbabwe. Historical evidence in Mutema 
indicates that the indigenous people practiced irrigated agriculture prior to the colonial period. 
The long history of irrigated agriculture in both schemes provides an opportunity to trace changes 
in governance of water and poverty over time.  
 
The establishment of Mutema Communal Area, where the two irrigation schemes are located, is 
embedded in the colonial expropriation of fertile land in Chipinge District. The process of land 
alienation saw the removal of people from the fertile parts of the district to give way to the 
development of commercial agriculture based, inter alia, on tea, coffee, forestry and dairy. The 
establishment of commercial irrigation of wheat, maize, citrus fruits and cotton in the lowveld 
parts of Chipinge district by both government and private companies led to the further removal of 
indigenous people. These historical processes that led to the establishment of Mutema Communal 
Area, which only receives erratic rainfall. Interviewees frequently stated that a good harvest from 
rainfed agriculture occurred once in every 5 years. 
 
Fortunately for Mutema communal area, Tanganda and Save Rivers provided a source of water 
for productive use, mainly irrigated agriculture. The presence of these rivers provided the impetus 
for local people to irrigate crops. It is commonly stated that flood irrigation was therefore 
practiced by local people during the pre-colonial period. This partly provided the basis for the 
establishment of Mutema irrigation scheme and later Tawona. It is widely acknowledged that the 
two irrigation schemes were meant to boost household food security and to alleviate poverty 
among Africans living on marginal land in Mutema Communal Lands. 
 
Current Size and Number of Plotholders in Mutema and Tawona Irrigation Schemes 
Area  Plot Size in Hectares  Number of Plot Holders 
Mutema Irrigation Scheme 
Mutema 1     
Bombeni 7.6  20 
Matsikidzi 8.3  21 
Total 15.9  41 
Mutema II 
Block I  90  143 
Block II  92.0  114 
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Total 218.8 333 
Total for the Scheme  234.7  374 
Tawona 
Block A  28.0  40 
Block B  48.8  79 
Block C  48.0  72 
Block D  28.8  45 
Block E  11.2  28 
Southern Block  32.0  80 
Northern Block  40.8  102 
Total for the Scheme  237.6  446 
(Source: Agritex Mutema Sub – Office 2005) 
 
Access to water for irrigation 
 
Since the development of irrigation schemes were to alleviate poverty in communal areas, in this 
case in Mutema and Tawona irrigation schemes, the main criteria for gaining access to the 
irrigation schemes were: one had to be a resident of Mutema communal area; be married and 
landless; and be willing to take up irrigation on a full time basis. It is important to note that, while 
the aforementioned were broad guidelines governing access to the irrigation schemes, the rules 
changed dramatically over the years.  During the 1930s and 1940s, it was pointed out that people 
who were deemed hardworking by their local Headman and government officials were selected to 
be members of the irrigation scheme. In the early 1970s, rules governing access to water for 
irrigation changed from the voluntary basis of the 1930s, to ones based on wealth and experience 
in agriculture. Potential irrigators were asked about the assets that they had. The assets mainly 
entailed cattle, agricultural equipment (for instance, ploughs, hoes), potential labour (mainly 
family labour) and experience in farming. The reason being that having a certain amount of 
agricultural assets and experience would put one in good stead to become a successful irrigator.  
 
A letter to the District Commissioner from the Irrigation Manager dated November 1972 is highly 
revealing: 
 
Dear Sir, Please can I have your permission to evict the attached list of plotholders from Tawona 
Scheme. All are poor farmers who cannot pay water rates, several would not plant crops last 
season, and have no livestock to sell to pay water rates. As the water rates will be increased to 





The letter explicitly points out that access to water for productive purposes was limited to the 
wealthy people in Mutema communal area, despite the fact that irrigation was intended to lift the 
poor from poverty. Notwithstanding such biases, the poor people were also considered on the 
basis that they had the potential to be successful irrigators. 
 
After 1980, there were slight changes to rules governing access to water for productive purposes 
in both Mutema and Tawona irrigation schemes. There was need to increase the number of people 
in the two irrigation schemes in line with the resettlement programme of the 1980s. Although 
there were new entrants to Mutema and Tawona irrigation schemes, as a result of the land 
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were recommended by their local traditional leaders, who confirmed their marital and landless 
status, and the fact that they were hardworking and able to work as a team. The recommended 
persons were later interviewed by relevant government officials (mainly AGRITEX) and 
members of the Irrigation Management Committee to ascertain their agricultural assets and 
experience. 
 
However, new dynamics of access to water in irrigation schemes are emerging. Access to water 
for irrigation can also be gained through renting and inheritance. With inheritance, the irrigated 
plot is passed from one family member to the other in the event of the death of the registered plot 
holder. In instances where the husband dies, the irrigated plot, and by extension the right of 
access to water for irrigation, are to the wife. In other instances, the irrigated plot is inherited by 
the eldest son. This was in line with the local patriarchal tradition that viewed the first born son as 
the head of the household in the event of the death of a father. In both cases, it was reasoned that 
the inheritors would continue irrigated farming to meet the livelihood needs of the family. 
 
Renting out a plot in the irrigation scheme also provided a means of gaining access to water for 
agricultural production under various circumstances. Invariably, the circumstances centre on an 
unexpected financial need, for example a sudden illness that requires urgent hospital fees or the 
need to pay school fees. In other cases, renting out may be due to a failure by the plotholder to 
raise enough money to pay water and electricity bills or to purchase seeds and other inputs. In 
these instances, a plot holder rents out part or the whole plot to an individual in return for 
financial assistance. Renting out of plots is common among poor farmers. It is also interesting to 
note that dryland farmers with fields along the 8-km long canal from Save River to Tawona and 
Mutema irrigation schemes, access water through the illegal siphoning of water from the canal to 
irrigate dryland crops. 
 
The period from 1999 to present, has witnessed a new political dimension, driven by the 
dynamics of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. Rooted in the politics of land redistribution 
and partly in the militancy of the war veterans and the youth militia the Fast Track Land Reform 
Programme provided a 20% stipulation in allocation for both war veterans and youths. As a 
result, there were emerging demands for access to water for irrigation in Mutema and Tawona 
irrigation schemes based on the political narratives of fast track land reform. While the fast track 
land reform programme is about the redistribution of land, the narratives used to gain access to 
land, reveal a similar, albeit latent, demand for access to water when they are extended to 
smallholder irrigation schemes. It is vital to note that smallholder irrigation schemes are located 
in communal areas and thus does not constitute part of the land targeted for compulsory 
acquisition and resettlement. As such, the extension of the fast track land reform programme on 
smallholder irrigation schemes, such as Mutema and Tawona, reveal an underlying need to gain 
access to land and water. 
 
However, access to water for irrigation based on the narratives of the fast track land reform have 
been deeply contested by irrigators and traditional leaders in the two schemes. The irrigators and 
traditional leaders are arguing that the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme does not apply 
to communal areas as well as to smallholder irrigation schemes, as the programme specifically 
targets large-scale commercial farms. One irrigator, with a flair for diplomacy stated that: ‘We are 
not challenging the State on the application of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme per se, we 
are merely pointing out that the programme does not have smallholder irrigation schemes, 
Mutema in particular, on its list of compulsorily acquired farms. As it is currently spelt out, it 
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State, War Veterans and the Youths
nnn. 
 
Added to this, traditional leaders in the two schemes have also argued that they have powers, 
vested to them by the State, to allocate land in communal areas, and in the irrigation schemes in 
particular. Traditional leaders have reasserted their powers in land allocation in the Mutema and 
Tawona irrigation schemes, and are challenging the powers of the Land Committee, an institution 
constituted for the purposes of allocating land under the fast track land reform programme. 
Despite the contestations, a significant number of people acquired plots in the two irrigation 
schemes under the fast track land reform. 
 
Governance of Mutema and Tawona Irrigation Schemes 
 
The governance of water in irrigation schemes is guided by several pieces of loose and 
uncoordinated legislation, compounded by an unclear policy on irrigation. This mainly emanates 
from a dual agricultural system and irrigation development in Zimbabwe, which has its roots in 
the colonial period. This is exacerbated by a general lack of information on the nature and extent 
of smallholder irrigation. In view of this, the Water Act of 1998, and the Zimbabwe National 
Water Act of 1998, provide the governance framework through which water and irrigation 
management and development occurs.  
 
Institutionally, the then AGRITEX was largely responsible for national planning and 
development of irrigation schemes. At the local level, AGRITEX, through its Agricultural 
Extension Worker and Agricultural Extension Supervisor was responsible for ‘helping farmers or 
irrigators to increase their agricultural productivity for food self sufficiency and cash income 
through the provision of agricultural extension, technical services and management services’
ooo. 
These duties are currently performed by AREX as a result of the splitting of AGRITEX into 
AREX (Agricultural Research and Extension) and the Irrigation Department. In conjunction with 
AREX, the Irrigation Management Committee is responsible for the day-to-day management of 
the irrigation scheme, which ranges from maintaining discipline among irrigators, controlling 
water distribution, collecting fees and other service charges, setting up local rules and regulations 
and determining local requirements and standards for the irrigators and those intending to join the 
irrigation scheme. 
 
ZINWA and the Sub-Catchment Council are also part of a constellation of institutions that govern 
the different types of water used to irrigate crops in Tawona and Mutema irrigation schemes. The 
relationship between ZINWA and the two irrigation schemes is based on ZINWA’s management 
and provision of dam water (agreement water) from Ruti and Osborne dam. This is mainly during 
the winter period when the water flow in Save and Tanganda rivers is extremely low, making it 
inadequate to support irrigated agriculture in both Tawona and Mutema irrigation schemes.  
 
On the other hand, the institutional role of the Lower Save East Sub-catchment in Mutema and 
Tawona irrigation schemes rests upon the use of raw (river) water from Save River, and to a 
limited extent, Tanganda River. With reference to Mutema Irrigation Scheme, its relationship to 
the sub-catchment council is also based on the use of underground borehole water, which is used 
to irrigate crops. In view of the fact that the borehole water for Mutema Irrigation Scheme is 
salty, and thus necessitating the need to use raw water from Save River, and agreement water 
                                                 
nnn Interview with an Irrigator in Mutema Irrigation Scheme. 7/12/2005. 
ooo Zhakata, W (1991) Role of A.E.W. and Irrigation Committees at Government Run Irrigation Schemes. 
Paper Presented at Chipinge District Annual Conference. 
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Save East sub-catchment council in water governance. 
  
Added to the modern institutions are traditional institutions of water governance. Traditional 
leaders, namely kraal-head to headman and the chief, though peripheral to the management of 
water in irrigation schemes, plays a central role in the allocation of land in the two irrigation 
schemes on the basis that they are the traditional custodians of the land. Thus, in the allocation of 
irrigable plots, traditional leaders surrounding Mutema and Tawona irrigations schemes were the 
people responsible for compiling lists of, and recommending,  new entrants into the schemes from 
their respective villages, in consultation with the Irrigation Manager (during the colonial period) 
or the AGRITEX officer (between 1980-2000) or AREX officer (post 2000).  
 
It is important to note that there still exists within the two irrigation schemes Water Bailifs who 
are under the Department of Water Development (DWD). In addition, some institutions that are 
indirectly involved with irrigation schemes include, Rural District Council (Local Government), 
Department of Natural Resources, Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority through its subsidiary 
Rural Electrification Agency, Ministry of Health, Grain Marketing Board and private agro-
industrial companies e.g., Cairns (for purchasing of tomatoes), Agri-Bank (provision of loans), 
and Tarafin and Cotton Company (purchasing of cotton) and many others. 
 
Water and  Poverty in the Mutema and Tawona Irrigation Schemes 
 
Central to debates on governance and institutional and policy change in the water sector and 
irrigation subsector is a concern for poverty reduction and rural livelihood improvement. This is 
particularly so in southern Africa where water sector reforms in the 1990s—embedded as they 
were in the discourse of integrated water resources management principles—were founded on the 
goal of poverty reduction. This section examines the changing nature of the governance of water 
resources in the irrigation sector and their implications on rural livelihoods and poverty, taking 
Mutema and Tawona irrigation schemes. 
 
Over the years, the two irrigation schemes have supported the livelihoods of individual farmers, 
both in terms of food security and food self-sufficiency, as well as providing a major source of 
income. Invariably, all farmers stated that they sent their children to boarding schools through 
money earned from irrigated agriculture. In addition, most irrigators in the two schemes boast of 
having built brick houses and installed electricity to their homes through irrigation. Income was 
earned through the commercial production of crops for sale to major agro-businesses, such as 
Cairns for tomatoes, Cottco for cotton and GMB for maize. The table below presents crop 
production for the ten year period from 1996 to 2005 for both Mutema and Tawona Irrigation 
Schemes. 
 
Crop Production in Mutema and Tawona Irrigation Scheme 1996 – 2005 
 
Mutema Irrigation Scheme  Tawona Irrigation Scheme 

























1996/97  1.5 2.0 18  1.0 1.0 3.5 16  1.4 
1997/98  2.0 4.0 20  0.5 1.5 4.5 20  1.1 
1998/99  2.5 5.0 15  0.5 2.0 5.5 22  1.4 
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2000/01  3.5 1.0 15  0.2 3.0 3.5 15  1.0 
2001/02  4.0 0.5 10  1.0 3.5 4.0 14  1.8 
2002/03  4.5 0.1 22.5  0.6 2.5 2.5 25  1.0 
2003/04  1.5 0.5 4  0.1 0  2.0 7  1.4 
2004/05  0.2  0 2.5  0 1.5  0.5  10  1.2 
(Source: Agritex Mutema Sub – Office 2005) 
 
Notwithstanding such achievements, the past three years or so have witnessed a precipitous 
decline in both crop production and income earned from irrigated agriculture, which threatens the 
very existence of the irrigation schemes, particularly Mutema Irrigation Scheme. These processes 
have adversely impacted on poverty and rural livelihoods among irrigators. The following section 
explores the internal and external factors that have affected the livelihoods of irrigators. 
 
Water Governance Policy and Poverty Reduction 
 
At the heart of Zimbabwe’s water reforms are concerns about instituting a water governance 
system that ensures an equitable distribution and allocation of water to all water users, with a 
view to improving the livelihoods of previously disadvantaged water users, namely small-scale, 
resettlement and communal farmers. Further, the drought-prone nature of Zimbabwe and the need 
for sound management of the country’s fragile water resource base as well as the need to 
effectively respond to the adverse impact of drought underscore the current policy regime.  
 
Yet the water policy in Zimbabwe as enshrined in the Water Act and ZINWA Act of 1998 draws 
largely from the global discourse of integrated water resources management, founded upon neo-
liberal concepts of less state involvement. This has exposed communal, small-scale, resettlement 
and newly resettled farmers—and in particular, smallholder irrigators—to the vagaries of a 
market-based system. 
 
The treatment of water as an economic good has made water unaffordable to small-scale, 
resettlement and communal farmers, more so among smallholder irrigators who are dependent 
upon it for their agricultural activities. Added to this is a general lack of awareness of the water 
policy among smallholder irrigators and of their roles and responsibilities within it, and more 
importantly the livelihood benefits that they may gain within the context of the current water 
policy regime. Further, the conspicuous absence of a clear and coherent policy framework that 
governs and guides the smallholder irrigation sector has provided a recipe for failure in the 
objectives and intentions of smallholder irrigators. While smallholder irrigation schemes were 
established with the objective to secure rural livelihoods and attain food security and food self-
sufficiency, in addition to providing an income through the selling of crops, the absence of a 
coherent irrigation policy to steer the smallholder irrigation sector undermines the securing of 
livelihoods for small-scale irrigators and rural populations.  
 
Institutional Matrix of Water Governance and Poverty Reduction  
 
Institutional restructuring brought about by the water sector policy and reforms in the irrigation 
sector were based on the need to ensure local level participation and representation of livelihood 
concerns in decision-making processes of water governance. This is also rooted in the broad 
theoretical argument that stresses the centrality of institutions as critical channels through which 
people’s livelihood strategies are shaped and mediated. Now there exists a complex web of 
formal and informal institutions that govern water in the irrigation sector. 
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Their existence ensures competing and conflicting roles with a resulting situation in which the 
institutional environment has bred confusion within the smallholder irrigation. This was clearly 
illustrated in both Mutema and Tawona irrigation schemes whereby several institutions manage 
the different types of water for irrigation, a situation brought partly by the current water reforms 
and institutional changes within AGRITEX. As part of the water reforms, two institutions 
governing water were created, namely Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) and sub-
Catchment Councils. Under the water reforms ZINWA’s major task is to provide bulk raw water 
to irrigators. Since ZINWA was a transformation of the Department of Water Development, it 
took over the operations and maintenance of engines and pumps that supply the irrigation 
schemes. In addition, ZINWA took over the management and construction of dams, which 
previously had been under the Department of Water Development which mean that dam water or 
‘agreement water’ became ZINWA’s responsibility.  
 
On the other hand, the management of underground and raw water is under the jurisdiction of the 
SCC. The Water Resources Management Strategy specifically states that the sub-catchment 
council functions include, inter alia, regulating and supervising the exercise of permits for the use 
of water including ground water within the area for which they are established. In addition, the 
sub-catchment council reports to the catchment council on the exercise of water permits within its 
area, monitoring water flows and water use in accordance with the allocation made under the 
water permit, and collecting sub-catchment rates, fees and levies. 
 
In short, the distinction that is often expressed between ZINWA and SCCs is the ‘type of water’ 
each institution manages, with the former managing agreement water and the latter managing 
rivers and underground water. The apparent establishment of the two institutions of water 
management and the separation of their respective roles and responsibilities threw the irrigators in 
Mutema and Tawona irrigation schemes into confusion. Since the two irrigation schemes use both 
agreement and raw water, they have to deal with ZINWA and the lower Save East SCC.   
 
Mutema and Tawona irrigation schemes rely on raw water from the Save River during the rainy 
season—from November to March—when flow is normal. During periods of reduced flow (June 
to October) the Save River is augmented by agreement water (i.e., dam water) from Ruti and 
Osborne dams. It is during the periods of reduced flow in the Save River that the Irrigation 
Management Committee of Tawona and Mutema irrigation schemes liaise with ZINWA so that 
they can conduct their winter cropping.  
 
For Mutema Irrigation Scheme, the use of borehole water for irrigation adds another layer of 
complexity, albeit the saltiness of the borehole water, which necessitates reliance on raw and 
agreement water from Save River and Osborne and Ruti dams. This demands that Mutema and 
Tawona irrigation schemes deal with both Lower Save East SCC (during normal flow of the Save 
River when the schemes rely on raw water) and also with ZINWA (during winter when they use 
agreement water). One farmer, an Irrigation Management Committee member for Mutema 
Irrigation Scheme, aptly captured the institutional messiness by noting that: the fundamental 
question is which institution do we have to work with for our farming purposes? And secondly, to 
which one institution should we pay the water rates, since ZINWA has its own charges and the 




                                                 
ppp Interview with a committee member for Mutema Irrigation Scheme. 9/12/2005. 
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irrigators at both Mutema and Tawona irrigation schemes had resolved, whether by design or by 
defiance, to pay a monthly lump sum to ZINWA. In the words of the IMC treasurer for Tawona 
Irrigation Scheme: we let ZINWA and Lower Save East Sub-Catchment Council sort out their 
own problems of sharing the money we pay!
qqq
 
While ZINWA and Lower Save East SCC are central to the management of water in the two 
schemes, AGRITEX has had a long history of working with farmers in irrigation schemes. 
AGRITEX officials or ‘madhomeni’ as they commonly known, are responsible for assisting 
irrigators with the provision of agricultural extension, technical and management services. 
AGRITEX officials were responsible for the management of water in the schemes, the 
construction and maintenance of canals, the pegging of plots, and the monitoring of irrigated 
crops to ensure successful crop production. However, the institutional reforms in 2002 caused the 
splitting of AGRITEX into two public institutions under different ministries, namely the 
Department of Agricultural Research and Extension (AREX), under the Ministry of Lands, 
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and the Department of Irrigation (DI), under the ‘Ministry of 
Water Resources and Infrastructure Development’. AREX was created after the amalgamation in 
2002 of research and extension functions in the former departments of AGRITEX and Research 
and Specialist Services. In turn, AREX’s responsibilities in the irrigation sector were limited to 
the management and provision of extension services that pertain to crop production. Thus, water 
management on smallholder irrigation schemes was passed to the Department of Irrigation (DI). 
It was stated that DI is also responsible for the construction of canals and rehabilitation of all 
irrigation schemes and the development of new ones. 
 
The impact of the government institutional changes, particularly as it transformed AGRITEX into 
AREX and the Department of Irrigation, led to the exacerbation of the extent and level of 
confusion among irrigators. One AREX official noted that: when farmers in the scheme come to 
our office with water issues, I tell them that this is the wrong office and they should go to the 
Department of Irrigation. Unfortunately, our office is the one located on the scheme while the 
offices for the Department of Irrigation are in Mutare
rrr. 
 
While the IMC and AREX officials enjoy a healthy working relationship, the logic that underpins 
the formation of AREX may in the long term undermine the relationship between IMC and 
AREX, at least on irrigation schemes. As AREX officials lose or cede the control and 
management of the most vital resource on irrigation schemes—water—they may lose the 
confidence of the irrigators and irrigators may seek new alliances, predictably with those 
institutions that control and manage water.  
 
Indicatively, an AREX official, who used to be an AGRITEX official, pointed out that: In the 
past we use to control and manage water on the schemes, which enabled us to contribute to high 
crop production on the schemes. If you observe that some crops are wilting, you could go and tell 
the water bailiffs to provide to those sections that have wilting crops. We could liaise with the 
Department of Water Developed to have water released to the relevant fields. Now, as AREX, my 
hands are tied to crop production, yet water in irrigation schemes is central to that. With the 
changes, some of the institutions involved in irrigation schemes do not have a clue about 
agriculture. There are there to make money. It’s frustrating for me to see a promising crop wilt 
and die just because someone is not willing to provide water to the farmers.
sss  
                                                 
qqq Interview with the Treasurer for Tawona Irrigation Scheme.5/12/2005. 
rrr Interview with an AREX officer in Mutema. 5/12/2005. 
sss Interview with an AREX official at Mutema Irrigation Scheme. 5/12/2005 
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The sentiment and observation of the AREX official were shared by the irrigators in both 
Mutema and Tawona irrigation schemes, who laid the blame for a complete write-off of the maize 




Case 1: Electrifying Crops – The Intervention of Rural Electrification Agency in Mutema and 
Tawona Irrigation Schemes 
  
After farmers in the two irrigation schemes had planted their maize crop in November 2004, by January 
2005 the crop was at the tussling stage. It was during this stage that an official from the Rural 
Electrification Agency (REA), a subsidiary of the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, visited the two 
schemes informing them of a donated engine that could supply the two schemes with more than sufficient 
water for irrigation. While the irrigators were delighted with the news, they pointed out that the 
installation of the new engine and pump should be stopped for about two weeks so that their crops could 
survive, since they were at tussling stage. They reasoned that a further two weeks of irrigating their maize 
would ensure them a decent, if not bumper, harvest. The REA official insisted that the engine and pump 
be installed and went ahead to dismantle the old engine and pump, and installed the donated one. The 
installation led to the stoppage of water to the irrigation schemes and consequently the writing off of all 
the maize crop in Mutema Irrigation Scheme and a half-ton harvest in Tawona Irrigation Scheme, as the 
crop was scorched by the heat that characterize this part of the lowveld. Further, the ‘new engine and 
pump’ subsequently worked for a maximum of six hours at a time as it is frequently switched off because 
of overheating. One irrigator in Mutema Irrigation Scheme noted that the engine is either not working or 
overheating since it was installed in January 2005: If we call an engineer from ZINWA Harare to come 
and fix the ‘new engine’, when he is on his way back we would have already called his office twice about 
another breakdown. This season’s (2005/2006) maize crop was planted during the first rains. The ‘new 
pump’ has reduced us to dryland farmers!  
In a corollary to this tale, the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), through its 
subsidiary Rural Electrification Agency (REA), supplies electricity to pump raw and borehole 
water for Mutema and Tawona irrigation schemes, thus making these two parastatals important 
institutions in smallholder irrigation. However, electricity is supplied to the two schemes at a fee. 
Thus the two schemes pay a significant amount of money in electricity bills to ZESA. Failure to 
pay ZESA bills results in the electricity being cut-off from the pumps, which directly results in 
the lack of water supply to the irrigation schemes, and in turn adversely affect crop production. 
One of  the recent problems cited by irrigators in both Mutema and Tawona irrigation schemes is 
the problem they face in paying their electricity bills, which was viewed as ‘always too high’. 
This is illustrated by conflict between ZESA and irrigators in Mutema irrigation scheme in 2000. 
 
Mutema irrigation scheme had accrued a combined bill of Z$203,674 in January 2000 and were 
failing to pay the bill. The electricity was cut-off and thus there was no water to irrigate their 
maize crop. The farmers argued that most of their boreholes had broken down and only one out of 
five was working, a situation that had led to the insufficient supply of water for crop production. 
Consequently, they had not harvested and sold enough crops to earn sufficient money to pay for 
the bill. In a letter from Mutema Irrigation Scheme to the District Agricultural and Extension 
Officer in 2000, they pointed out that due to insufficient water to the scheme it was difficult [for 
the farmers] to pay the bill. In addition, the letter stated that farmers in Mutema Irrigation Scheme 
paid their ZESA bill in 1999 despite the fact that they lost their crop due to lack of water, a direct 
consequence of electricity being cut off by ZESA. 
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irrigation schemes is a recent phenomenon as the electricity bills were previously paid by the 
Department of Water Development, through a budget allocation from the Treasury. 
 
In reference to the January 2000 case, although the Department of Water Development managed 
to pay the controversial ZESA bill, the official pointed that: the ZESA bill should be addressed to 





Despite the fact that the Department of Water Development (DWD) was transformed into 
ZINWA, Water Bailiffs still exist, who are under the Department of Water Development. 
However, it is not clear at present whether the Water Bailiffs are within the Department of 
Irrigation or are still with the Department of Water.  As a result of the transitory nature of 
institutional changes, some respondents noted that the water bailiffs seem to have no control as 
indiscipline is rampant. Perhaps, this indicates the lack of clarity with regards to where water 
bailiffs are institutionally located.  
 
In essence, there are multiple institutions involved in the provision of raw water from the river to 
the crops. ZESA lays its claim to water for irrigation by supplying electricity, which is necessary 
for pumping of water. The sub-catchment council has jurisdiction over raw and underground 
water. On the other hand, ZINWA has authority over agreement water, which it provides up to 
the field edge, through the main canal. As the water is drained into a network of minor canals, it 
is owned by the Department of Irrigation and is controlled by water bailiffs who are responsible 
for ensuring the equitable distribution of water among irrigators in the scheme. The siphoning of 
water from the minor canal into the field, for flood irrigation, is the responsibility of the Irrigation 
Management Committee, through the Block Committees, which ensures the equitable distribution 
of water among individual farmers or plot holders. 
 
The Concept of Water as an Economic Good and Its Implications on Poverty Reduction 
 
One of the central tenets of the water sector reforms of the 1990s was the conceptualization of 
water as an economic good, with a fee attached to it. The premise is that paying for water will 
induce effective and efficient ways of water management among users (Mtisi and Nicol, 2003; 
Movik et al, 2004). Zimbabwe’s Water Resources Management Strategy document clearly states 
that treating water as an economic good is the best way of achieving fair and efficient use, and of 
encouraging conservation and protection of water resources (WRMS, 1999). 
 
In practice, the treatment of water as an economic good has revealed contradictions that adversely 
affect smallholder irrigation sector. For both Mutema and Tawona irrigation schemes, the water 
bill that they pay to ZINWA has drawn significantly from their income. With specific reference to 
Tawona irrigation, the payment for water constituted 97% of their total expenditure for the year 
ending 2004
uuu. The high water bills are worsened by the inadequate supply of water to the 
schemes, which has led to poor harvests. Thus, the farmers point out that they are failing to sell 
enough crops to meet the ZINWA charges. One irrigator succinctly captured the situation by 
noting that: the high water charges by ZINWA are killing us. ZINWA is failing to repair the 
engines that supply the scheme with water, and also to provide water to the field edge as per its 
mandate. We are paying a lot of money for water to ZINWA, yet we receive inadequate water for 
                                                 
ttt Minutes of Mutema/Tawona Area Staff Meeting held at Mutema Sub –Office  dated 05/09/2000. 
uuu Tawona Irrigation Scheme Financial Report for 2004. 
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water. We are now selling our livestock and other assets to pay for ZINWA bills!
vvv
 
The comment indicates explicitly that smallholder irrigators are not receiving adequate supplies 
of water to support viable agricultural production, which would have enabled them to meet the 
water bills. In such a context, irrigators have resorted to selling their assets in order to pay for 
water to the extent that it has undermined their livelihoods and led to asset stripping—another 
dimension of rural poverty. 
 
Irrigation Technology and Poverty 
 
In Zimbabwe, there are two main irrigation technology systems used in smallholder irrigation 
sector, namely surface (or flood) and sprinkler (or overheard) systems. The sprinkler system is 
used on 11% of the irrigated area in smallholder sector, while 89% is under surface irrigation 
(MLAWD and FAO, 1994). It is noted that the overall design efficiencies of surface and sprinkler 
irrigation systems are estimated to be 40-45 % and 75 % respectively (ibid.). 
  
Irrigation technology in Zimbabwe has undergone numerous changes from simple gravity fed to 
pump and pressurized overhead sprinkler systems, a process that is associated with changing 
policies and politics of irrigation management (Chidenga and Vincent, 2004). Sprinkler systems 
came to increasingly dominate the smallholder irrigation sector from the 1970s onwards. When 
AGRITEX took over of control of the smallholder irrigation sector in 1987, this sealed the 
dominance of sprinkler irrigation systems as it expedited the move from simple gravity systems to 
pump/lift and pressurized sprinkler systems (ibid.). This was largely attributed to the biases in 
favour of sprinkler systems which originated from the global developments in sprinkler 
technologies as well as within AGRITEX. With reference to AGRITEX, Chidenga and Vincent 
(2004) point out that: the training programmes supported by FAO also helped to focus attention 
on pressurized delivery systems (2004:85). 
 
In the case of Mutema Irrigation Scheme, the broad shifts in irrigation technological 
developments had an important bearing. Largely in response to technological shifts, Mutema 
Irrigation Scheme moved away from surface to a sprinkler irrigation system in 1973. Of the 237 
hectares of the scheme, 183 hectares were put under sprinkler and the other 54 hectares remained 
under flood irrigation. However, it was commonly reported that the sprinkler system had 
problems shortly after it was installed. The problems still persists even today. Thus, despite the 
technological advantages of sprinkler systems, such as the ability to irrigate larger areas and 
better delivery of crop water, the system was sophisticated and very expensive for smallholder 
irrigators in Mutema irrigation scheme. 
 
A common complaint by farmers in Mutema Irrigation Scheme was that the system was old and 
needed replacement. They point out that the pipes leaked to such an extent that most of the water 
was lost through leakages. This has led to a general feeling of neglect, particularly with the 
current lack of water for irrigation on the scheme due to frequent engine failures. In addition, a 
common perception shared by the farmers in the scheme is that the sprinkler system ‘loses a 
significant proportion of water in the air’. One irrigator in Mutema Irrigation Scheme figuratively 
pointed out that: the sprinkler system, spits at the crops! Most of the water is lost in the air, 
particularly when it is windy. One is only irrigating when one uses a flood irrigation system. 
That’s what we call irrigating because the water seeps into the soil.
www
                                                 
vvv Interview with an irrigator in Mutema irrigation scheme. 11/12/2005. 
www Interview with a farmer at Mutema Irrigation Scheme. 10/12/2005 
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Given the technological problems associated with the sprinkler system at Mutema Irrigation 
scheme, the situation is exacerbated by the prohibitive costs of rehabilitation. The economic 
reforms of the early 1990s, and the later water reforms, saw an increased reduction in the role of 
the state in smallholder irrigation, particularly in providing funding for such rehabilitation 
programmes. For instance, the notion of cost recovery, which was at the heart of the economic 
reform programme in Zimbabwe, called for reduced government spending in water with negative 
implications for smallholder schemes such as Mutema and Tawona. The water sector reform 
programme, which similarly called for reduced role of the state in providing funding to the water 
sector necessitated a broader funding base for the water sector since government had been the 
major financier of water development projects in the context of  simultaneous increased demand 
on its resources and a sharp decline in allocations to the water sector (WRMS, 1998:1). 
 
Added to the decline in government funding, the current economic crisis, with triple digit 
inflation and a depressed commodity price for agricultural produce, has made it difficult for 
farmers in Mutema to pay for rehabilitation on their own. In short, the livelihoods of farmers in 
Mutema irrigation scheme have born the brunt of the adoption of the sophisticated sprinkler 
irrigation system. The reliability of the sprinkler technology was in doubt shortly after installation 
and the high costs associated with its maintenance have resulted in added problems to the 
irrigators. Consequently, such technological problems have led to inadequate supply of water for 
crop production. 
 
The leakages within the pipes and the perceived inefficiency of the sprinkler technology have led 
to delays in crop planting. The situation has been worsened by frequent engine failures. As a 
result, this has led to a significant drop in hectarage under production. For instance, farmers in 
Mutema have significantly reduced maize cultivation for the 2005/2006 season partly due to 
sprinkler unreliability. It was common during the study to see uncultivated irrigation plots. One 
owner stated that he did not plant any crop since he was certain that no water was going to be 
provided in Mutema Irrigation Scheme because of frequent pump failures. The owner of the 
uncultivated plot reasoned that his failure to plant was to safeguard the savings that he had, rather 
than to use his savings to buy inputs and then ‘to sow and reap disaster’. 
 
Environmental factors and Poverty 
 
One of the major impacts on water provision is the siltation of the Save and Tanganda rivers. 
Excessive siltation of the Save River can be attributed to poor land husbandry within the 
communal areas of the catchment, which in turn is a result of colonial land policies that resettled 
thousands of people and livestock on marginal lands. The effect is to reduce the period of flow for 
Save and Tanganda rivers, hence the period of time that raw water can be abstracted for irrigation 
purposes. It was commonly stated that the ‘perennial Save River has been reduced to a seasonal 
river, with the river flowing from late November to about May, and having reduced amount of 
water available for irrigation between June and October’
xxx. Secondly, it was noted that siltation 
has severely affected the life span of irrigation pumps to the extent that the frequent breakdown of 
some pumps is attributed to it. Siltation of Save and Tanganda rivers has led to the shortages of 
water for irrigation in Mutema and Tawona, a situation that has adversely affected the livelihoods 
of irrigators and surrounding communities. 
 
Fast Track Land Reform Programme, Water Supply and Poverty  
 
                                                 
xxx Interview with an AREX officer. 8/12/2005 
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water governance and poverty debate, particularly within the smallholder irrigation sector, and 
particularly so given the fact that smallholder irrigation schemes are located in communal areas, 
where demands for land and water are more severe.  
 
There exists a rich body of literature on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (UNDP, 2002; 
Government of Zimbabwe, 2002; Moyo, 2002; 2004 on the origins and rationale of the fast track 
land reform; Chaumba, Scoones and Wolmer 2003; on the politics that surrounds the land reform 
programme). The land reform programme was aimed at the compulsory acquisition of land—
largely from the white commercial farming sector, private companies and absentee landlords—for 
resettlement purposes and without paying compensation. The programme was aimed at 
decongesting the densely populated communal areas, and to increase agricultural production in 
these new schemes and thereby reducing the extent and intensity of rural poverty. 
 
For Mutema and Tawona irrigation scheme, fast track land reform has led to an increased number 
of plot holders, leading to a simultaneous increased demand for water for irrigation. In the context 
of prevailing water shortages at Mutema irrigation scheme, the additional plot holders are adding 
another dimension to the water shortages experienced by the scheme. Firstly, it was pointed out 
that the available water is failing to adequately support the existing plot holders let alone 
additional new members. Secondly, in trying to meet the irrigation needs of the increased 
numbers of farmers, this inevitably results in prolonged periods of each plot holder getting water 
to irrigate his/her plot. In view of the prolonged down-times due to engine failures and leakages 
within the sprinkler system, the addition of new plot holders extended the length of irrigation 
cycles. A Water Bailiff at Mutema Irrigation Scheme, pointed out that: In the past, one irrigation 
cycle took five to nine days, and when the engine and sprinkler problems started, the irrigation 
cycle extended to 21 to 30 days, and with the current addition of new plot holders under fast track 
land resettlement, the cycle has increased to 40 days. By the time I move water to the first plot, 
there will be nothing to irrigate. All the crops would have died
yyy. 
 
These observations were also true for Tawona Irrigation Scheme, where the irrigators expressed 
an increased number of days for the irrigation cycle. In short, in the absence of a concomitant 
increase in the supply of water to the two irrigation schemes, the addition of plot holders under 
the fast track land reform programme is proving disastrous to the livelihoods of the people that it 




The global and local debates that underpin the broad policy on water governance and smallholder 
irrigation rest on the need to reduce poverty through increases in food crop production, raising 
rural incomes and creating employment in rural areas. Policy changes in the water sector in the 
1990s were premised on improving access to and use of water for productive purposes in 
communal and resettlement areas and to correct inequalities in the distribution and allocation of 
water among different water users. The institutional restructuring that accompanied the water 
reforms was aimed at providing the institutional mechanisms for gaining access to the resource as 
well as providing an institutional fora for the participation of users in the governance of water. At 
the heart of this reform process was a need to reduce the level and extent of rural poverty that is 
common in Zimbabwe’s rural areas, where more than 70% of the population reside and rely on 
agriculture for their livelihoods. 
 
                                                 
yyy Interview with a Water Bailiff at Mutema Irrigation Scheme. 12/12/2005. 
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reforms presented an opportunity for poverty alleviation through opening up access to water for 
productive uses among the previously disadvantaged smallholder irrigators, communal, 
resettlement, small-scale and newly-resettled farmers. Access to water could be legally gained 
through the issuing of a water permit, a process that was intended to benefit the previously 
disadvantaged water users, particularly smallholder irrigators. More importantly, the water permit 
system replaced the tying of water rights to land rights, thus people residing in communal and 
resettlement areas (a majority of whom are poor people and without land rights) and smallholder 
irrigation schemes can gain access to water, and enforce their claims to the resource. 
 
However, there is a general lack of adequate information about the water reform process, 
particularly the aims and objectives of the water sector reform, and how the Water Act and 
ZINWA Act seek to improve the means and mechanisms through which users can gain their 
access to water for productive purposes. This lack of knowledge has proved to be an obstacle in 
the policy implementation process. Added to this gap in information is a lack of proper 
delineation of roles, functions and responsibilities of decentralized institutions. The creation of 
SCCs to ‘replace’ the River Boards, has witnessed the emergence of strong commercial farming 
interests within the SCCs and CCs to the extent that they can thwart the interests and livelihood 
concerns of new water users (Mtisi and Nicol, 2003). In addition, the establishment of ZINWA 
along commercial lines has led this institution to be mainly concerned with collecting water levies 
from water users at the expense of representing and safeguarding the interests of poor farmers. 
This has encouraged the dominance of sectional interests (i.e., large-scale commercial farming 
interests in SCCs and financial interests in ZINWA) in the new institutions.  
These new institutions have been overlaid on existing institutions of smallholder irrigation 
governance, including government departments and locally-based institutions such as the 
Irrigation Management Committees and traditional leaders. The institutional complexity that has 
emerged has distorted institutional routes through which smallholder irrigators gain access to 
water and manage the resource effectively. At present smallholder irrigators on Mutema and 
Tawona schemes are failing to establish viable institutional linkages with the relevant institutions 
of water management in order to enhance their access to the resource. 
 
Despite the merits of enhanced crop water efficiency that are attributed to the sprinkler 
technology, its adoption in Mutema irrigation scheme highlights the problems that may arise in 
the absence of adequate funds to maintain the system. Thus, declining government funding to the 
scheme and the associated high costs of rehabilitating the sprinkler system is threatening both the 
irrigation scheme itself and the livelihoods of the people that the scheme supported. This is 
largely due to the unreliable supply of water for irrigation. Lastly, the fast track land reform has 
added to the problems affecting smallholder irrigators in Mutema and Tawona irrigation schemes. 
The increases in the number of plotholders in the two schemes, as a result of the land reform 
programme, has led to increased demands on a declining water resource base (as a result of 
siltation) and an unreliable supply of water (as a result of technological problems, engine failures 
and so on). This has led to increased irrigation cycles per plot which has reduced the number of 
plots cultivated in the ‘fear of sowing and harvesting disaster’.  
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Palestine  
 
Agriculture is a central feature of Palestinian national identity
zzz. Although in recent years it has 
only contributed a dwindling proportion of GDP, the sector continues to provide an economic 
core to many rural households in the West Bank and Gaza. In recent years the sector has played 
the role of employer of last resort under economic crisis conditions. Debate over its future role in 
the Palestinian economy continues, but an enduring narrative remains the connection between 
agriculture, land use and Palestinian political aspirations to statehood. 
 
Agricultural production in Palestine has varied historically and has been subject to major external 
impacts ranging from Ottoman laws and the British Mandate to Israeli occupation and 
restrictions. Changes to land title under the Ottomans allowed creeping control by large families 
and tribal and helped to precipitate the decline of Palestinian peasant farming in the latter part of 
the 19th Century,  well before the political nakba or ‘catastrophe’ of 1948. Additional factors 
contributing to this decline included lack of rural credit, low levels of technological innovation 
and continued land fragmentation under Islamic inheritance systems. One consequence of the 
changes in land ownership instigated under Ottoman control was the poor registration of land title 
that was never fully completed due to the rapidly deteriorating political situation in the 1930s. 
This is a problem that persists to this day. 
 
The forced dispossession of Palestinians from their lands in 1948 and 1967 (mainly to Jordan and 
Lebanon) shook the economy and undermined much of Palestinian society. Only some 30% of 
the indigenous Palestinian population remained in the West Bank, 15% in the Gaza Strip and 5% 
in Israel, leaving behind economic enclaves along the spine of the West Bank and in the Gaza 
Strip. Much economic activity in these enclaves remained isolated from the most productive land 
and important markets plain (Al-Malki, 1994: 74-76)
aaaa. 
 
Occupation, control and dependency  
 
The structural impact of Israel’s occupation post 1967 contributed further to marginalization of 
Palestinian agricultural activities. In 1968 agricultural output was 40% of GDP, declining to 25% 
in 1990 and 19% in 1994 (El-Jafari, 1997: 102). In parallel employment in the sector dropped 
from some 43% in the mid-1960s to 24% in the mid-1990s (Foundation for Middle East Peace, 
1998).  By the 1970s unskilled wage labour in the Israeli economy had come to absorb up to a 
third of the WBGS
bbbb workforce. Israeli labour markets substituted for indigenous employment 
in the Palestinian industrial sector which from just 11% in the WB and around 2% in GS by the 
1960s had risen to just 17% in the WB and 13% in the GS by 1997. High levels of employment in 
Israel during the 1980s made the Palestinian economy one of the most remittance-dependent in 
the world.  
 
The loss of land and property to Israel combined with the emergence of a salaried and wage 
labour economy strengthened the value to households of education and migration. The latter in 
                                                 
zzz This section draws on an unpublished report produced under the SUSMAQ project, Shalabi et al (2005). 
aaaa ‘Enclave’ development is again becoming a feature of the Palestinian economy under occupation and closure—see 
below and final section. 
bbbb In 2000 the population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were 2.3m and 1m respectively. There are also some 
800,000 Palestinian Israelis living within the Green Line (1948 ceasefire lines). 
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cccc, but frequently decisions to 
migrate and/or educate favoured male family members, which helped to entrench intra-household 
gender disparities in employment, skills acquisition and education, continuing to this day. The 
value placed on education led a third of the population in the WBGS to become students in 
schools and universities causing a flood of new graduates to enter what was an already 
overloaded labour market in the early 1980s thereby exacerbating unemployment (Al-Malki and 
Shalabi, 1993: 46-61). This was at the expense of investment in agricultural development. 
 
New rules of the game and the second intifada 
 
The Oslo Accords and subsequent emergence of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) 
changed the rules of the game by presenting the possibility of Palestinian statehood in the near 
future
dddd. At the outset PNA decision making was dominated by the challenge of leading a 
society and economy still largely economically dependent on, and controlled by, Israel.  In spite 
of the accords, however, and the Paris Protocol on economic relations
eeee, Israel continued to 
periodically close its border and prevent access to the Israeli labour market. Large tracts of the 
WB, including crossing points and most of the natural resource base, remained under Israeli 
control at the same time as settlement expansion continued
ffff.  
 
The result of this new situation was substantial change in the socio-economic relationship of 
Palestinian society to Israel. Combined with the introduction of the closure policy
gggg, Palestinian 
unemployment began to increase substantially and reached 25% by 1996 (World Bank, 2002: ix), 
before declining again towards the end of the decade as the Palestinian service sector—
predominantly public services—began to expand rapidly. Participation in the labour force also 
grew significantly from 1995-2000, increasing from 39% to 43% of the active population. In fact 
that the economy was faced with a labour force annual increase of some 6% and, with it, an 
exceptionally high dependency ratio of 1 : 7 dependents (reflecting both the extremely young 
population and the low rate of women’s participation in the labour force) (Fischer, et al, 2001: 
262). Significant social change which took place following the PNA’s establishment included a 
widening social gap between the rich and poor and the emergence of new public sector and 
returnee investor elites (Hilal, 2002: pp 86-90). 
 
The outbreak of the second—or Al-Aqsa intifada—in December 2000 led to a dramatic decline in 
economic activity in Palestine and helped to redefine again the relationship between Palestinians 
and Israelis. Many Israeli responses to the second intifada directly affected Palestinian 
livelihoods, blocking farmers and rural consumers from urban markets, and by extension major 
urban centres from their key rural hinterlands. One of the main impacts was to isolate and 
‘atomise’ Palestinian economic activity. The Separation Wall which began construction around 
the WB, continued this process through encroaching on more than 1,000 dunums of agricultural 
                                                 
cccc An estimated 20,000 people migrated annually from Palestine until the late 1980s (Hilal, 1998: 27). 
dddd Although some authors still regarded the Accords as ‘legal cover’ for Israel’s continued, if not intensified, ‘policy 
of confiscation of Arab lands and construction of settlements’ (Abed, 1999: 30). 
eeee Signed in April 1994 the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations envisaged a trade regime that would encourage the 
expansion and reorientation of the WBGS productive base towards agricultural and industrial exports, and start 
reducing dependence on the export of labour (Kanaan, 1998: 69). Three critical features of the Paris Protocol are that it 
retained: a) Israeli military law over the territories;  b) Israel’s full control over key factors of production (including 
land and water); and c) control over external borders and the perimeters of Palestinian areas (Roy, 1999). 
ffff In fact from 1992 to 2000 the settler population in the WBGS nearly doubled from 109,784 to 213,672 (which does 
not include East Jerusalem; here the total settler population rose from 141,000 in 1992 to 170,400 in 2000) (Roy, 
2002). 
gggg Which between 1993-1996 is estimated to have cost nearly twice the sum of disbursed donor aid over the same 
period, roughly equivalent to a year’s GDP (Diwan and Shaban, undated: 7). 
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agriculture through the destruction of land and water assets or rendering them inaccessible. The 
Wall also limited the mobility of people and goods, contributing to higher transaction costs, and 
dampening investment and overall economic activity (unnamed, 2003: 14). Particularly affected 
areas were around Jenin, Tulkarem and Qalqilya governorates, which together account for some 
37% of all agricultural land in the WB, and the most fertile. Just 5% of the land is irrigated in 
these areas, but alone produced 16% by value more than the remaining 95% rain-fed land in the 
same areas in 2000. And in that year these governorates produced 45% of all WB agricultural 
production, with an output value some 41% greater per sq km than other WB governorates 
(unnamed, 2003: 15). 
 
An important impact of the second intifada has been to highlight again
hhhh the important role 
agriculture plays as employer of ‘last resort’ in local economic activity. In the second quarter of 
2002 agricultural workers reached 16.9% of the active labour force, compared to 11.7% in the 
third quarter of 2001, directly preceding the outbreak of the intifada. At the same time 
employment rates in other sectors dropped, with the exception of the service sector which 
remained roughly the same, and transport, storage and communications which rose marginally. 
The rise in agricultural work appeared slightly higher in the GS than in the WB, from 9.4% in the 
third quarter of 2001 to 21.8% in the second quarter of 2002, against respective figures of 12.8% 
and 14.9% in the WB (MAS Economic Monitor, December 2002). At the same time as 
underscoring its key social significance, the continued economic challenge to commercial 
production posed by occupation remained, not least due to the increasingly complex marketing 
structure occasioned by barriers to internal market access
iiii. 
 
Local water sources in most communities provide a key resource for small-scale, household 
horticulture and other productive activities, providing vital access to natural assets that help to 
provide a minimum of economic activity. Most of these activities use non-network sources and 
rely on local, private initiative to ensure a regular supply. A recent survey of water and 
livelihoods noted that where there was irrigation this was in small gardens averaging just 0.3 
dunums
jjjj, with regional variation from 0.46 dunums in the central West Bank to just 0.09 
dumums in the Gaza Strip. This small size is both due to the fragmentation of holdings and 




The institutional environment in water management is dominated by the Palestinian Water 
Authority (PWA). The PWA grants licenses, monitors the yield of sources and quality of wells 
and large springs. Municipalities, village councils and water undertakings manage the public 
networks within their respective powers and jurisdiction and are responsible for maintenance and 
collection of water fees from consumers. Local government—represented by municipalities, 
village councils and project committees—comes under the supervision of the Ministry of Local 
Government, which certifies their formation and ratifies plans and budgets. They may also enter 
into relations with the Governor. At the local level municipal and village councils also work with 
PECDAR, which is responsible for the implementation of developmental projects, and through 
the MLG, other government ministries and organizations, including the Ministry of Public Works 
and Housing responsible for infrastructure.  
                                                 
hhhh The first time being during 1996-1997 when Israeli closures were also severe. 
iiii As an example of impact, Roy (2002) speaks of the Hebron plum harvest worth $2.5m 2000, but dropping in value to 
$250,000 a year later because of the transport restrictions between the southern and northern WB (where the major 
markets are located for producers). 
jjjj 1 dunum is the equivalent of 1,000 m2, or 0.1 hectares. 
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Local-level institutional arrangements managing water are extremely diverse, in number and type 
of stakeholders involved and in the way resources are allocated. Ownership structures vary from 
individual to community and municipal control, and in some cases private owners are under 
contract to provide from private wells to municipal users. Generally resource owners controlled 
distribution and tariffs, frequently through unwritten rules between clans. Charing for water was 
usually based on stepped tariff rates per volume, or their approximate ‘pump hour equivalent’, 
and varied widely across the territories from NIS 2 to NIS 7 a cubic metre.  
 
Some local management structures had mechanisms to respond to shortage, introducing new 
systems of irrigation ‘minutes’, which gave priority to domestic needs over agricultural use. 
However, there was also evidence that private owners used periods of shortage to exploit demand 
by raising tariffs. Key informants in many communities noted that not only did women perform 
the bulk of agricultural work, but that they were increasingly beginning to market their own 
produce in towns. In some cases this was in response to demand, including where Israeli demand 
for organic Palestinian produce had prompted increased investment in greenhouses and drip 
irrigation.  
 
Spring sharing arrangements varied greatly. Sometimes a combination of allocation mechanisms 
existed. In many cases these arrangements were unwritten agreements between extended families 
making regulation and control not simply a management issue but a highly localised political 
issue as well. In other cases the systems were large-scale and formalised, with, for example, 
hundreds of farmers involved in the Ein as-Sultan cooperative in Jericho. Here the relationship 
was particularly complex because of linkage to Municipal supply, complex methods of 
distribution based on land title and use and the fact that new investment to improve management 
of the resource (shifting from open channels to piped water) was beginning to challenge the 
vested interests of more powerful farmers within the cooperative.  
 
Stakeholder meetings held across the territories revealed a range of management concerns 
including the need to improve existing PWA management, which was generally regarded as 
poorly coordinated, overly centralised and lacking key managerial and technical capacity within 
local authorities (at both municipalities and council level). Key concerns at the user level 
included inadequate and outdated networks and irrigation distribution systems, as well as a lack 
of a regulatory authority to deal with illegal connections. Stakeholders called for greater 
leadership on strategy and policy, improved institutional clarity on overlapping roles and 
responsibilities between water sector institutions and improved coordination outside the water 
sector.  
 
Reaching a consensus on local water management in the absence of a strong regulatory 
framework poses a challenge in some areas. Inhabitants of Badan, for instance, differed widely on 
the collection of water and its distribution via closed networks. Although there was general 
agreement that the spring needed better protection from contamination, the owners of tourist 
projects believed that the current flow regime was a part of the ‘character of the area’, that 
attracted tourists. By contrast, farmers who irrigated wadi lands from Ein-Al-Nasarieh believed 
that closed networks would increase water availability. The head of a household with no tourist 
project said, ‘We support the storage of spring water in reservoirs and distribution by pipe to 
agricultural lands, instead of keeping it opened and exposed to contamination and loss—even if 
nominal fees are imposed. We have a problem of contamination especially when the valley water 
mixes with Nablus sewage water. But water is important for agriculture and this area is an 
agricultural area. If supplies are transformed into domestic use only, agriculture will decline and 
the livelihoods of many will be affected, and so will tourism’. Another farmer stated that 
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difference?  
 
Water resources in Palestine 
 
Total precipitation in the WBGS is some 2,990 mcm annually, of which 2,870 is received in the 
inland region and 120 mcm in the GS. It is estimated that two-thirds are lost to 
evapotranspiration. Until the 1950s and 1960s, most water in the WB came from springs and rain 
collection because drilling in the rocky soil was too costly. With better technology farmers began 
drilling wells along the north-western edge of the WB, pooling their savings and creating ‘well 
companies’. Water was sold on a ‘time basis’ (unnamed 2003: 54). From 1967 to 1990 only 23 
permits were granted by the Israeli Civil Administration for new well drilling of which 20 were 
for exclusive domestic use. Quotas were imposed on existing wells, according to the quantity 
matching the first year of metering (from 1968-1970). (unnamed, 2003: 54). 
 
Total annual water consumption in the WBGS is about 220 mcm annually, some 62% of which is 
extracted from artesian wells, with the remainder from Israel, minor spring and cisterns, etc. 
Domestic and industrial use together account for 60 mcm (27%) of which 27 mcm (45%) is in the 
GS and 33 mcm (55%) in the WB. Only 70% of households are directly connected to supply 
system. Most water—160 mcm (73% of the total)—is used in agriculture. Of this quantity the GS 
draws 65 mcm (40%) and the WB 95 mcm (60%). Some 60% of agricultural water comes from 
2,310 wells of which (86%) are in the GS. The remaining 40% of agricultural water is drawn from 
springs and surface run-off in wadis (PECDAR, 1995). 
 
In September 1995 the Interim Agreement allocated 28.9% of total water resources (including 
water to be extracted from the eastern Aquifer through later development) to the Palestinians and 
71.1% to Israel. Annual renewable underground freshwater in the order of 600-650 mcm of which 
Israel permits the Palestinians access to only 167 mcm a year to irrigate 240,000 dunums. Israelis 
currently use more than 80% of this resource for irrigation and other purposes, including 60 mcm 
consumed by about 340,000 Jewish settlers in the WB (including East Jerusalem), compared to 62 
mcm of non-agricultural water consumed by 1.9m Palestinians in the WB.  The Palestinians have 
not fully drawn their allocation; the quantity authorised including 78 mcm from the eastern 
Aquifer yet to be developed looks overly optimistic without harming the resource base 
(Unnamed, 2003: 55). The Interim Agreement recognized Palestinian Water Rights without 
defining them, instead specifying that rights would be settled in the context of permanent status 
negotiations (ibid, 56). It is estimated that there is long-term potential to extend the irrigated area 
in Palestine by 400,000 dunums (FAO, 2000: 26). Out of a total of 612,556 ha only some 178,669 
are currently under irrigation—down from 240,000 ha. 
 
Agriculture uses some 60% (167 mcm/year of which half in the WB, half in GS). Currently non-
agricultural sectors consume some 112 mcm (62 mcm in WB and 50 MCM in GS) accounting for 
about 40% of total consumption, but demand in these sectors expected to grow exponentially 
reaching 236-338 mcm by 2020) (FAO, 2000: 26). Irrigation efficiency ranges from 450 cubic 
m/dunum in the coastal semi-arid area to 900 cubic m/dunum in the Jordan valley. This is 
reflected in wide difference in irrigation water prices which vary from $0.03/ cu m in the Jordan 
valley to $0.12-14 cu m in the GS, and to $0.21-0.34 in Jenin/Tulkarem. Lower water prices in 
the Jordan Valley explain current low levels of water use efficiency. Although irrigated 
agriculture covers only 10% of the total cultivated area it contributes about a third of agricultural 
output (FAO, 2000: 10). The agriculture sector in the WBGS uses on average 70% of the water 
and contributes about 15% of GDP; industry and construction consume about 13% but contribute 
some 25% of GDP. Typical value added by irrigated agriculture in the region is between $0.15 
and $0.30 per cum, while for industries this can be as high as $30-$50 per cum. But given the 
large share of the labour force in agriculture the future adjustment required will be substantial 
(Diwan and Shaban, undated: 24). 
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the town’s water supply for both drinking and irrigation. Located in the Palestinian portion of the 
Jordan Valley some 300m below sea level, Jericho has a unique climate and an abundance of 
springs and wells. Ein as-Sultan is one of the largest springs in Palestine with an average hourly 
flow of 670 cubic meters (see Box 4). The spring both feeds a recently-established public network 
managed by Jericho Municipality, as well as providing farmers with irrigation water through an 
extensive cement-lined canal network extending over 28 km.  
 
Livelihood activities in Jericho are numerous and range from working in the public and private 
sectors within the city to work in Israel or neighbouring settlementskkkk. Agriculture forms a 
main income source for some households, but particularly for Ein as-Sultan Irrigation Society 
members with medium-sized holdings. Smaller farmers tend to undertake more diverse 
occupations. According to official statistics, 16% of the labour force works in agriculture, though 
this has increased significantly since the outbreak of the intifada. Farmers of Ein as-Sultan focus 
their cultivation on vegetables in the winter and mulokhiallll in the summer, in addition to some 
animal husbandry. Many activities in Jericho town are related to agricultural service provision. 
Tourism was previously important, but since the intifada is now virtually non-existent.  
 
Better-off households tend to lease their lands and water shares from Ein as-Sultan spring and/or 
construct wells and sell water on to the farmers who rent their lands. Many of the farmers who 
rent land come from other parts of the WB and are provided with a complete ‘package’ of  inputs 
from fertilizers, pesticides and other production inputs, to final control of marketing. Many 
households ensure that they grow a range of crops to avoid serious losses due to crop failure. 
According to one Jericho farmer, ‘Crops balance each other out—vegetables that are loss-making 
are compensated for by others. Last winter aubergine was the most profitable, whereas cucumber 
achieved only low prices and we lost money on it. Our aubergines compensated for the losses’. 
 
This is the largest shared spring in Palestine. Records of farmer ownership shares are registered 
with the municipality. Farmers own pumping hours which are inherited and hence are in danger 
of fragmentation. Share size is proportionate to size of land holding and the type of crops 
cultivated. There are two types of ownership: first is ‘orchard water’ (where a pumping hour is 
the standard 60 minutes). This right cannot be rented, sold, mortgaged or transferred (though 
there is some bending of the rules). The second type is farming water (moftalah), a pumping 
‘hour’ of which is far shorter at 23 minutes and is separated from land ownership (i.e. it can be 
rented, sold, mortgaged or transferred). Irrigation water is distributed along four main channels 
each of which irrigates a specific command area. Every channel has 168 pumping hours per week 
(at 80 m3 per hour). An orchard hour therefore equates to 80 m3. Two employees supervise the 
transfer to the various quota holders, who usually receive their quota weekly. The large landlords 
can distribute their quota on their lands any day of the week, dependent on the availability of 
water within the nearest channel, many of whom have constructed substantial reservoirs to hold 
their quotas until application is required. 
 
The Ein Al-Sultan Irrigation Society (a co-operative) comprises 943 irrigators, but in mid-2003 
just 350 members owned 80% of the allocated water. Part of the rationale for establishing the 
society was to respond to increasing water theft. Membership fees are charged (originally J.D 30, 
                                                 
kkkk In the West Bank as a whole some 30% of all permits since 1994 have been provided for employment in 
settlements (Farsakh, 2002). 
llll A species of mallow which is commonly used in Middle Eastern cooking.  Farmers use Ein as-Sultan waters to 
cultivate mulokhia in the summer as it needs little water to grow. The Jericho crop is marketed across all parts of 
Palestine.  
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ranges from one to 100 dunums, and just 5% of spring owners have 50 dunum plots or larger. The 
majority have small plots of one or two dunums. A high percentage of owners have fewer than 11 
hours of water. The society represents farmers with the Municipality with whom there is joint 
management of the spring water and distribution of quotas. Presently the society is investigating 
replacement of open canal irrigation by piped water.   
 
An agreement between the Society and the Municipality allows the latter to obtain 42% of the 
outflow for the public network with the remainder allocated to irrigation. According to this 
agreement neither the Municipality nor the farmers pays for the water. The Municipality imposes 
fees on the water from this spring according to the size of water ownership. It also collects NIS 3 
annually for every water minute owned, such that farmers owning an orchard meter pay NIS 180 
annually and owners of farming meters pay NIS 69 annually. The municipality also charges fees 
for registering water leases of JD 15 from each of the tenant and landlord. The orchard water 
meter is JD 200 annually and the farming water meter JD 120. Despite the renting of orchard 
water being technically illegal, people in charge overlook this in order to increase municipality 
income. The Society has found external funding and expertise (Chinese) to renew the irrigation 
system. This project is to be implemented in two phases working down from the major to minor 
canals. The project management committee comprises the PWA, the Society, the Municipality, 
and the Agricultural Department in addition to a local engineering office. Open water channels 
are to be replaced with sub-surface pipes connecting farmers through metered pumps. The idea is 
to reduce unaccounted-for-water due to evaporation (and probably from water ‘theft’). Whilst the 
majority of farmers support the project—particularly the smaller land-owning farmers—some 
farmers will lose their system control over the system and benefits of receiving ‘extra’ water 
unused upstream and oppose the project. (Source: case study research, key informant interviews).  
 
In Dhinnaba wells are privately owned and the water privately distributed, for which there are 
four main pipelines. The water is sold at J.D. 15 per pumping hour, and an average pumping hour 
yields some 60 m3. In case of damage or disruption to a well, beneficiaries will be supplied with 
water from an alternative. Modern irrigation methods are practised and the proximity of Dhinnaba 
to Israel has encouraged more commercial exploitation of water. Usually a portion of each share 
is used for irrigation whilst the remainder is stored for subsequent use. Shared wells come under 
partnership agreements, which sometimes limit their scope for development. In Abasan, for 
example, one respondent stated that he paid an annual sum of around NIS 800 for fuel and 
equipment to maintain the well owned by his family (his immediate family’s share of operating 
costs).  At the same time he pays nothing to use the water for irrigation: ‘The water capacity of 
the well is limited and is only used by partners who belong to the same family and some other 
relatives. My uncle, father and I thought of drilling another well to increase the quantity of water 
and provide farmers with water (to sell water to farmers as a source of livelihood), but our project 
is presently frozen because of high costs (exceeding $7,000) in spite of the increasing demand on 
wells in the village’.  (Source: case study key informant interviews). 
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Key governance issues 
 
Institutions and Decentralisation  
 
The emergence and centrality of the concept of ‘governance’ in the debates on water 
management is challenging intellectually and practically many established management and 
allocation norms at a local level. Governance is increasingly conceptualised as a relationship 
between the state and civil society, covering a whole range of institutions and relationships such 
that the term ‘water governance’ is taken to refer ‘to the range of political, social, economic and 
administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery 
of water services, at different levels of society ‘(GWP, 2003:7).  
 
This understanding is driven by notions of entitlements and the ways in which entitlements lead 
to access to the resource. Entitlements can range from market entitlements, to direct entitlements, 
public entitlements and civil entitlements. The route to these entitlements varies from direct 
sources—i.e. direct access to the resource and indirect access through membership or affiliation 
to organisations—arrangement by the State (i.e. public entitlements) and by affiliation to 
institutions. 
  
A particular focus in new water governance debates are notions of decentralisation, embedded in 
which are elements of accountability and local level participation and representation, as well as 
issues of legitimacy, institutionalisation of central and local power, and the interface between 
political institutions and institutions of water management.  
 
Central to many conceptualisations of governance are notions of ‘institutions’
mmmm. From an 
institutional perspective, governance is the institutional capacity of public organisations to 
provide the public and other goods demanded by a country’s citizens or their representatives in an 
effective, transparent, impartial, and accountable manner, subject to resource constraints’ (World 
Bank 2000:48). Governance processes provide institutional fora for citizen empowerment and 
participation in governance of their lives (and livelihoods).  
 
However, this  World Bank’s articulation centres on formal institutions, whilst other theorists 
increasingly emphasise the role of informal institutions of governance—i.e. the norms, rules and 
expectations in binding behaviour for the collective good. In this understanding institutions 
operate not just because of reform of rules, procedures and routines but because of the norms, 
expectations and customs that guide behaviour (North, 1990; Woodhouse, 1997; Hulme and 
Murphree 2001; Scoones 1998).  
 
                                                 
mmmm The term ‘institution’ has been variously defined by different authors from different academic disciplines. From a 
sociological and anthropological perspective, North (1990) defines institutions as ‘rules of the game of a society’. Giddens 
(1979) defines ‘institution’ as ‘regularised practices (or patterns of behaviour) structured by rules and norms of society 
which have persistent and widespread use’. From this perspective, institutions may be formal and informal, often fluid and 
ambiguous, and usually subject to multiple interpretations by different actors (Scoones, 1998). Further, institutions are 
viewed as dynamic, continually being shaped and reshaped over time. Institutions are thus part of a process of social 
negotiation, rather than fixed ‘objects’ or ‘bounded social system’ (Ibid.). 
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which are “as dependent on inter-subjective meanings as on formally sanctioned constitutions and 
charters” (Rosenau 1992:4). In other words, “governance” points to a complex of relations 
ordered through the interaction of a panoply of governing and mutually influencing actors 
(Kooiman and Van Viet 1993:64).  This demonstrates a shift in the balance between the state and 
civil society, resulting in the opening up of governance space to a variety of interested actors in 
the search of common ground and shared solutions. 
 
A concern with institutions leads to a broader concern that of how various institutions and actors 
are accountable to each other, and to their respective constituencies. How are they arranged 
(vertical or horizontal; central or local); what is their nature (i.e. are they legitimate, participatory 
and democratic?, and if so, do they foster efficiency and equity in the management of resources?). 
Wedded to the above, are attempts to describe the key features of governance with the view of 
providing a guiding map for understanding governance and drawing its constituent elements 
(Newell, 1998; Stoker 1997). 
 
Stoker (1997) proposed key features of governance (cp. Newell, 1998) which are: a set of 
institutions and actors drawn from but also beyond government; autonomous self-governing 
networks of actors; the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and 
economic issues; power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in 
collective action; capacity of getting things done which does not rest on the power of government 
to command or use its authority; participatory and accountability. 
 
Where does this leave water governance and production debates? 
 
From this backdrop the term ‘water governance’ evolved and became a key theme, both in 
academic and policy circles. One definition commonly used is that it refers ‘to the range of 
political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage 
water resources, and the delivery of water services, at different levels of society ‘(GWP, 2003:7).  
Water governance thus encompasses the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which 
citizens and groups articulate their interests on water, exercise their legal rights, meet their 
obligations, and resolve their differences (adapted from OECD 2003). In addition, the term ‘water 
governance’, “encompasses norms, values, actions, laws, regulations, institutions and policies” 
(GWP 2003:4) that surrounds the management of water resources. National sovereignty, social 
values, religion or political ideology have strong impact on the governance arrangements related 
to the water sector and play a role at least as significant as institutional structures. Clearly the 
relationship to the resource is mediated by the relationship to layers of decision making which is 
structured according to different institutional set-ups, both formal and informal. 
 
In global terms, the 1992 Dublin Principles on Water and Sustainable Development, Agenda 21 
Declaration in Rio, and the 2002 Johannesburg Ministerial Declaration all sought to promote 
water governance, supported by a set of fairly recent international institutions—the World 
Commission on Water, the World Water Council and the Global Water Partnership. The legal 
framework for water reforms were largely entrenched in the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of 
the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water Courses, which in principle provides a legally 
binding framework for member states  who have ratified the convention, including the 
development of institutional mechanisms for collaboration and recognition of equitable water 
utilisation.  
 
Many authors have indicated that the role of the state or government in water governance is to 
‘provide an enabling environment for establishing effective institutional, legal and policy 
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GWP 2000; 2002; 2003). The State as a partner with non-state actors in natural resources 
governance.  Conceptualising the state in this manner is typical of international organisations (e.g. 
the World Bank) and other donor agencies, which through ‘good governance’ programmes, wish 
to support reforms that strengthen the recipient governments’ capacity to steer, while at the same 
time seek to promote and strengthen participation by civil society in the governing of water. 
 
Challenges to governance: the role of the State? 
 
Many premises of water governance—including the role of the State—are sharply challenged by 
the reality of states in regions of Africa. Several texts conclude that states in the Horn of Africa, 
for instance, exhibit varying degrees of weakness and ineffectiveness to the extent that terms like, 
‘failed states’, ‘failing states’, ‘states at risk of failure’ (Mepham and Gaass, 2004:5), ‘stateless 
state’, ‘stateless part of the world’ (Little 2003:1) or ‘collapsed states’, have been used. 
Consequently, the state’s capacity to establish democratic institutions or the will to provide an 
institutional, legal and policy environment conducive for effective governance is greatly reduced. 
In effect, this challenges the premise of the existence of stable states occupying homogenous 
socio-economic and political spaces, currently espoused in the new discourses of integrated water 
resources governance. The reality of the nature and character of states in the Horn and other parts 
of Africa has posed serious challenges to the state in governance. 
 
Non-State Actors in Governance and then Natural Resources 
 
Others, including Ostrom (1990), have pointed out that communities have relied on non-state and 
non-market institutions to govern resources systems with reasonable degree of success over long 
periods of time. Studies by Odell, (1982) Sandford (1983) Doughlin, Doan and Uphoff, (1984) 
Little and Brokensha, (1989) Woodhouse (1997) Hulme and Murphree (2001) similarly illustrate  
existence and centrality of an elaborate and resilient traditional and religious systems of natural 
resources governance in sub-Saharan Africa. With specific reference to the Horn, Kebebew, 
Tsegaye and Synnevag’s (2001) study of the Borana and Afar of Ethiopia shows the persistence 
and importance of traditional institutions of natural resources management. For the Afar, the 
Medaa and Adaa  institutions  are central in natural resources management (livestock and 
rangeland management) and conflict resolution, while for the Borana, the Geda system is vital in 
governing access and use of grazing lands and water resources. 
 
Ray and Reddy (2002) also noted that the role of traditional leaders in rural local governance has 
been widely overlooked. Yet, because their authority originates in pre-colonial times, traditional 
leaders and institutions have often retained legitimacy and a failure to recognise their importance 
results in lost opportunities for local governance. Since the early 1990s, there the development 
community has increasingly recognised the need to incorporate these leaders into local 
governance. In post-colonial states, people often see political legitimacy as divided between the 
state and traditional leadership, and believe that democratic practice should include aspects of 
both. But is traditional leadership compatible with local and state democracy? This is a complex 
question, though in many African countries, traditional leaders continue to enjoy popular support 
and remain important political actors who can and do play a significant role in rural local 
governance 
 
Huggins (2004) observed that, Chiefs in Burkina Faso have traditionally managed village 
conflicts and controversies over natural resources. Replacing chiefs with democratic institutions 
during the Gestion de Terroirs programme ended up releasing, rather than restraining, conflicts, 
particularly as no higher authority was willing to mediate in local conflicts. This underscores the 
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access to the resource for productive purposes. Hence the important role of traditional institutions 
in determining entitlements. 
 
However, it is significant to note that despite the significance of traditional institutions and their 
notions of communality, as with all laws and custom, these institutions are produced out of 
negotiations over competing meanings by groups of people with unequal power. As such, 
indigenous institutions, laws and custom, are embedded in inequality, and in particular, women 
and the poor may be marginalized.   Wedded into customary institutions are different 
conceptualisations and multiple meanings attached to natural resources.  
 
Water Governance and Decentralisation 
 
In contrast to Ostrom (1990) and Hyden and Bratton (1992), the involvement of non-state actors 
in local level governance is attributed to a scramble for space by non-state actors created by a 
‘rolled back state’ in the context of globalisation and neo-liberal reforms, particularly through 
decentralisation. Wunsch (2001) notes that, over the past 15 years, many African countries have 
invested in political and administrative reform aimed at increasing local governance.  
 
Decentralisation was premised upon the rationale that it would result in state structures that are 
more exposed and therefore more responsive to local needs and aspirations (Crook and 
Sverrisson, 2001). This, it is argued, will produce systems of governance that are more effective 
and accountable to local people (Blair, 2000; Crook and Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999). Crook and 
Manor (1999) also argue that democratic decentralisation leads to partnerships between 
institutions and agents of government as well as between civil society and grassroots 
communities, and may foster a sustainable public-private-NGO co-operation. In addition, 
democratic decentralisation is viewed as having the potential to foster sustainable development, 
contribute to monitoring of government performance and enhance local political participation and 
citizens’ understanding of government programmes. 
 
In many cases, however, decentralization is not a smooth process as different interest groups 
struggle to assert themselves at different levels. Experiences of decentralization differ widely 
from place to place and the results are understood differently by different actors. Participation of 
a wide range of stakeholders, and increased political space for articulation of their needs, 
expectations, and grievances, tends to reveal social tensions and may actually lead to latent 
conflicts becoming more manifest. Decentralisation of natural resource governance calls for the 
inclusion and active participation of multiple and diverse stakeholders in water management, 
thereby challenging the state’s sole responsibility in management and distribution of water.   
 
Similar conclusions were drawn by Besteman and Cassanelli (1996) who, in their examination of 
local struggles for natural resources (i.e., land and water) and the legal and administrative 
institutions that regulate access to them, aptly noted that, at the heart of the Somali crisis is the 
tension between the state and society, specifically the state’s attempt to control natural resources 
and the latter’s resistance and contestation. Further, embedded in the struggle over control and 
access to natural resources, is the contestation of power and legitimacy over the leadership of a 
reconstituted Somali state.  The findings by Milas and Latif (2000) and Besteman and Cassanelli 
(1996) confront the embeddedness of public involvement and participation in governance, and the 
legitimacy of democratic decision- making. 
 
Examples of problematic aspects of decentralization exists include the tendency of some states to 
provide local institutions with many responsibilities, but few rights or resources to fulfil those 
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their vested interests; or a situation where ‘local’ institutions are headed or captured by some 
actors so closely linked to the top that decentralization actually represents a penetration of 
grassroots organizations by the centralist power-base (Huggins, 2004). 
 
In decentralisation concerning natural resources, Ribot (2003) notes that local institutions being 
chosen to receive powers and the degree and form of power transfers do not automatically 
establish conditions for more efficient or equitable use and management. A combination of 
locally accountable representation and discretionary powers are required. This combined 
condition is rarely established. Alternative local institutions are chosen even when democratic 
local bodies exist. This choice and the failure to transfer discretionary powers can undermine 
local democratic bodies and concentrate powers in the executive branch. The choices being made 
around natural resources appear to reflect a broad resistance of central governments to local 
democratisation and decentralisation of powers. This resonates with Hesse and Trench (2000) 
who observed that in most Sahelian states they studied there still existed resistance by 
government to the transfer of full natural resources management responsibilities to communities. 
  
Further, it is stated that some policy makers are doubtful as to whether natural resources can be 
properly managed by community-based organisations, and it is still believed in some quarters that 
privatisation or state control are the only means of preventing the degradation of resources that 
are customarily held in common (ibid.). In Mali, for example, creation of ‘decentralized’ local 
municipalities and councils may actually result in a loss of downward accountability, as 
(informal) village taxes (e.g. for use of water sources by livestock-keepers) will be channelled 
upwards away from local resource-managers. These situations result in latent or manifest conflict, 
typically between government and local actors, or between local actors who have become 
(further) divided due to differing roles (Huggins, 2004). 
 
An East Africa example
nnnn
 
In Tanzania there is a long and complicated history of decentralisation and local governance, with 
each decentralisation process located within a different political milieu. Initial decentralisation 
was wedded to colonial state politics, which were aimed at using decentralisation as a political 
tool for effective control and management of local communities, sometimes in conjunction with 
local traditional authorities (as was the case during British administration) or without them 
(during German administration). The second phase of decentralisation was founded on Tanzania’s 
socialist politics of the 1960s to late 1970s, which gave primacy to central state planning and 
viewed decentralisation as the deployment of the state’s development agents from the centre to 
the periphery.  
 
The socialist development agenda ‘resulted in the centralisation and consolidation of power by 
the State’
oooo. This was exacerbated by a dearth of competitive multi-party democratic politics 
added to which was the transformation of political structures of the ruling party – Tanganyika 
African National Union (TANU) – into institutions of local governance. This politicisation of 
local governance institutions was legalised through the Local Government Election Act No. 50 
which decreed that all councillors had to be TANU members. Consequently, elected division 
secretaries in Ward Development Committees were replaced by TANU’s division secretaries, 
who were acting as both party and government heads in their respective communities. The 
                                                 
nnnn This section draws on a survey of issues carried out by Sobona Mtisi at a conference on water resources 
management in East Africa in March 2005. 
oooo Interview with Ambrose Kessy, University of Manchester. 
HDR Final [3]:  Page   67localisation of central power became a central feature of Tanzania’s decentralisation process with 
important repercussions for water management. 
 
Similarly, decentralisation of local governance in Uganda was rooted in the National Resistance 
Movement and the 1980s popular struggle led by Yoweri Museveni. In view of this, the 
decentralisation system in Uganda evolved within the context of political struggle of the 1980s to 
the extent that the decentralised institutions of local governance mirror the National Resistance 
Council system. From this backdrop the current decentralisation of local government in Uganda 
was inaugurated in 1992, and enshrined in the Local Government Statute of 1993, which stated 
that decentralisation was aimed at ‘bringing political and administrative control over services to 
the point where they are actually delivered, thereby improving accountability, efficiency and 
effectiveness, and promoting people’s feelings of ownership of developmental programmes and 
projects in their districts’. Further, decentralisation in Uganda was intended to ensure people’s 
participation and democratic control of decision making in local governance.  
 
Institutionally, decentralisation reforms in Uganda led to the creation of hierarchical structures of 
councils and committees composed of elected officials, from village to district level.  Village 
representatives become part of a Village Executive Committee, with villagers residing within the 
constituency. Village Executive Committees in a parish form the Electoral College and elect 
another Executive Committee at that level. Elected representatives constitute the Electoral 
College from which an Executive Committee is elected. Whilst the election of councillors by 
universal suffrage occurs at the village level, beyond that, the democratic right to elect 
representatives into higher structures of local governance is a privilege of elected village officials, 
who in turn, surrender the same democratic right to vote to representatives in the upper echelons 
of local government.  It appears as if direct and democratic participation of people in electing 
their respective representatives into institutions of local governance is limited to the village level.   
 
In Tanzania, the current decentralisation process was initiated in 1982, largely as a result of the 
failures of central state planning, bad local administration and mismanagement during Tanzania’s 
socialist period.  The 1982 decentralisation reform was inaugurated through several pieces of 
legislation constituting the Local Government Act. The various pieces of legislation were aimed 
at facilitating a more effective democratic participation in decision-making at the village, district 
and regional levels. Further, this reform process was in line with Tanzania’s multi-party 
democracy and the need to promote good governance at national and local level. The political 
institutions of the liberation movements – geared towards political mobilisation and mass 
participation of the peasantry – were transferred to manage the bureaucratic task of local 
governance. There remain, therefore, strong linkages between the ruling party and local level 
administration and development, a situation which shaped the tone and character of decentralised 
local governance in both Tanzania and Uganda.  
 
Under this political context, water reforms were established in Uganda and Tanzania. The 
impetus to reform the water sector is located within the global discourses on water management, 
particularly the integrated water resources management principles. In the case of Uganda, 
pressure for water reforms came from donors, which called upon the government to open up 
space for other stakeholders to come on board. With regards to Tanzania, the process was being 
led by global forces, particularly, the World Bank which is central in drafting Tanzania’s Water 
Resources Assistance Strategy document. At the heart of the water reform exercise in the two 
countries, is the decentralisation of water resources management to local water users, increased 
stakeholder representation and participation and a strong drive to promote private sector 
participation.  
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synthesis of the Water Statute of 1995 and the Water Action Plan, which is partly aimed at; 
promoting the rational management and use of water; conferring all rights to use and manage 
water to the State. Institutionally, the Ministry and Directorate of Water, through the Water 
Policy Committee coordinates the rational management and use of water and arbitrates disputes 
between agencies on water management. The Water Policy Committee is tasked with the overall 
responsibility for developing national policies, standards and priorities, and for coordinating 
revisions to legislations and other sector ministries’ plans and projects which affect water 
resources.   
 
The Water Sector Planning and Coordination Unit serve as the secretariat for the Water Policy 
Committee, and also ensure that the principles of the Water Action Plan are adhered to. In 
addition, there is a Water Permit Unit, which falls under the Directorate of Water Development 
and is responsible for the coordination and processing of applications for water permits. The 
Local Government Act and the Water Statute defines the roles and responsibilities of central and 
local government in the management of water. The National Water Policy also allows for the 
decentralisation of functions that can best be performed at lower levels.  
 
Local level representation and participation is ensured through the election of representatives into 
the village executive committees and water user associations. The institutions of water 
governance are linked up with local level governance through the District Environment and 
Natural Resources Committee, located within the District Council. Thus, at district level DENRC 
is mainly involved with local decision-making and management of water resources within the 
framework of the National Water Policy. 
 
Water governance in Tanzania is enshrined in the 2002 National Water Policy, which is aimed at 
providing a clear and comprehensive legal and administrative framework for water resources 
development, management and supply. The water policy framework in Tanzania is composed of 
two draft bills, namely the Water Resources Management Bill and Water Supply Bill. [The 
aforementioned Bills will be presented to Parliament in July 2005 with the view that they will be 
passed into law.] The Water Resources Bill seeks to operationalise the water policy and to repeal 
the 1974 Water Act and other previous pieces of water legislation, and thus becoming the 
ultimate Water Act. On the other hand, the Water Supply Bill seeks to improve the supply of 
clean water to rural and urban population by defining ownership and management structures of 
water supply mechanisms. More importantly, it strongly encourages private sector participation in 
water supply and sanitation. 
 
Central to the water reform process in Tanzania is a need to decentralise the management of water 
resources to lower level institutions with the view that this will ensure equity in access to water 
among diverse water users and facilitate their participation in use and decision making regarding 
water. Consequently, Tanzania transferred all responsibilities for water management from the 
State to lower level institutions, mainly river basin management authorities, catchment and sub-
catchment councils, and water users association.  
 
The conceptualisation of the role of the State has shifted in the context of the water reforms, from 
managing, supplying and developing water to the provision of a conducive environment for 
effective water policy implementation. Further, the State’s role is limited to policy formulation, 
coordination and management. However, both the State in Tanzania and Uganda is actively 
involved in irrigation development through training of farmers and funding irrigation 
development. This, it is argued, is in line with the goals of poverty reduction which is central to 
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development programme, it hands the project to irrigators on a built-operate and transfer system. 
 
On the other hand, the State in Uganda is noted as playing a dominating role in water 
management on the basis of the Water Act of 1998 which vested the overall responsibility for 
water management in the State. This control is extended to districts through various mechanisms, 
for instance through funding of district water management programmes. Within this framework, 
the State in Tanzania through the Ministry of Water and Livestock, and Ministry of Agriculture, 
plays a facilitating role and providing a conducive environment for the diverse stakeholders to 
participate in the management of water. The State’s role also includes preparation of policy, 
strategy and enacting laws for water resources management; capacity building of water user 
associations; financing irrigation schemes; allocation of water rights; collection of water fees; 
data collection on water flows. The river basin authority is central in implementing the water 
policy, as it is tasked with the coordination, management and charging of water as well as 
monitoring water flows. 
 
Despite the absence or weakness of traditional leaders, the water act in Tanzania recognises the 
existence of customary institutions, viewed broadly as social organisation of people at an 
informal level.  To illustrate the conceptualisation of customary institutions in Tanzania, if there 
is a problem, for instance in water scarcity areas, people will form an association for digging 
canals, and such an association of people is referred to as customary institution. Further, 
customary institutions are mainly communal organised association of people, and are marked by 
their fluidity. 
 
What emerges from both Tanzania and Uganda is that decentralisation of water management is 
fraught with problems to the extent that the process ‘can neither be defined as decentralisation nor 
centralisation but a mixture of the two.’
pppp This arises from the fact that State continues to play a 
dominant role in decentralised water governance. In Uganda, the State implements and controls 
local level water management processes through the control and provision of funds necessary for 
implementation of local level water management programmes. While decentralisation entails the 
transfer of all responsibilities for water management from the centre to the local level, 
decentralisation of responsibilities is not accompanied with a corresponding transfer of funds to 
district councils, leaving them with unfunded mandates. Since central government in Uganda 
provides funding for water management activities at the district level, this gives the State the 
power to influence and control local level water governance processes. This is exacerbated by the 
lack of capacity in water management at the district level, without which decentralisation does 
not deliver its intended better water governance goals, such as effective participation. 
 
At a national level, the State in Uganda has been described as lacking the capacity to effectively 
implement a decentralised water management regime in the first place. Uganda has limited 
human capacity to effectively prepare guidelines that will be used at the district level, and worse 
still to monitor delegated functions. In addition, central government lacks the funds to effectively 
implement and monitor decentralised water management. Consequently, the central government 
in Uganda does not have adequate financial resources to distribute to the 45 districts with the 
view to implement integrated water resources management at a local level. The combined effect 
of a lack of financial and human resources has resulted in incomplete decentralisation of water, 
which militates against implementation of effective water governance. 
 
                                                 
pppp Interview with Charles Sokile, 6 March 2005. 
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and dominance in local level water governance at the expense of other water users, mainly poor 
farmers and irrigators. To this end, participation in water governance in Uganda is limited to State 
and NGO’s, despite the fact that the latter work closely with local communities. It is noted that 
local water users are neither consulted on water governance issues nor informed about the water 
reform process. Where participation of the poor is required, it is limited to the provision of their 
labour and materials in borehole construction.  
 
Given that the water reforms in Uganda and Tanzania are geared towards ‘big water issues’ – 
water for agriculture – it appears that the lack of wide-scale participation in water governance is a 
consequence of the logic of the water reforms. Since Uganda and Tanzania have an 
underdeveloped irrigation sector, mainly among the poor, this subsequently leads to fewer 
stakeholders coming from this sector to participate and engage with other water users (i.e., 
commercial and private sectors) on issues of water governance. Inadvertently, the arena of water 
governance is thus open to the State, NGO’s, commercial and private sectors, and ‘a few 
irrigators dotted along the Nile River’, as is the case with Uganda. Water is mainly used for 
domestic purpose, thus making the policy highly irrelevant to the majority of people it is intended 
to benefit. Put differently, the major thrust on water for agriculture embedded in the water 
reforms in Uganda and Tanzania seems to disenfranchise a significant proportion of the 
population who use water for domestic supply.   
  
In the corollary of the above, another emerging challenge of decentralised water management in 
Tanzania, is the fact that participation in water governance is limited to registered irrigators at the 
expense of unregistered ones. A key informant from PAMOJA Trust, a non-governmental 
organisation, noted that in Pangani basin there are 1,000 registered users and 1,800 unregistered 
users, of which, the later are not represented at all levels of water management from basin to 
water user association.
qqqq In Tanzania, the issue of participation and its problems are intimately 
related to the conception of water user associations. The lower tier of decentralised institutions of 
water management is the water user association. Which, it is noted:, In theory, water user 
association should be composed of different participants or stakeholders, but in practice they are 
sectoral. For instance, small-scale farmers, irrigators, livestock keepers, and households who use 
water for domestic supply form respective water users association. As one moves up the 
structures of water management, the politics and power of numbers comes in to adversely affect 




It appears as if the structural arrangement of decentralised water institutions, particularly at basin 
level, promotes a form of elite capture based on numerical supremacy. A general lack of 
knowledge about the water reforms and the role of local communities in water governance 
adversely affects the participation of local communities. One respondent noted that, “people do 
not know about the water reforms, their rights to water and the fact that they can demand water 
from government.”
ssss The lack of knowledge is intrinsic to the lack of resources within 
government and district councils which would have enabled both central and local government to 
conduct information awareness and educational campaigns about water reforms in local 
communities. While there has been a concerted effort to decentralise water management to local 
level, central government still retains the overall responsibility of water management and in a 
poor informational environment there is little local people can do to challenge this role.  
                                                 
qqqq Interview with Mr. R. Burra (PAMOJA Trust). 9 March 2005 
rrrr Interview with Charles Sokile, 9 March 2005. 
ssss Interview with Joseph Mulindwa 
HDR Final [3]:  Page   71 
At the local level, the district council plays a rudimentary role of providing and maintaining of 
water supplies in liaison with the ministry responsible for water, and to assist government in the 
preservation of the environment through the protection of water resources. At lower local 
government levels, local governance institutions and actors are reduced to environmental 
stewards, tasked with the control of soil erosion and protection of local wetlands, rather than 
active involvement in local-decision making regarding water. 
 
Contrary to Uganda’s experience, in Tanzania there exists a weak link between the institutions of 
local governance (i.e., district councils) and those of water management. This is illustrated by the 
District Water Engineer, a district council employee, whose role is described as the ‘overall 
management of all water projects in the district, that is domestic water supply (boreholes) and 
gravity feed irrigated agriculture.’
tttt In addition, the District Water Engineer, is also tasked with 
the responsibility to advise farmers on water rights application. Mapunda described the 
relationship between district council and sub-catchment council as ‘limited to water right 
application.’
uuuu However, another respondent noted that the District Water Engineer is also 
involved in training water users, and raising awareness on water reforms and other water related 
issues.  Despite the fact that the relationship between district council and sub-catchment council 
has been variously described as ‘ weak’ and ‘limited to water right application’, one respondent 
noted although weak the relationship is significant. The significance being the role that the 
engineer plays in water rights application.  
 
In Tanzania, the government has been scrapping what it terms ‘nuisance taxes’ which cut into 
people’s already low income. The danger is that in this context water user fees risk being viewed 
by people as a further ‘nuisance tax’. Added to this, is fact that poverty in Uganda and Tanzania 
is high to the extent that the State may be called upon to intervene in implementing water 
reforms. The problem of introducing water user fees in a context where poverty is rampant was 
illustrated by Sokile who noted that, ‘sometimes people do not eat for two days in order to save 
user fees for water.’
vvvv Despite the fact that water reforms calls for reduced intervention of the 
state in water governance, the state in Tanzania and Uganda may be unwilling to relinquish its 
role in water governance. 
 
 
Participation and IWRM 
 
A critical issues emerging is whether or not the inclusion of more stakeholders leads to better 
managet decision making and whether or not it really brings the user closer to the centre of 
resource control. This is a central tenet of the emerging policy theme of Integrated Water 
Resource Management (IWRM), which forms one of the main planks of new water governance 
debates. 
 
This idea envisages a resource-centric management process that is focused on managing natural 
units—or catchments. Most policy processes during the 1990s and 2000s have focused on 
IWRM. The 2002 Johannesburg Convention buttressed the process by stipulating that all 
signatories must draw up national water plans in line with IWRM principles by 2005. In this 
                                                 
tttt Interview with Kristian Mapunda, 8 March 2005. 
uuuu Ibid. 
vvvv Interview with Charles Sokile, 9 March 2005. 
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developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Turral (2000) notes that in an ideal framework, such an approach to water governance would 
possess the following characteristics: 
 
•  A decentralised and accountable structure that is coherent and consistent at 
each layer of administration, from national through provincial/river basin 
levels to local; 
•  Self management of independent bodies and self-financing at user and higher 
levels of activity, according to user’s ability to pay; 
•  Increased involvement of water users and other stakeholders; 
•  Government plays an enabling rather than controlling role, with key 
responsibilities for capital investment, supporting legislation, data collection 
and processing, and support for basic technical research and development; 
•  A comprehensive and consistent legal code which clearly defines the water 
rights and responsibilities of individuals, groups, agencies and government 
bodies. A set of procedures for de jure and extra legal arbitration of disputes 
and established enforceable penalties for misuse and degradation of water 
resources; 
•  Market mechanisms are an integral part of water allocation, determining the 
value of water between sectors, the value to the management agency and to 
the user (Turral, 1998:5). 
 
In defining IWRM and outlining its key principles, GWP (2000) makes no reference of politics, 
yet it notes that water governance is about power. Power is exercised through articulation (access, 
voice), mobilisation (of groups), distribution and confirmation (through procedures and 
institutional practices). In addition, IWRM emphasises decentralisation of management, 
stakeholder participation, and “user pays” principle. Problems of adoption in many contexts 
include the lack of capacity by new institutions to address agricultural concerns in a region, and 
in particular of poorer small and communal farmers. In Zimbabwe and South Africa, new 
catchment institutions of water management are supposed to provide better access to water for 
small-scale users and large-scale farmers. They become institutions for representation and 
participation and information on water issues. 
 
Research in Zimbabwe has shown that many farmers spend a lot of time trying to gain access to 
the appropriate institution, often resulting in significant delays to water provision for irrigation, 
and with adverse impacts on agricultural crop production (Mtisi and Nicol 2003). Such 
institutions can also provide a focus for struggles for political control between water users. In 
Budzi and the then Lower Save sub-catchment councils, many commercial farmers viewed the 
access and use of water by small-scale, communal, and newly-resettled farmers, as leading to 
land degradation, siltation and the disappearance of rivers. This focused the institutional 
environment on wider issues of land reform and environmental degradation, rather than the 
agricultural concerns of poor farmers and the ways in which they could benefit from water 
reforms. Ignoring local issues can precipitate failure and/or encourage conflict between different 
user groups.  
 
 
Put differently, the comment explicitly indicates that smallholder irrigators are not receiving 
adequate supplies of water to support viable agricultural production, which would have enabled 
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The studies show # that current governance environments demand knowledge of changes to 
established processes and how these changes will impact on livelihoods. In Zimbabwe, in some 
areas, the first that small-scale irrigators new of the change in systems of permits was when sub-
catchment council representatives turned up to levy charges. 
 
The institutional ‘messiness’ in many countries including India and Zimbabwe adds confusion to 
the daily lives of irrigators and makes their claims to entitlements of water hard to fathom in 
some cases, and hard to execute in others. In one scheme in Zimbabwe the water was ‘divided’ 
between two different institutions on the basis of where it came from. The same applies in India 
where groundwater and surface water are governed by different policies and institutional 
structures. Knowledge of institutions—and individuals within them—is often the preserve of the 
richer irrigators, providing them with an immediate advantage in determining who gets permits 
and where and how rights can be granted. Institutions themselves may not therefore be creating 
the barriers, but their inability to disseminate knowledge may lead indirectly to invisible barriers 
to entitlements by the poor. 
 
Frequently it is not water alone that is part of an institutionally complex environment, but land 
too. In Palestine and in Sri Lanka land fragmentation has been a problem. In the former, within 
families as well as between them. Within schemes this can create major problems of 
management, or, in some case, precipitate (where allowed) the trade in usufruct or ownership 
rights. In Zimbabwe too, the recent land return policy has created a confusion of new irrigators in 
established schemes with major issues for the long-term equity of existing farmers. In some cases 
the grant of land has been a route to achieve control over water access. 
 
Of particular concern in all of the above is the rapid change to the ‘rules of the game’ governing 
water access and how well these changes are understood, either formally or informally. This calls 
for government institutions to manage information on policy implementation more effectively, 
having organised its content and drafting. How, for instance, do local users understand shifts from 
informal and customary rights and rules governing ownership to new, formalised systems of 
permits, with associated layers of bureaucracy and form-filling for which many farmers may be 
ill-equipped to respond? 
Participation 
 
Lack of knowledge can lead to lack of participation and a disenfranchisement of marginalised 
groups. With lack of participation can come lack of power over institutions that are supposed to 
be locally-driven. This can enable abuse of position by officials. An example from Zimbabwe 
shows how this can lead to poor decisions being pushed on communities—in this case to accept 
new technology, but at the wrong time—with disastrous production consequences.  
 
The new environment of IWRM expects user participation, but does it support it? Frequently the 
new decentralised environments require technical and communications skills in order to 
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the skills required to participate? At the same time as participation, frequently the agenda is 
broadened to include new ways of generating revenues for operation and maintenance.  
 
Farmers are empowered on the one hand, but also shouldered with increasing financing 
responsibility under many participatory irrigation management schemes, on the other. In some 
cases these has become an issue at a national level within policy environments, where the new 
directions perceived on ‘privatisation’ and the ‘commoditisation’ of water are regarded as 
inimical to existing rules and cultural sttitudes. Such has been the case of Sri Lanka, where the 
draft policy has now been scrapped. But what will be the long term repercussions be for the 
equity of small users when there is no clear guidance on the rights regimes governing access to 
water? 
 
In the past traditional systems of participation have been critical to ensuring continued supplies of 
water for production—for instance the rajakariya system in Sri Lanka. But their perception as 
wither voluntary or forced caused them to be questioned. How, in the modern era, can the 
balances and incentives for participation be enhanced so that participation is on the basis on 
sound knowledge and equal say? Sri Lanka has more recently found that human catalysts for 
participation can help the process to succeed at a local level. 
Investment 
 
Investments in the sector have been patchy. In the 1990s the investment climate in irrigation was 
very sluggish. However the repeated mantra of a ‘water crisis’ and the perceived global demand 
for food products generating a ‘water gap’—according to organisations such as IWMI, IFPRI and 
FAO—has now forced irrigation investment back onto the agenda. There are strong arguments 
for the increased provision of water for food in order to address a looming ‘food gap’, but there 
are also other ways in which food products can be brought to ameliorate national demands, 
including trade. These debates need to be brought down to national-level decision making. 
 
Whilst investment may well be needed, the question is from where is it likely to come? In parts of 
Africa, for instance, where there is high variability and drought proneness, it might have to come 
from farmers themselves. In recent drought scenarios, evidence points to the greater success of 
farmers in drought-proofing their own sources rather than relying on others to do so.  
 
The collection of fees is a part of the participatory irrigation management approach. It has been 
supported in countries including Sri Lanka and India, but is subject to pressures including costs of 
collection and the impact of broader conflicts (in the case of Sri Lanka, in particular). The 
absence of a clear rights framework in Sri Lanka continues to hamper the operation of farmer 
companies, and as on many schemes, where equity has not featured, there has been widespread 
marginalisation of tail enders.  
 
At the level of the State, institutional fragmentation and poor decision making environments have 
hampered investment decision making. In some cases the range of investment decisions driven by 
perceptions and realities of water availability have changed substantially market for local crops, 
with cash crops replacing key food staples. This has been fuelled by water inequity and low 
returns. Invariably, in communities in India, it is only the richer households that have the capacity 
engage in new irrigation schemes to exploit cash crop production or intensive rice cropping, as 
examples from AP have shown. 
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Equity and power are closely related. The achievement of equity comes through claiming 
entitlements. In  many water-production contexts there is severe disempowerment through lack of 
knowledge. Knowledge helps in increasing human capacities which support adaptation to 
change—including the vagaries in weather and the availability of the resource. Knowledge also 
empowers individuals to understand how they should seek access to the institutions and systems 
that provide their public entitlements to water for production. Likewise, they can help in 
regulating the actions of others—the well drilling and abstraction in India that is drying up the 
shallow irrigation wells of the poor, for instance. 
 
But there remain barriers to empowerment—education, income, group and class affiliation—that 
are hard to overcome and that go beyond knowledge. With water supply access affecting over a 
billion people, at an aggregate scale the problems are huge, but the opportunities substantial too. 
Improved access can have many related production impacts as well as providing more water for 
crops. Less time spent in ensuring access for water for productive uses—and domestic uses—
opens up opportunities for decision making on other activities and access to other livelihood 
opportuniteis. This in itself can be immensely empowering. 
 
The behaviour of water as a resource can be influential at higher levels in shifting perceptions of 
vulnerability and enabling policy to be established that creates new management and allocation 
decisions. Drought in the 1990s in southern Africa and the Middle East managed to do just that—
but was it for the benefit of the poor water users? Did it generate governance for poverty 
reduction and equity? On paper yes, in many cases, in practice, perhaps not, as the paper shows. 
 
At root issues of power drive notions of ‘social scarcity’; the social conditions that determine 
access, foremost amongst which is the power to control land. In India this is critical to accessing 
groundwater, given the riparian rights relationship that exists. In Zimbabwe too, the two are 
closely linked. The lesson to be drawn is that in understanding water and production and issues of 
equity, one has to broaden the analysis to the political economy of the land-water relationship. 
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Conclusions 
 
This paper has provided a summation of some of the issues involved in water and 
governance for poverty reduction. It has highlighted a selection of the challenges, but 
offers not ‘ideal type’ governance as a solution. Rather all circumstances are subject to a 
relative set of political, power and economic challenges. The key to understanding the 
relationships is understanding what is happening locally to the livelihoods of the poor. If 
there are any ‘findings’ from this paper they are the following: 
 
1.  Equity is not easy to accomplish without support (and without interference, where 
necessary—though a key balance has to be struck);  
2.  Water and land rights have to be considered together; to separate them out is 
fraught with difficulty and likely to complicate future management processes; 
3.  Decentralisation has to avoid benign views of local actors and understand the 
local environment as political and complex; transparency and greater 
accountability cannot and should not be assumed; transaction costs may rise at a 
local level; 
4.  Water management is not just about the resource; what happens beyond the 
resource is key in the broader political economy of decision making; and beyond 
the national political economy lies the global food-water economy; 
5.  In seeking to respond to change, the nature of change needs to be understood and 
how best adaptations can be made need to be assessed; responding to water 
problems with water solutions if the cause lies elsewhere continues the boxed in 
thinking that will fail the poor and their right to more equitable access. 
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